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THE DUALISM OF FACTS AND VALUES IN HUMANISM

WALTER M. HORTON

Graduate School of Theology, Oberlin College

BEFORE attempting to pass judgment upon the humanist movement, one must first come to some understanding as to what it is all about. That is a precaution which is not universally observed in current discussions.

The most glaring example of what I have in mind is, of course, the very general tendency—general, at any rate, among writers in popular magazines and literary reviews—to confuse the religious humanism of Doctor Dietrich and Eustace Haydon with the literary humanism of Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More. The mistake is not without excuse, for Mr. Walter Lippmann is, in a somewhat unorthodox sense, both a literary and a religious humanist; and the *Preface to Morals* has had a wide reading in both circles; but some very strange complications and misunderstandings have arisen from it. Mr. Allen Tate has attacked humanism in *The Hound and Horn,* on the ground that " if the values for which the humanist pleads are to be made rational or even intelligible, the prior condition of an objective religion is necessary." Obviously, Mr. Tate is attacking Mr. Lippmann's type of humanism; but he includes Professor More and Professor Babbitt in the same

indictment—which causes Mr. Robert Shafer to castigate him in the *Bookman* for "impudence" and "deliberate misrepresentation." While such complete misunderstandings as this can occur, it is not surprising that the fight over humanism among the New York literati has (in the trenchant words of *Scribner's Magazine*) "assumed the aspects of a Corsican vendetta." [1]

I believe that it may carry us toward an understanding of religious humanism, with which we are primarily concerned, if we begin by asking why, in spite of fundamental differences, it can plausibly be confused with literary humanism, as is often the case.

The two movements are of course quite diverse in origin and history. Literary humanism is, to quote Mr. Shafer, "a movement of criticism which for a quarter of a century has been led by Mr. Paul Elmer More, of Princeton, and by Prof. Irving Babbitt, of Harvard . . . opposed to impressionism, pure contemporaneity, scientific dogmatism, and unbuttoned expansiveness . . . naturalism in its many and apparently divergent forms . . . romanticism, humanitarian sympathy, mechanistic or vitalistic determinism, the doctrine of progress and the like" [2] surely a formidable and curiously assorted list of antipathies, in which "pure contemporaneity" appears to be the real *bête noire*. Indeed it might not be unfair to describe Professor Babbitt as the G. K. Chesterton of American criticism, always "on the side of the angels," always championing the merits of antiquity, always opposed to innovation in matters of morals, politics, and religion as well as in matters of literary form. Now, religious humanism is a much more recent movement, of a radically different temper. Originating just after the war in a little group of Unitarian clergymen led by Doctor Dietrich and Doctor Reese, it has made its appeal to those pioneering spirits—Unitarians, Universalists, and liberal Jews—

[1] See Shafer, "Humanism and Impudence," in the January *Bookman*, and Grattan, "What Is Humanism?" in the April number of *Scribner's*.

[2] *Bookman*, LXX, No. 5, January, 1930, p. 490.

who find Modernism itself too antiquated for them,[3] and who are convinced that we have not yet gone far enough in the application of scientific and humanitarian principles. The next step in advance requires us, they believe, to recognize that as the whole supernatural realm of heaven and the gods melts away before the advance of scientific naturalism, all existing religions, including Judaism and Christianity, are doomed to succumb, to be replaced by a purely this-worldly faith, in which Man instead of God is to be the object of devotion.

Surely, one will say, between two movements so utterly different in aim and temper, there can be nothing in common but the name. Yet there *is* something more in common—something fundamentally important. Both literary humanism and religious humanism rest upon identically the same underlying philosophy: a dualistic philosophy, which exalts man and his world of ideal values above the merely naturalistic world of scientific fact, and creates a deep cleavage between the two worlds. I have believed for some time that a dualism of this sort was the key to the understanding of religious humanism; imagine, therefore, my interest at discovering that Mr. Norman Foerster has defined the essence of literary humanism in almost precisely the same terms. "The central assumption of humanism," he says, "is that of a dualism of man and nature, as opposed to the monism assumed by naturism. . . The rightful concern of man is his humanity, his world of value and quality that marks him off from a merely quantitative natural order."[4] The cleavage between the two realms is to be discerned, according to Mr. Foerster, in the freedom of the moral will—a "will to refrain" from the expansive animal urges of the natural man in the interest of ideal values and aspirations which are not natural but human. There is evident in this emphasis upon free-will, as an almost miraculous interloper in the realm of

[3] Cf. the following words of Doctor Slaten: "When Daniel Boone's nearest neighbors came to be only nine miles away, Daniel Boone moved on. . . The Modernists are close up to where the Unitarians were a hundred years ago, and where some Unitarians are yet. . . Modernism crowds upon our rear guard. It is time to move again."—*Humanist Sermons*, p. 90.

[4] *American Criticism*, pp. 238-239.

nature, an anti-scientific bias which is quite foreign to the temper of the religious humanists; yet both schools of humanists are at one in their insistence that all natural forces—including the natural impulses of man—must be brought under the domination of human ideals, and science itself must be made to minister to universal human ends, if the good life is ever to be attained.

What is the significance of this strange meeting of opponents upon a common platform, under a common banner? How does it happen that the literary and religious humanists have independently been led to the same philosophical position? I believe the secret lies in the fact that any one who seeks to promote *human culture,* whether his interest be primarily in literature and the arts, or in religion, is obliged to recognize that a purely scientific, factual, naturalistic approach to the problem is utterly inadequate. Values, ideals, ends, purposes, meanings —these are the stuff of which culture is composed; and any philosophy which explains them away, or reduces them to the level of raw biological fact, loosens the whole fabric of civilization and hastens its decay. Some of the religious humanists do not seem to be aware of this. In their zeal for scientific method in religion, they are gravitating toward a complete scientific naturalism, which is bound to undercut that sense of the dignity and worth of man which is the focus of their faith. They loudly call attention to the fact that in a world of pure science there is no reason for faith in God or immortality; they fail to note that there is no room in it for faith in man, either, or anything, in short, to dissuade one from complete disillusionment and despair. The world of science is not a world in which a human being can live; it is a world of mathematical formulæ and bloodless abstractions, which would kill any red-blooded creature who tried to live in it as quickly and effectively as a breath of poison gas. The more intelligent humanists realize this, and therefore devote themselves earnestly to maintaining the independent validity of human values.

It may be questioned, however, whether the attempt to validate our human ideals and values against the assaults of pessimism and disillusionment can possibly succeed while one maintains a strict metaphysical dualism between the realm of facts and the realm of values. A *provisional* and *relative* dualism between them is defensible and indeed necessary, to mark the difference between the impoverished world of scientific analysis and the rich, meaningful world of direct experience; but if values have nothing to do with facts, if, instead of being grounded in nature, they subsist in a subjective dreamland of pure essence, eternally divorced from existence (as they do, for example, in the philosophy of George Santayana) then the religious humanist is of all men most miserable! He has ceased to worship the gods because he regards them as mere projections of human desire, the objectification of wishful thinking; but by the same logic, he ought to refuse to bow down to anything real, whether in the heavens above, or on the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth—for whatever is real must be valueless (except as value is "projected" into it) and whatever is valuable must be unreal! As Santayana says, only the ideal—the disembodied, non-existent ideal—deserves our allegiance! The humanist who accepted this logic would have to admit that the path of true religion was a mystic path leading away from reality into a land of pure fancy and wishful thinking; and he ought forever to renounce the hope of remolding the world in the likeness of human ideals.

I need hardly say that there are very few humanists who would accept this logic, or who would carry out the consequences of the dualism of facts and values to the bitter end. Humanism is a delicate balance between the naturalistic spirit of cool, scientific disinterestedness and the humanitarian spirit of warm, zealous devotion to the welfare of mankind, and one or the other spirit generally tips the scales. When naturalism tips the scales (as in the philosophy of Mr. Bertrand Russell or Mr. Joseph Wood Krutch) humanism degenerates into an

attitude of sad acquiescence or futile Promethean defiance in the presence of a universe too overwhelmingly hostile to give much reason for hope or endeavor. When humanitarianism tips the scales (as in the philosophy of Professor Dewey) the dualism of facts and values is given up, in favor of a philosophy which grounds the validity of human values in the organic structure of the world of facts, thinks of meanings and ideals as part of the fabric of reality, and regards scientific concepts as products and instruments of human purpose, subordinate to the ideal ends they are designed to serve. I have no doubt that the humanist movement, as an embodiment of "the religion of social passion," is going to gravitate for the most part toward Professor Dewey's position rather than toward Mr. Krutch's. Professor Eustace Haydon's recent book, *The Quest of the Ages*—by all odds the ablest book yet produced by the movement—clearly breaks loose from the dualistic entanglement, and embeds human values in the structure of reality, where they belong. Though he rejects the belief in God as traditionally conceived, he affirms his faith in the "stable balance" and "orderliness" of the natural world, the security of man's biological heritage, and, most important of all, the existence of a process of "social enfoldment," supporting our highest endeavors, "growing more perfect with the generations and real as the enfoldment of home." "The human individual," he says, "is not a solitary and helpless soul adrift on an adventure in time without star or compass. He is wrapped about with an environment of social security." If it would be premature to dignify "the natural-human milieu, as it now exists, even in its ideal phases," with the great name of God, there is a clear possibility, in Professor Haydon's view, that social development may eventuate in "a unified world intelligence, heart and purpose," which *would* deserve the name.[5]

When humanism reaches this pitch of affirmation, the chasm between humanism and theism is reduced to bridgeable

[5] *The Quest of the Ages*, pp. 111-121.

dimensions; and it becomes a bit difficult to determine where humanism leaves off and theism begins. Professor Haydon calls himself a humanist and will not use the word God; but his colleague, Professor Ames, whose position differs only slightly from his, rejects the humanist label and has no hesitation about using the word God. Professor Wieman clearly regards himself as a theist; yet his conception of God as a " value-making process " is very hard to distinguish from Professor Ames's conception of God as a " matrix of life," [6] or Professor Haydon's conception of a process of " social enfoldment " which he will not call God! My own conception of God is founded upon exactly the same phenomena of social enfoldment and cosmic orderliness which Professor Haydon observes. I would hardly care to change a word of his description. I certainly do not wish to challenge anything he says about the impersonality of the natural order, the danger of drift and easy-going trustfulness, and the necessity of human responsibility and cooperation if a better human society is ever to be created. God, as I conceive him, is not a celestial autocrat, demanding allegiance to the *status quo.* He reveals himself primarily in the holy spirit of insurgent idealism which protests against the *status quo,* and slowly transforms it into a form of society where human beings can live in fraternal accord and develop their potentialities to the full. God incarnate in Christ, God immanent in the Church, and in all institutions and movements which minister to the security and progressive enrichment of human life—such, for me, is the immediate object of religious loyalty and trust, and perhaps the greater part of my actual religious experience could be expressed in these terms. A sense of being surrounded and supported by a great on-going process of " social enfoldment " from which we have drawn all that is best in our personal life, and to which we owe gratitude, love, and loyal service in return—such, for most theists, most of the time, is the experience of God; and Professor Haydon

[6] *Religion,* p. 154.

could share it with us. I differ from him only in regarding this immanent God as evidence for and partial revelation of a transcendent God, the Source and Ground of all good, in whose ultimate dominance over both history and nature I intuitively believe whenever my consciousness of the reality and power of the immanent God is most vivid and compelling, and whenever my hopes of human betterment rise highest. Professor Haydon implicitly expresses the same faith when he expresses the hope that social development may eventuate in "a unified world intelligence, heart, and purpose." If this is not a vain hope, it implies the existence of a transcendent cosmic Ground by which our efforts are supported; if such a Ground does not exist, the hope is groundless.

Thus I return to the position that the dualism of facts and values is the essence of the humanist dilemma. If facts overrule values, humanism becomes naturalism. If values are given their rightful place in the real world, humanism comes within hailing distance of theism.

MORALITY WITHOUT RELIGION

RICHARD MINER VAUGHAN
Newton Theological Institution

MORALITY is common ground for Humanist and Theist. All good men believe in morality as the art of living together for the achievement of personal values. They may differ in their maxims of conduct but they do not in their general spiritual objectives.

When we begin to think about the wider implications of morality then the cleavage between Humanism and Theism becomes manifest. Is morality a self-sufficient reality within our human world, or does it involve more-than-human and cosmic relations? We wish to state the issue without prejudice. Ernst Troeltsch bluntly wrote of *Atheistische Ethik*. The word "atheist," however true etymologically, has acquired opprobrious connotations which disincline us to apply it to high-minded Humanists. With the disputants before us, we shall listen first to the plea of Humanism for an autonomous morality, and then to an exposition of the service of Religion to morality.

I

Humanism is a spacious term which has had many meanings through the centuries. In its most general sense, Humanism signifies a high estimate of humanity and devotion to its welfare. Under this definition, all of us wish to be regarded as Humanists. In the world of religion today, Humanism has become a *quasi* technical word which means reverence for human values and service to them irrespective of theological conceptions. The humanistic movement proposes to build here upon earth the fair structure of the Kingdom of Man and to pay no heed to a suppositional God or to the delusive hope of a compensatory world beyond death.

In justice to the Humanists as a party, it is necessary to note the wide diversity of opinion in their ranks. There are even theists who insist upon calling themselves humanists. Far more numerous than isolated theists among them are the agnostics. Curtis W. Reese tells us that the humanist attitude toward the idea of God is not that of denial at all, it is that of inquiry. It is, nevertheless, the type of inquiry which evidently expects to make no discoveries. The typical Humanists in the new movement have passed beyond agnosticism to a militant naturalistic view of the world. They declare without equivocation that God and immortality are unnecessary hypotheses and that we must rely wholly upon ourselves for the achievement of moral values. They have issued a declaration of independence from religion in any of its historical " supernatural " forms.

To sustain its demand for an autonomous morality, Humanism argues, first of all, that morality is itself religion. The mutual relations of morality and religion have hitherto deeply engaged the minds of philosophical moralists. We are now offered a solution which will save further trouble in this particular. It is solution by definition—morality is religion.

Religion, as we know it historically, has played a very large part in the world. Wilhelm Bousset declared that it is " the most powerful factor that affects the mental life of mankind." Ages of human aspiration have given emotional values to the word " religion " which Humanists wisely seek to conserve. We must, if possible, maintain continuity with all that is good in the past.

It is nothing new, however, in the history of thought for men to modify or even to revolutionize the content of a word. Religion can, therefore, be redefined in purely humanistic terms. God thus becomes the Spirit of the Group, or the growing totality of our ethical ideals, while immortality becomes the persistence of our influence in the human generations who follow us.

The social interpreters of religion insist that what religion meant to its votaries all the time was the conservation of ideal social values and participation in them. They assert that the gods are personifications of those values, the giant shadows of men themselves projected upon mythological clouds. Durkheim found that the god of the clan was simply the clan itself personified in the totemic principle. But if we concede that the clan gave content to the god-idea, must we not insist also, in opposition to Durkheim, that the god as possessor of *mana* had a transcendent reference?

In the opinion of A. Eustace Haydon, religion in all its innumerable forms is reducible to "the shared quest of the good life." Does not such a definition of religion, we ask, overlook the whole question of the means upon which religious men relied to realize the good life? They tried to make "proper connection with the higher powers," as William James reminded us. They sought by prayer and sacrifice to avail themselves of the cooperation of cosmic forces. To miss this fact in the history of religion is to miss religion altogether as it has unfolded itself in human experience.

Religion, moreover, has been defined in terms of ethical attitudes, irrespective of the objective realities concerned, whether divine or human. Fifty years ago, J. R. Seelye wrote that the name "religion" belongs by right to any "habitual and permanent admiration." It pertained, therefore, to our human loyalties and only by way of eminence to God. In our day, Bertrand Russell defines religion as worship of our ideals as ideals, and also as worship of the real order of the world as actually existent and frankly recognized to be indifferent to distinctions of good and evil. "We must ask nothing of the universe," says he, "but must accept it as it is and try to love it and worship it as it is, however fundamentally rotten it may reveal itself to be." But surely it is necessary to reply to the genial Englishman that worship as the spirit of reverence and adoration must have an appropriate object. No one can

respect, much less love, a "rotten" universe. Only personal values at their highest can evoke true worship.

If Humanists wish to call morality "religion," we shall not withstand them. We shall feel that their reverence for ideal personal values is reverence for values which exist in their perfection in God. But we shall feel also that reverence for God as the objectively real constitutes religion in its highest and normative sense. We believe also that it conduces to clearness of thinking to employ terms in their accepted historical meaning. By this standard morality means relation to our fellow men and religion means relation to God as more-than-human reality. In morality, we look around; in religion, we look up. And it is hard to argue with Humpty-Dumpty as he attaches to terms arbitrary and unusual meanings. "When I use a word," says he, "it means just what I choose it to mean —neither more nor less."

II

Humanism insists, furthermore, in its effort to free morality from external dependence, that morality in its origin was independent of religion. How could it be otherwise, it is said, when morality appeared in the world long before religion. Priests came early upon the scene and made themselves custodians of morality. They taught, doubtless in all sincerity, that the gods gave us consciences and also imposed upon us definite commandments. The divinely given code was naturally regarded by people as sacrosanct, although often arbitrary in many of its precepts and ill-adapted to changing human conditions. Humanism declares that our duties must be defined in concrete terms of personal and social welfare.

According to naturalistic ethics, the origin of conscience can be explained in biological and sociological terms. It is said that our human morality has its roots deep in our animal ancestry. The earliest forms of life speedily learned that certain adjustments to environment were necessary in order to be

able to live at all. Adaptive behavior became ingrained in organisms as instincts. The ants learned industry and the wolves obedience to the law of the pack. Man possesses instincts as part of his evolutionary heritage. His social experience also has taught him the ways in which he can best get along with his fellows and achieve his goals in life.

And even if we grant the unique character of "ought" in human experience, does not the existence of the moral imperative in us make us self-legislative and independent of all external cosmic authorities? Immanuel Kant made ethical values the very ground of our faith in God, freedom, and immortality. The most pronounced theists assure us that the sense of obligation is an ultimate datum whose imperative is unconditioned. Whether we believe in God or not, we must do right as we see it.

There are, nevertheless, metaphysical questions with respect to the ultimate origin of morality which Humanism has left unanswered. Does not the rise of morality upon our planet require some larger explanation than mere recognition of the method of its appearance? And may not the will of God, who is immanent in the order of the world as well as transcendent, define our duties in and through the demands of human welfare? And can we doubt that the existence of obligation in us casts some light on the structure of the universe which has made us what we are?

III

As an additional argument for the self-sufficiency of morality, Humanism declares that morality possesses an adequate dynamic apart from religion. Through long centuries religion sought to enforce morality by supernatural sanctions. It promised the favors of the gods here and hereafter to the obedient and threatened violators of the code with divine chastisements. Our human ills were interpreted as the vengeance of heaven upon our sins. If David took a census of

Israel contrary to divine interdict, a pestilence followed. But science has taught us that pestilence is due to the activity of bacteria. If we would avoid pestilence we must obey the laws of sanitation.

Humanism proposes to utilize all the resources of science, natural and social, that we may know what are our duties and why they are our duties. Education is the watchword of the new morality, education in the rationality of duty and in the emotional attitudes which are the driving power in conduct. We must agree with the Humanists that much can be done in these ways. Socrates rightly believed in the moral power of knowledge, but like all representative Greeks he knew that "knowledge" is far more than information. True knowledge is wisdom and reverence. And these are virtues which religion particularly seeks to cultivate. The sense of the sacred is the special gift of religion to mankind. It lies at the heart of all appreciation of values and hallows the whole of life.

We are assured by Humanism that public opinion is the chief power for securing the performance of our social obligations. Morality is the right fulfilment of relations within the group, and the group enforces its demands by approval and censure. A soldier in battle-line will face death itself rather than incur the social stigma of cowardice. Pudd'nhead Wilson understood the constraints of public opinion when he remarked, according to Mark Twain, "We should never do wrong when people are looking." As a matter of fact, we often wear the ring of Gyges and are invisible as far as the observation of our fellows is concerned. When we are not under public scrutiny, the anchors which hold strongest take hold of both human and divine realities.

It is necessary to recognize that the prophet, not infrequently, as the servant of religion, must defy and reshape public opinion. Religion with its other-worldly point of view assists him to that detachment from the present order of things by which he can judge and correct society. And if martyrdom is

the price of fidelity, the assurance that the Nature-of-Things is on his side and will deal fairly with him will be one of the unfailing sources of strength.

IV

By one other consideration Humanism seeks to free morality from the control of religion. It declares that morality is weakened by religion. Of course, all thoughtful men recognize that religion in its historical expression has been the source of both good and evil. Humanists usually concede that the idea of God rendered necessary service in the immaturity of mankind. But they are now convinced that the persistence of theism can only increase the disservice which in some respects has pertained to it through the centuries. "There cannot be the slightest doubt," says Harry Elmer Barnes, "that religion in the past has produced far more suffering and misery than it has eliminated."

The force of the ethical indictment of religion is somewhat broken by the reflection that all our social institutions have a debit as well as a credit side. The state, for instance, has not been an unmixed blessing, as the countless wars it has waged bear witness. And as for the family, every one knows what infelicities and tragedies stand over against its vast and beneficent service to humanity.

Nor may we forget that many of our atrocities are as chargeable to science as to religion. Thrusting needles into the eyes of a child to let the demons out of him is even more bad medical science than it is bad religion. When a cannibal eats the heart of a captive offered as a human sacrifice, in order to get the courage of his foe, it is psychology and dietetics which are chiefly at fault and not religion alone. These facts no more discredit science in its purer forms than they do religion.

It must be acknowledged that religion today is rightly chargeable with social defects. Its so-called infallible laws

coming down to us from earlier ages have been the refuge of persecutors, witch-burners, and polygamists. There are pious people not a few whose religion in some respects is an " opiate." They expect God in answer to prayer to do things which they ought to do themselves. They tolerate evil conditions in this life because " There'll be pie, in the sky, by and by."

None of these evils are inherent in religion. They simply mean that we need a more intelligent religion, even as men through the ages have been building up a more intelligent science. And one of the first things incumbent on religion today is to learn wisdom from the protest, so justifiable in many ways, which Humanism is making.

We are under obligation, in common with naturalistic Humanists, to accept the findings of science with regard to a universe of inviolable law. In no respect is science hostile to religion as a spiritual interpretation of the world. Even a mechanistic philosophy must concede that a " machine " is the incarnation of purpose and intelligence. And it is our duty to toil more passionately to promote social well-being in this present life upon earth, although we boldly affirm that our efforts in this particular do not compare unfavorably with non-theistic groups. We can do so all the more effectively because we believe in God and in the life everlasting. Thus the Christian religion will take the wind out of the sails of this new humanistic craft and leave it becalmed upon the seas of time.

V

The plea of Humanism for a morality divorced from all cosmic reference lacks convincing power. Against its negations we place in relief the service of religion to morality. Religion, in its fulness of meaning, we have already observed, signifies man's reverent trust in more-than-human power and cooperation with it.

The helpfulness of religion to morality is suggested, first

of all, by the general interdependence historically of morality and religion. History in its details speaks with no finality on metaphysical questions, for the shores of time are littered with its discarded opinions and practises. There is, nevertheless, a presumption of truthfulness in the major findings of history. They represent the universal experience of the race, the response of men through the ages to the order of things in which they live. The virtually inseparable presence of the good life and reverence toward divine power suggests that each is necessary to the other.

Among primitive peoples we find that *mores* and *mana* are not wholly separate interests. A recent writer tells us that "morality is far older than religion." The statement is true if religion means the writer's kind of religion. But belief in *mana* is religion, of a sort. The pre-animistic savage believed in a mysterious force resident in objects, which force he sought to control. This awesome, other-than-human force was regarded as intending whatever it did to man, and as intention is an activity of personality, it can be truly said that the idea of the divine is implicitly personal from the beginning.

In point of fact both morality and religion are as old as man. To be moral is to feel an obligation to do whatever is regarded as right, and to be religious is to feel dependence upon higher powers whose help is available for the attainment of the goods of life. And both of these interests co-existed in the same man and it is not irrational to suppose that they vitalized each other.

Among the culture races of the world, throughout the whole historical period to our own time, it is plain that morality was under the sanctions of religion. In Greece, such gods as Zeus, Apollo, Athena were givers and guardians of the laws. As for the Jews, are we not told that Yahweh himself wrote their laws and gave Moses an autograph copy?

On the other hand, the statement is frequently made that two great religions, Confucianism and Buddhism, ignore the

gods and are purely ethical. Confucianism, nevertheless, as a state religion, fostered the worship of Heaven and in forms virtually personal. And Buddhism builds its way of life on karma as the exact justice in the universe which deals with a man according to his deed. Thus karma performs in good part the functions of God. All students of Buddhism, particularly in its later developments, know how deeply it takes account of cosmic reality.

But we are now told by Humanism that the great deliverance has come from the erroneous interplay of morality and religion to which history bears witness. Morality has reached maturity, and it proposes to leave the old religious homestead and to set up housekeeping for itself. "Our whole life and mind," wrote George Santayana, "is saturated with the slow, upward infiltration of a new spirit—that of an emancipated, atheistic, international democracy.

And yet strange to say, and not so strange, the prophets of the new order cannot wholly dissociate themselves from a friendly cosmos. Did not Auguste Comte say that our social instincts could never gain the mastery "were they not sustained and called into exercise by the economy of the external world?" And John Dewey finds that in the midst of conflict, struggle, and defeat, a consciousness is possible of "the enduring and comprehending Whole." The modern Humanist in one way or another is compelled to trust in cosmic reality, for he is in the position of Emerson's Angelo,

> Himself from God he cannot free.

VI

When we leave the realm of history for distinctively metaphysical territory, we find that religion renders service to morality by presenting the most satisfactory explanation of the fact of morality. The appearance of morality upon our planet is the most momentous phenomenon connected with it.

The lower animals, so it seems to us, are dominated by instinctive drives, while man possesses reflective intelligence and is able to create and to achieve ideals. These idealisms of man, expressed in personal and social life, are not self-existent realities which have no explanation beyond themselves; they are emergent in our human world. And when we see a fact like morality, the rational intelligence in us refuses to be satisfied until we find some adequate explanation of it.

What is the explanation which Humanism offers? Many of its advocates offer none at all, they are agnostics with regard to any cosmic implications of morality. To them philosophy is no quest for ultimate causations but a liaison officer whose duty is to coordinate the activities of the various sciences and to make them serviceable to humanity. Its function is to enable us to make our bread more efficiently, a laudable task truly, but it does not feel itself able to give us God, freedom, and immortality. Possibly if it could realize its ancient ideal in this particular, the bread which it bakes would have a sweeter taste.

Whenever Humanists turn philosophers and seek to derive the moral constructions in human life from atoms or energy-units, their success is proportioned to the degree in which they assign to these creative entities the qualities of purpose and intelligence which appertain solely to personality. To the Humanist, morality must remain an exotic in the universe, a cosmic accident. If he talks of a tendency in the universe which makes for ever higher wholes, he has surrendered his fortress, for the principle of integration or concretion is only an awkward name for the purposeful and benevolent Intelligence whose usual name is God.

Religion advances an explanation of the fact of morality which at least obeys the laws of adequate causality. Of course, morality in a true sense is a free human achievement. But we must ask ourselves how we became possessors of moral creativity and what kind of a universe it is which makes possible our

moral achievements. We cannot stop with the fact of moral value and give no heed to the cosmos in which the value is achievable. The interrelatedness of all things forbids air-tight separate compartments of value and reality. Value somehow bases itself in reality and reveals reality. Morality inevitably points beyond our immediate human world. We do not originate the laws of the moral order any more than we do the laws of the physical order. We can play the moral game, but we do not make the moral rules.

It is always necessary for us to take account of environment in its relation to various forms of life. Science declares that all organisms exist by virtue of their correspondence to their environment. There is at least selective power in environment which decrees that only those entities survive which are adapted to the environment, which find in the environment something kin to themselves. May we not say that human morality has appeared and that it continues because there is a Spiritual Order, not voted into existence by us, which evokes and sustains it? If attention is called to the presence of evil, as well as of good, in human life, the reply can be made that evil carries in itself the seeds of its own destruction because it runs counter to the deeper forces of the moral universe. The trends of history are opposed to the wrong-doer because there is a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness.

The argument from ethical value to divine reality does not move in the realm of mathematical demonstration but of moral certitude. But such certitude is all that we have in the concrete interests of life as opposed to the world of abstractions in which alone mathematical demonstration obtains. We begin with the ethical, in the order of our experience, but we are compelled to proceed to the metaphysical. The content we give to divine reality has its basis in our experience but the causative nature of our intelligence teaches us that God, as the moral order, is the prior, foundational, objective fact.

The experiential proof of the religious hypothesis lies in

the fact that when we make the proper adjustment to this divine reality, it certifies its existence to us by the joy and power and hope which come into our lives. Nor can a naive psychologism deprive us of this conviction by explaining all religious experience as subjective illusion. That penitence for sin and trust in God bring peace, consolation, and strength is not a law which we ordained any more than we ordained the law of gravitation. It is the expression of cosmic will which is plainly moral and, therefore, personal.

VII

Another aspect of the service which religion renders to morality is the fact that religion deepens our sense of the worth of personality as the basic postulate of morality. Happily Humanist and Theist agree that human personality is the highest value of which we know upon our planet. The Humanist would say that it is the supreme value in the universe, for he sees nothing beyond the borders of humanity but whirling matter and empty space.

Believers in religion have dignified man by basing his higher life in something kindred to him in cosmic reality. As the significance of its own premises became clearer, religion has shown through the centuries an increasing appreciation of the worth of man. An ancient Hebrew poet felt that man was crowned with "glory and honor" because the universe consciously loved him and cared for him.

Jesus staked everything upon the supremacy of personal values in man and in God. The soul outweighs the world. Better to be sunk in the depth of the sea than to cause a little one to stumble. Thomas Hill Green gave utterance to the Christian estimate of man when he said, "All other values are relative to value for, of, or in a person." And Immanuel Kant erected the supreme worth of personality into an ethic when he bade us to live so as to make personality always an end and never a means only.

On their part, Humanists in our day proclaim the worth of man as personal being. They too are sharers in the personalistic religious heritage which ages of faith have bequeathed to us. John H. Dietrich states as the first fundamental belief of Humanism, " Man is an end and not a means toward something else." He then proceeds, in common with all Humanists, to violate his own basic principle by making the individual man a fleeting means to the progress of a society which itself will ultimately vanish into chaos and old night.

Our sense of the worth of personality rests upon our appreciation of its intrinsic values and upon the place we assign to it in the cosmic order. There is a scale in values and not a dead level. Some values are instrumental, and some are ultimate. Economic values are subordinate to spiritual. The values which possess intrinsic excellence are goodness, truth, beauty, all of them values " for, of, or in " personality. Our estimate of personality is deepened and confirmed when we find that it is the goal and crown of an eonian evolutionary process. And it has supreme validation in the conviction that Divine Personality is the originative, directive, ultimate fact in the universe.

The logic of naturalistic Humanism is far otherwise. It bids us believe that man in all his loves and hopes is only an ephemeral product of an accidental collocation of atoms. The *l'enfant terrible* of Humanism is Joseph Wood Krutch. In his book, *The Modern Temper,* he has blurted out " what atheism really means." It means the reduction of the whole life of man to " merely a physiological process," wherein love sinks into a " biological urge " and great literature becomes impossible because the illusion of human greatness has utterly vanished.

One thing is certain, the future of morality and, therefore, of mankind, belongs to the world view, humanistic or theistic, which can inspire the noblest devotion to human welfare. Organized religion in our own land has nothing to fear from

a census of the men and women who sustain by their toil and their gifts our philanthropic enterprises. Whoever else may come and go upon our human scene, " The lover rooted stays." The love which serves is directly proportioned to the estimate placed upon personality. And our estimate of human personality rests upon our faith in the supremacy and permanence of personal values in the universe wherein we live. Belief in God and immortality are really value-judgments upon the significance of personality.

VIII

Through its idea of God, religion performs service to morality by pledging to it the friendliness of the universe. No one can fail to appreciate the importance of the universe to our personal interests. Margaret Fuller's decision " to accept the universe " has elicited general approval. The universe gave us our beings, and it will have the last word to say as to what will become of us.

Humanism finds nothing in the universe spiritually kin to man. It discovers only a soulless mechanism, omnipotent matter going its relentless way. Some thinkers, notably Thomas Huxley, have regarded Nature as hostile to morality, for its law is " ruthless self-assertion." But the new appreciation of the part of " mutual aid " in evolution has outmoded Huxley's gladiatorial philosophy. The prevalent view among anti-theists in our day is the utter indifference of the universe to us. The recognition of such indifference, according to Walter Lippmann, is a mark of our intellectual maturity. But the theist pertinently insists that a deeper insight will find precisely in the absolutely undeviating, dependable, trustworthy character of the natural order the proof of divine love.

One strange attitude of Humanism is its self-sufficiency in the presence of the universe. There is nothing " above or beyond " man. To look up to God as " overlord," according to Dietrich, is to be " serf " and " vassal." Certainly the

analogy of feudal relations may be overworked, but are we to understand that human creaturehood carries no relation of dependence upon higher reality? We might as well declare our physical independence of the effulgent sun and of the dinner-table. We can guard our self-respect by thinking of ourselves as fellow workers with God in the spiritual freedom of sons rather than as servile dependents upon him. And that we may enjoy such freedom may well be the reason why God is the unobtrusive Spirit of the universe, the absolute essential of such a freedom.

Another misconception of Humanism is the idea that we shall love our fellow men all the more when we discover that we have "only each other." It has never yet been found that a man loves his wife and children less because he loves his father and mother. Harry Elmer Barnes, in *The Twilight of Christianity,* apparently sets his approval on the argument of a writer who declares that love to God "uses up just that much love" which could otherwise be given to our neighbor. The truth is that we could not love our neighbor at all unless we lived in a universe where love is valid. God is the antecedent fact who makes our social life possible, and our love for him vitalizes all other loves. Love is a spiritual reality, and the more we give away, the more we have left, as every experience of true love reveals.

Theism gives morality a support in the ultimate nature of things. The implicit assumption in every noble enterprise is that the universe will not negate our efforts. Our faith in justice and righteousness is really faith in God, for justice and righteousness are not attributes of matter but of personal will. And when our highest ideals are embodied in God, they shine with new splendor and power, for duty henceforth is loving loyalty to the Father of our spirits and cooperation with him. Not even the presence of evil in the world invalidates our faith but makes us helpers of God in the age-long battle wherein vicarious love achieves its victories.

IX

The final consideration in the service of religion to morality concerns itself with the hope of immortality. By this hope religion aids morality with the assurance of the conservation of our moral values. Religion has never meant by immortality mere perpetuity. Even among primitive peoples, unusual virtue, such as a hero's death in battle, made a difference in his status in the realm of the dead. Certainly religion in its higher forms emphasizes the qualitative aspects of eternal life and by virtue of that fact it is an ethical force here and now. If conduct here makes a difference hereafter, if tomorrow is ethically continuous with today, it is idle to represent Christian faith in a future life as hostile to personal righteousness and social service.

We are bound to ask ourselves what place personality occupies in the scheme of things. Is it a purely local and temporary incident on our grain of star dust where, by some fortune or misfortune, man accidentally acquired self-consciousness? An immortality of influence is seen to be a hoax when we recognize the fact that society will eventually cease to exist on our planet. The only immortality is personal immortality.

Our faith in a future life rests upon our confidence in the reasonableness and the goodness of the world order. Such a faith, or absence of faith, cannot fail to affect profoundly our attitude toward life. In reality it makes the difference between hope and despair.

Humanism, with respect to the ultimate issues of human existence, is a philosophy of defeatism. It bids us rear our temporary personal and social structures, knowing well that soon or late, blind insensate nature will destroy them. "Ours is a lost cause" is the verdict of Joseph Wood Krutch on human life. "To save human life from ultimate defeat," says M. C. Otto, "may indeed be out of the question." And Bertrand

Russell declares, " Only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built." We admire their candor, and particularly their rhetoric, but we refuse to join the dismal chorus in their gratuitous pessimism.

The experience of a distinguished humanist of an earlier day, John Stuart Mill, awakens the hope that the Humanism of our time may find its way to a nobler outlook upon the future. In his essay on " The Utility of Religion " he saw little if any social value in the hope of immortality. He even declared that in a happier society " not annihilation but immortality may be the burdensome idea." But in his essay on " Theism," written ten to twenty years later, his deeper wisdom finds expression. He recognizes the large " beneficial effect " of belief in a future life through the enhanced values placed upon human nature. And he declares it to be the part of wisdom to make the utmost of probabilities favorable to it.

X

On the basis of our discussion as a whole, the conclusion seems plain that religion provides morality with a needed margin of power. In every sphere of life the margin decides. The human body has within it forces which tear down and forces which build up, and whether it is headed for larger effectiveness or for the cemetery depends on which forces have the margin in their favor.

In the experience of temptation, the angel of our better nature does not win the race by the length of the field but often by only a chin-point. It is frequently very hard to do right, and we need all available resources. Human society is the scene of disintegrative, corrupt, criminal elements and also of progressive, redemptive, constructive elements. Whether mankind is lapsing into barbarism or moving toward a golden age is purely a question of margin.

There is power in humanistic ethics, but is there power enough? A bridge which nearly spans the stream is no bridge

at all. Religion at its best is the supreme generator of sacrificial forces and its permeative influence is the salt and yeast which assure the preservation and the progress of society. Humanism can never take exclusive and permanent possession of the life of a people, for the simple reason that only the people who believe in the basic truths of religion have survival power.

If these judgments are true, religion gives to morality an additional content which relates to religion itself. In and through and beyond our obligations to our fellow men, there is the duty of the quest of the Eternal. It was the Master of the spiritual life who said that men "ought" always to pray and not to faint. And from fellowship with the central Love whom Dante saw move the sun in heaven and all the stars, they will come enriched and empowered for the service of humanity.

"THE JEW WHOM NOBODY KNOWS"

Dr. LEO M. FRANKLIN
Rabbi, Temple Beth El, Detroit, Mich.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of the faith of the Jew is its universalism. This fact is in some sense central to the content of this paper. In saying this, however, we would not yield to the temptation of self-laudation for virtues which the Jew may or may not possess. The pose of a superior morality is not becoming. The Jew is as good but no better than his neighbors. Their elements of strength are his, and he shares their frailties. That this should be so is inevitable in the light of his genius as a universalistic people. It is the goad of that genius that has pushed him into every remote corner of the world where men dwell. It is that genius that has given him the privilege and the power to be at home everywhere, to help shape and to share in every culture and civilization, to move among all peoples and to leave his mark indelibly upon them.

It is just that which men do not understand about the Jew. Some speak of the persistence of the Jew as the inexplicable mystery of the ages. It is not mysterious at all if one understands his destined part in history. Some marvel that persecution cannot destroy or martyrdom uproot him. His power to resist untoward forces is part of that same destiny. Whether his environment be friendly or hostile does not matter. He cannot die. He must go on. To die would spell less defeat for the Jew than for the purposes of Providence.

It is this circumstance that makes it well-nigh futile to attempt to describe or to define the Jew. For there is nothing that may be said of any man or of any group of men that may not somehow be said about him. He walks empyrean heights with prophets and philosophers, and he grovels in the mire with men become beasts. He sings with poets, and he snarls with

brutes. He is ruler and slave; victim and conqueror. He is saint and sinner. He is beggar and philanthropist. He is pauper; he is plutocrat. He is of the masses, and he lives alone. Individualist and socialist; republican, revolutionist, anarchist —he is all these. He is the miser grasping his gold; he is the spendthrift throwing it away. He is tradesman, artisan, scholar, thinker. He is exploiter, dullard, fool. He is conservative; he is liberal. He is fanatic; he is skeptic. He is mystic; he is materialist. He is a dreamer, and he is man of affairs. He loves deeply; he hates intensely. He seeks the limelight, yet he hides in the darkness of his ghetto cell. He is exclusive; yet he assimilates. He is excluded; yet his presence is felt everywhere. He is martyr; he is master. He is all things that men can be. Of him it may be truly said that nothing human is foreign to him. One seeks a type of the highest to which man can attain. He finds that type in the Jew. One looks into the lowest depths to which men can sink their souls. There too he finds the Jew.

I take it that it is because of this chameleon character of the Jewish personality that he has been so difficult to understand. Perhaps it is because of this that the literature from which after all most people have learned to judge the Jew—for contact with him has not been universal—has been so diverse and frequently so unjust and so untrue in its delineations of him. Think for a moment what the literature of fiction has made of the Jew. Has it not painted him as demon or as saint, and but seldom as a man like other men with all the loves and hates, with all the fears and hopes, with all the virtues and the vices, that go to make up a common humanity? The words—too well-known to need quotation—which Shakespeare puts into the mouth of his Shylock represent a protest against a misunderstanding of the Jew of which the Bard of Avon was himself guilty with all others. For the truth is that Shylock, or Barabbas, or Fagin, are no more typical of the Jew as he is than are Nathan the Wise, or Daniel Deronda, or old

Riah, or any of those other characters in fiction that have portrayed the Jew as an unblemished angel of light.

But when one realizes how various have been the manifestations of Jewish character in actual life, he can somehow forgive the literary artist for having drawn his pictures in too light or in too dark a hue. The Jew to be properly drawn must represent a composite picture, a picture with high lights and deep shadows, a picture of a human being in the building of whose personality the noblest emotions and the basest passions play their part.

When, however, an attempt is made to depict the Jew as the embodiment of some one special characteristic, or when he is painted as a being in whom some one virtue or some one vice is so dominant as to be all-controlling, the resultant picture of necessity becomes distorted and is bound to be little less than a caricature. This is equally true when virtue is overemphasized, as when weakness and vice are overstressed. Nor is it less objectionable when the painter of this picture happens to be a Jew than when he is a non-Jew. For let it be conceded that the Jew himself is very frequently guilty of gross ignorance as to the essential character of his fellow Jew. He is inclined on the one hand, perhaps in resentment of the constant misinterpretation of his people, to picture him in colors that are all too fair and beautiful. Or on the other hand in his self-consciousness and in his desire not to overpraise his own, he is likely to lean backward and to berate the Jew for every petty folly and for every small weakness that in others would pass almost without notice. And if this be true of the Jew who is bound to his fellows by the ties of blood and of five thousand years of unbroken tradition, must we not expect a greater misunderstanding at the hands of the non-Jew?

In truth there is a Jew whom nobody knows. And it is of him that I would tell in this paper. But first, a word about the Jew who is known and concerning whom we are all accustomed to read and to speak. In these days the Jew is rather

constantly in the public eye. You scarcely pick up a daily paper but that you find him mentioned in one way or another. Today it is the account of some great achievement in the business or commercial world which is adjudged worthy of record. For the Jew as a business man is recognized. The Jew the financier is also known. Indeed, when men speak the names of Schiff, and Warburg, and the Rothschilds, many think they speak of those in whose image all Jews have been created. Or it may be that the record tells of some outstanding benefaction on the part of this great Jew or that. For who is there who does not know the Jew the philanthropist? Has not the Jew set the pace in the art of giving? Has he not been the inspiration for the largest part of progress that has been made in the administration of modern philanthropies?

And one hears of the Jew as the scholar and the scientist. The story of modern medicine, of chemistry, and of the other sciences could not be written without names like Ehrlich, and Einstein, and Flexner, and Steinmetz and Rathenau, and others too numerous to mention. One knows the Jew the musician, the artist, the dramatist, the playwright. For the list of the world's great composers and artists would be pitiably small without such names as Mendelssohn, and Meyerbeer, and a hundred others akin to them in spirit and in genius. The reader of books is acquainted with the literary Jew whose contribution even to our modern fiction is quite notable. One knows the Jew as statesman in this and other lands—there a Disraeli and a Lord Reading, here a Morgenthau, an Oscar Straus, and others of their type. Or it may be that men know the Jew in other walks of life, though not so well. People speak learnedly about the Orthodox Jew and the Liberal Jew, though to be sure they know little enough about either. Here and there they quote the names of men become familiar to them through the public press like Stephen Wise, though frequently enough they do not know that it was another Wise who laid the foundations for the Liberal Jewish movement in this country.

One has heard much in these last times of the International Jew, though heaven only knows what such a term may mean. It is as vague and as lacking in accurate historical implication as that other term—the Wandering Jew— brought into modern literature by Eugene Sue, and before that by a hundred legends that, kin to the story of Barabbas in the New Gospel, found their way into the literature of all the peoples.

But why go on enumerating these familiar types of the Jew? The list might be endlessly extended. To be complete it would include the great and the small—men who have succeeded and those who have failed, some who have written their names and published their fame where all men may read, and some who have perished as though they had not been. But these men are not, I maintain, the expression of Jewish life and Jewish genius. While I believe that there is something in the psychology of the Jew born of his tragic but heroic history that has on the one hand lifted him to the heights, and on the other has dragged him down into the depths, it is not essentially because he is a Jew that he has become in scattered instances the shrewd man of affairs, the keen financier, the facile writer, the clear-headed and far-visioned statesman. The genius of the Jew lies in a different direction. But it is the Jew, true to that genius, whom the world does not know. Let us take a passing glance at that Jew.

The Jew whom nobody knows is the one who is what he is in virtue of his birthright. Environmental conditions may have played upon him from every side, and he may have fitted himself congenially and harmoniously into the life around him, but there is a something to that Jew which is inward and not outward at all, which has to do with his emotions rather than with his activities, an intangible—almost one might say an inscrutable—something which though it dominates him, though it shapes his thought-modes and molds his character, yet cannot be described or defined or pictured in words. And yet without it the Jew would cease to be a Jew. It is an attitude of mind

born of a conscious destiny. It is an outlook upon life which is the creation of a unique psychology. It touches the whole emotional life of the Jew. It is the something in his soul that makes him at his best not the active man of affairs, not the "go-getter," but the prophet, the psalmist, the intrepid preacher of righteousness, the willing Messiah, the martyr to truth, the servant of God.

It is only as somehow we try to penetrate into the soul of this Jew whom nobody knows that we can even in the vaguest way comprehend the significance of his history and the secret of his indomitable persistence through the ages. It is only as we know this Jew that we can sense the meaning of what latterly we have come to call his "mission" in the world. Yes, it is only as the Jew himself delves down into the deepest recesses of his own soul and learns to understand those forces that have acted and interacted upon him through the centuries to make him what he is that he can hope to become that factor in civilization which his teachers through the ages have told him he must be if he would justify his existence.

I am thinking of the Jew not as the aggressive protagonist of some great cause, nor as the tireless and busy man of affairs. I am thinking of him not as that invincible personality that against odds before which any other people would have gone down has climbed the heights of successful achievement. I am thinking of him not at all as the world thinks of him as one who has a hundred times wrenched victory out of defeat, and in the face of a thousand deaths has dared to go on living.

I am thinking of the Jew in a way that I would like the world to think of him. I am thinking of the Jew as a somewhat impractical man, as one not holding the key to those successes which modern men most esteem. I am thinking of him as one who likes to dwell on the heights—somewhat aloof from the crowd—his mind in the clouds, even indifferent to the buzzing and humming and whirring of the world in which gold

is God and the passion for getting more and more dominates the souls of men.

In other words I am thinking of the Jew who is the dreamer, the dreamer of a great dream which the world does not as yet understand—if indeed it will ever come to understand it. I am thinking of the Jew as a visionary—a bit unmindful of the things immediately at his feet, but with his eyes prophetlike looking into a far distance when things shall be different than they are today. I am thinking of the Jew indifferent to, and even misunderstanding, the goading purposes of a mad age such as this in which we live, but somehow living again the prophet's life and dreaming again the prophet's dream. I am thinking of the Jew who is somehow out of place in the midst of this industrial civilization, his thoughts, his hopes, his prayers, turned back a thousand years—yea, four thousand years if you will—to the days when his forebears dared to forevision a time when man to man would be as brother, when nation to nation would be as friends not foes, when dreams of self-aggrandizement and power and selfish leadership should not dominate the peoples of the earth, when war should be no more, when swords should be melted into ploughshares and spears become pruning-hooks, when justice should flow like water and righteousness like a mighty stream, when the divinity of every man should be recognized, and when as with one voice men of all creeds and of all climes should lift their prayers unto the heights and cry aloud, as did the ancient Jew, *Ovim She' bashomayim,* "Our Father Who Art in Heaven."

That is the Jew of whom I am thinking—a Jew as real as any, a Jew who has always been, and I verily believe will always be, a Jew who represents to me that saving remnant, that *She' ereth Yisroel* of whom the prophets spoke, through whom alone not merely Jews and Judaism but the ideals and the aspirations and the hopes of a forward-looking humanity can be conserved. He is the Jew whom nobody knows because

he lives far from the madding crowd. He represents the small minority, but the saviors of men have ever been of the minorities. Such men have not been popular at any time, yet they have been the ones who have kept civilization alive. But for them, humanity dragged into the depths by hate, by selfishness, by injustice, by corruption, would have been utterly lost. It has been these men—misunderstood as impractical fools and dreamers, that have saved humanity.

Oh, but you say that dreams which men like these have dreamed have remained forever unfulfilled. Centuries have passed since the prophets of Israel enunciated their messages of hope for a better world, but the world has grown steadily worse. I am not unmindful of all this, and yet I say that it is the dreamers, the idealists, the prophets, who have made life worth the living and turned it into the great adventure that it is.

And among the dreamers of the world, the Jew has been the foremost. Will his dream of a world at peace, of a unified humanity, of peoples of the earth sympathetic with and understanding one another, ever be fulfilled? I know not, but I hope it may, and I have faith it shall. Of this I am sure. Let all men stop dreaming and grovel in the mire of materialism—as do the majority in our day—and there will be nothing left to hope for and to work for. Let then the Jew continue to dream his dream of a better day. Perhaps it is that Jew the Dreamer—that Jew whom nobody knows who was sent into the world to point to men the way of life.

THE CRITICAL EPISTEMOLOGY OF IMMANUEL KANT

A. S. WOODBURNE

How does knowledge arise? Is there any foundation for the commonly accepted belief that certain ideas are inherent in the human mind, independent of all experience? The theological philosophers of the middle ages had asserted that man's knowledge of God and of morality was innate. John Locke was the first to revolt from this position. It was his contention that experience is the sole source of knowledge. "There is nothing in the intellect that was not first in the senses," he said. "No, nothing except the intellect itself," added Leibniz. Berkeley, on the other hand, pushed Locke's doctrine further, saying that, if matter can only be known through the senses, matter itself must be a form of mind. A thing is nothing but a bundle of perceptions, and knowledge is but a compound of sensations and ideas derived therefrom. Hume carried the argument a stage further by applying to mind the same criterion that Berkeley had applied to matter. Our knowledge of the mind is quite the same as our knowledge of matter. There is nothing substantial about it. It is merely the abstract name for a collection of ideas. The same weapon was hurled against the idea of cause, with the same sceptical results. The net result of interpreting philosophy empirically was scepticism.

According to Locke knowledge was simply a piecing together of elements supplied by sense-experience. It was a synthesis of ideas. Hume examined this synthetic function of the mind, and found it to be nothing beyond an association of ideas in the mind. This led him to reject the concept of substance, along with Berkeley, and the doctrine of cause. There is no evidence of necessity, he claimed, about these associations. It was this scepticism about the synthetic connections of causes and effects that aroused Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) from his

" dogmatic slumbers," and determined him to make a critical examination of the synthetic activity of the mind in general. Probably Hume was the occasion rather than the cause for Kant's critical activity, for Kant had already been wrestling with the problem of knowledge before he read the German translation of Hume's works. Be that as it may, it was the realization of the all too negative results of the empirical philosophy that determined Kant to subject it to a critical examination.

It was Locke who set the problem for philosophy both for Hume and Kant by instituting an inquiry into the nature of knowledge and the conditions under which it is possible. Hume gave poignancy to the problem by the thorough-going character of his critical analysis. The conclusion of Locke and Hume was that experience is the sole source of knowledge. Kant begins the Introduction to his *Critique of Pure Reason* by attacking that doctrine.

> That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of subjects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare, to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience?

This much of the empirical argument having been granted, he proceeds to indicate a fallacy.

> But though all our knowledge *begins with* experience, it by no means follows, that all *arises out of* experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion) . . . It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and is not to be answered at first sight—whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions? Knowledge of this kind is called *a priori,* in contradistinction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources *a posteriori,* that is, in experience.

Having admitted that the term "*a priori*" is as yet not sufficiently definite in meaning to make clear his point, Kant then sets out to explain the sense in which he uses it.

In speaking of knowledge which has its sources in experience, we are wont to say, that this or that may be known *a priori,* because we do not derive this knowledge immediately from experience, but from a general rule, which however, we have itself borrowed from experience. Thus, if a man undermined his house, we say, "he might know *a priori* that it would have fallen"; that is, he need not have waited for the experience that it did actually fall. But still, *a priori* he could not know even this much. For, that bodies are heavy, and, consequently, that they fall when their supports are taken away, must have been known to him, previously, by means of experience.

By the term "knowledge *a priori,*" therefore, we shall understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of *all* experience. [1]

The point which Kant is trying to make in opposition to the empiricists is that there are some truths of a general character that bear a character of necessity and universality, quite independently of the particular forms they take in our experience. They are true regardless of experience, even antecedent to experience. For

Experience is by no means the only field to which our understanding can be confined. Experience tells us what is, but not that it must be necessarily what it is and not otherwise. It therefore never gives us any really general truths: and our reason which is particularly anxious for that class of knowledge, is roused by it rather than satisfied. General truths, which at the same time bear the character of inward necessity, must be independent of experience—clear and certain in themselves. [2]

That is, they must be *a priori.*

It was thus the contention of Kant that when human reason approaches certain types of problems, particularly problems of metaphysics, it has to reckon not only with the facts

[1] *Critique of Pure Reason;* English translation by J. M. D. Meiklejohn, pp. i and ii.

[2] *Critique of Pure Reason,* Pref. p. xxiv, quoted by Will Durant, *The Story of Philosophy,* p. 290.

disclosed by experience but also with problems presented by its own nature. Indeed it was this other set of problems, psychological in origin, that commanded Kant's attention, even as it did Locke's. Doctor Caird compares this procedure to that of a man investigating a telescope before he turned it upon the stars. The first observation which Kant made was when the mind relates itself to external objects, it does not do so capriciously or at random, but in accordance with certain ways predetermined by its own nature. In every instance of knowing, there are two elements to be taken into consideration, the one factual and the other logical. The first has to do with the particular idea of an object or an event concerning which experience has given us information, and is called " matter." The second is concerned with the general or logical principles that lie behind the particular observation, and is called " form." The problem of this *Critique* is the investigation of the logical or formal element in knowledge. What is the contribution of reason itself to human knowledge, apart from what observations are made on the basis of experience?

All knowledge is judgment, though not every judgment is knowledge. There are two types of judgments, analytic and synthetic. The former makes an analysis of an idea, but adds nothing to it. In a synthetic judgment, on the other hand, something is added to the idea in the predicate. Consequently it is the synthetic judgment which enriches and increases knowledge. It alone constitutes knowledge. Yet not every synthetic judgment yields scientific knowledge. Some of them are quite accidental and contingent. Only those which are characterized by necessity and universality yield scientific knowledge. For example, " It is warm " is a scientific judgment but quite contingent, for it may be cold tomorrow. But " Heat expands " is a judgment as true a thousand years hence as it is today. Real knowledge in Kant's view was identical with those synthetic judgments that bore the characters of necessity and universality, his meaning of the term *" a priori."*

Briefly stated Kant's conception of knowledge was "synthetic judgment *a priori*." When Kant says that "The proper problem of pure reason is contained in the question, How are synthetical judgments *a priori* possible?" [3] he is really proposing to investigate the conditions under which knowledge is possible, because such judgments only have the right to be considered knowledge.

At the very outset of his inquiry, Kant criticized Hume. He believed that Hume had come nearer to a solution of his problem than any other philosopher, inasmuch as Hume appreciated the synthetic character of knowledge. Yet he fell short of a satisfactory solution through his inability to understand the factor that made cognition possible. Hume had identified the synthetic operations of the mind with a stream of associations, which Kant contended would not be knowledge at all. Hume had further accounted for general ideas by a process of abstraction, and virtually resorted to nominalism to explain them, while Kant maintained that the universals are of necessity implicated in the particulars.

On the other hand Kant's doctrine was offered as a corrective to the rationalism of Leibniz. Leibniz had conceived of the understanding as entirely analytical. His metaphysical doctrine of monads led him to assert that the soul itself is the only source of knowledge. There are no preexisting ideas in the mind, though they exist in it virtually somewhat as the veins in a block of marble might indicate the outlines of a statue which could be chiselled out of it. Kant's emphasis on knowledge as synthetic was in contrast to Leibniz. In another particular also he parted company from Leibniz. He differentiated between sensibility and understanding, both of which were included by Leibniz under the term *intellectus*. Thus Kant's doctrine of synthetic *a priori* judgments was intended to disclose the defects of both rationalism and empiricism.

Under what conditions is knowledge possible? Kant's

[3] *Critique of Pure Reason*, Introduction vi, p. 12.

answer is that the senses supply the materials for forming judgments, and the understanding or reason the principles by which they are bound together. Kant reproached both Locke and Hume for being ignorant of the fact that the senses by themselves are not able to explain consciousness. The senses at best can furnish the mind with the raw material for knowledge; the understanding must provide the forms through which the materials are to be arranged and organized. Locke committed the mistake of deriving from experience much more than was there, when he derived from it the concepts of the understanding. Hume also failed to see how the understanding itself by means of *a priori* concepts might even be the origination of certain experiences. These errors come from a too poor idea of the place of the reason in cognition. In pure mathematics and pure physics there are elements of scientific knowledge that are independent of experience, a fact that both Locke and Hume failed to realize. "The former of these two celebrated men opened a wide door to extravagance. . .; the latter gave himself up entirely to scepticism." Kant's concluding remark, after indicating the errors of his empiricist predecessors, is "We now intend to make a trial whether it be not possible safely to conduct reason between these two rocks, to assign her determinate limits, and yet leave open for her the entire sphere of her legitimate activity." [4]

The real trouble with the empirical account of knowledge, in Kant's view, was that it placed human reason in an inferior position to experience and observation. This point is made very explicit in the preface to the Second Edition of the *Critique* where Kant maintains that chance observations by themselves without a preconceived plan on the principles of reason could never be synthesized into a law. Our so-called "laws of nature" presuppose the operations of reason in logical operations. Reason must not be content to follow the leading-strings of nature, but must herself hold the leading-strings, and must

[4] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 78, 79.

put questions to nature which nature will be compelled to answer. "Reason must approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from it, not, however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels his witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose." [5] Kant was perfectly well aware that he was making a revolutionary proposal in insisting on this higher conception of the place of reason in cognition, and likened his revolution in epistemology to that of Copernicus in physical science. As Ward shows, Copernicus had exalted the universe and humbled the earth; [6] Kant exalted the knowing subject, and humbled experience.

The Kantian doctrine of the origin of knowledge stated that it was twofold, though Kant suggested that the two probably originated from a common but unknown source. These two are sense and understanding. The capacity for receiving representations or receptivity he called sensibility. By means of sensibility objects are given to us, and they alone furnish us with intuitions. Intuitive reason was another name that he gave to the processes of sense-perception. The effect of an object on the faculty of representation he called sensation. The matter of all these phenomenal representations is given to us *a posteriori*. Their form, however, must lie ready for them in consciousness, i. e., must be *a priori*. The understanding on the other hand, elaborates the intuitions sensibly received. The functions of the understanding are to connect intuitions according to *a priori* laws, and to arrange judgments under a series of universal ideas, the former being the work of the faculty of judgment and the latter the faculty of reason, the two faculties which together comprise the understanding. The inquiry with which the *Critique of Pure Reason* is concerned is divided in accordance with this analysis of the cognitive faculties. There are two main divisions, the *Trans-*

[5] Ibid., p. xxvii. [6] James Ward, *A Study of Kant*, p. 60.

cendental Æsthetic, which is a critique of sensibility, and the *Transcendental Logic,* or critique of the understanding. The latter is again subdivided into the *Transcendental Analytic* which examines the faculty of judgment, and the *Transcendental Dialectic* which inquires into the operations of pure reason. The *Critique* concludes with a section on the *Transcendental Doctrine of Method.*

Kant's philosophy is a splendid illustration of the fact that epistemology arises chiefly as a critical reflection upon metaphysics. Locke began the modern movement by an inquiry concerning the abilities of the human understanding to deal with metaphysical difficulties, and with what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal. Kant refers only cursorily to the matter of knowledge. His main concern was with the predetermining conditions that govern possibility. For the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics waits on the possibility or impossibility of knowledge. In the mathematical and physical sciences reason has been successful because certain conditions have gained recognition that metaphysics has not yet recognized. It was a long time before either mathematics or physics were scientific. The Babylonians and Egyptians blindly groped for a method which it was the merit of the Greeks to discover in the case of mathematics. They realized the need to understand certain *a priori* conditions before they could tackle particular problems. Physics was much more belated in becoming a science, and owed its start in the right direction to Francis Bacon. Scientific judgments, inasmuch as they recognize *a priori* synthetic principles in the light of which particular problems are attacked, go beyond what is immediately given in sense perception. They are judgments of an anticipatory character. Metaphysics is concerned with the problems of God, freedom, and immortality, none of which is an object of experience in the same sense as a stone or a tree is an object of experience. These problems arise out of the very nature of reason, and the way in which we deal with them is

not determined by experience but by reason. First of all, it is necessary to examine the nature of reason, and on the results of the inquiry we may determine the competency of reason to deal with the problems of God, freedom, and immortality. This in brief, is the nature of the inquiry that the *Critique of Pure Reason* undertakes.

The inquiry itself is in regard to " transcendental " knowledge, by which Kant means that " which is not so much occupied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible *a priori.*" He makes it very clear that it is not his purpose to carry his investigation any farther than is necessary to understand, in their full extent, the principles of synthesis *a priori* with which alone he is concerned. The *Æsthetic* deals with the first class of such principles, viz., those concerned with *a priori* knowledge relating to sensibility. This knowledge, he tells us, is with reference to space and time. He undertakes to show that the apprehension of space and time is not derived from experience, but originates in the power of apprehension of the human reason; and also that space and time are forms of perception or sensibility, and not of the understanding. He does not show, however, that they are the only possible forms of perception.

Kant insists that space must not be regarded as an idea abstracted from previous experiences of particular objects in different places. The idea of space is not derived from the perception of objects occupying space, but they could not be determined at all except on a presupposition of space.

> Space is a necessary representation, *a priori,* which serves for the foundation of all external intuitions. We never can imagine or make a representation to ourselves of the non-existence of space, though we may easily enough think that no objects are found in it. It must therefore be considered as the condition of the possibility of phenomena, and by no means as a determination dependent on them, and is a representation *a priori,* which necessarily supplies the basis for external phenomena. [7]

[7] *Critique of Pure Reason,* p. 24.

This argument, we are reminded by Caird, was

> directed on the one hand against Leibniz for whom space and time were confused ideas abstracted from an experience of things which were known in their pure nature and relations independently of and prior to space and time; on the other hand, against Newton, for whom space was an objective reality independent of the mind. [8]

It is important that we remember that Kant is dealing here with forms of pure perception or sensibility that are present in the mind prior to any use of them in experience. Neither space nor time is dealt with from the psychological point of view of our perception of objects in their relations, but only from a purely logical or transcendental view-point. They are the conditions of the possibility of perception, and are not in themselves perceptions, only becoming so by means of the synthetic operations of the mind. Space makes possible a synthesis of sense-perception, but is not itself perceived. The senses present us with a manifold of diverse elements which are united by the judgment in a synthesis, and referred to the unity of the object. The unifying operation of consciousness is necessary to any synthetic unity, and space and time are the general forms through which alone such a synthesis can be effected. Space and time afford the conditions by which unity is possible. Though in each perceptual experience we only have a limited bit of space or time, still the fact that these forms lie behind all perceptions suggests that they are infinite and all-embracing. We have no means of perceiving absolute space or time because we can only know them through finite spaces and times that we actually experience. Absolute space and time are therefore not objects of perception, but modes whereby we arrange and organize that which we perceive. Kant's method of indicating this distinction was to characterize space and time as empirically real and transcendentally ideal.

Thus by establishing the *a-priority* of space and time Kant shows also their ideality. All objects that are presented to us

[8] Edward Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, Vol. I, p. 287.

in sense-perception of necessity assume the forms of space and time. The absolute homogeneous and ideal nature of space and time holds true in spite of all the changing experiences of sense-perception. We cannot think away these irreducible forms. And yet he insists that they are not concepts obtained by a process of abstraction from the perception of particular spaces and times. They are transcendental forms of perception without which particular sense-experiences would be entirely impossible.

In the second main division of the *Critique* Kant deals with the logical factors in cognition. Knowledge in his view originates from two main sources in the mind, sensibility and understanding. The former he distinguished as receptivity for impressions, and the latter as spontaneity in the production of conceptions. Each of these factors is dependent on the other. "Concepts without percepts are empty; percepts without concepts are blind." [9] Furthermore both of these factors are present in all cognition. That means that there is no such thing as passive perception, but perception is always influenced by thought, is always associated with the synthetic activity of the mind. To put the matter in another way, we may describe Kant's position as an insistence that in all our knowledge of the world about us there are formal, logical elements as well as the forms of space and time, determining the possibility of knowledge. These logical factors are two:[10] (1) "the absolutely necessary laws of thought, without which no use whatever of the understanding is possible," and (2) "the laws of correct thinking upon a particular class of objects." The former is called "general logic" and the latter "pure logic." Then Kant goes on to divide general logic into analytic and dialectic, on which basis he subdivides the second portion of the *Critique* into the *Transcendental Analytic* which is concerned mainly with judgments apart from which objects cannot be thought,

[9] *Critique of Pure Reason*, Part 2, Transcendental Logic, Introduction I.
[10] Ibid.

and the *Transcendental Dialectic* which treats of the part played by pure reason in knowledge.

In passing from the *Æsthetic* to the *Analytic* we encounter a " naming and analysis of those elements in our thought which are not so much given to the mind by perception as given to perception by the mind." [11] When we reach this level of cognition, we find the conceptual knowledge of relations and sequences, the instruments of reason whereby the data of experience are converted into the data of science. There is a certain parallelism which continues here. For in the same manner that the sensibility arranges the manifold given to it in accordance with the forms of space and time, so the understanding arranges the objects and events, i. e., the phenomena given in sensibility, in accordance with the concepts of cause, necessity, substance, reciprocity, quantity, quality, possibility, and actuality. These principles of the understanding which he calls " categories " furnish the conceptual basis for thought. They are the forms through the use of which the mind coordinates the diverse elements of experience. Again it is apparent, as it was in the consideration of sense-perception, that the fundamental element of the mind is synthesis. However from the *Æsthetic* one might gather the idea that synthesis goes on passively in the mind. Such was the interpretation of both Locke and Hume, and when Kant discusses what is " given " in perception one might suppose him to be adopting the same idea. That idea, however, is thoroughly dissipated in the *Analytic*. The orderliness of the world and of thought is the outcome of the synthetic activity (not passivity) of the mind. Kant contended that it would be impossible to explain the universe, indeed to explain empirical facts, on any other hypothesis.

The *Analytic* is divided into two parts called the *Analytic of Concepts* and the *Analytic of Principles*. The subject with which it deals as a whole is the *a priori* and objective validity

[11] Will Durant, *The Story of Philosophy*, p. 295.

of judgments. The fundamental forms of the activity of the understanding he takes over from logic, and having made certain modifications, arrives at his celebrated table of twelve categories which are grouped into four classes.

Quantity	*Quality*	*Relation*	*Modality*
1. Unity	4. Reality	7. Substance and Accident	10. Possibility Impossibility
2. Plurality	5. Negation	8. Cause and Effect	11. Existence Non-existence
3. Totality	6. Limitation	9. Action and Reaction	12. Necessity Contingency

The categories are intended to indicate the ultimate forms to which the synthetic activity of the understanding may be reduced. They are all of them means of knowledge, but none of them objects of knowledge; they are grounds of the possibility of experience, rather than the contents of experience. Kant inquires as to the source of these concepts, and his table attempts to make an exhaustive classification of all possible categories.

Our studies of Locke, Berkeley and Hume have shown that these men were interested particularly in two of the categories, those of substance and causality. Locke had begun the attack on the concept of substance from the empirical standpoint. Berkeley and Hume carried it to its logical conclusion, and Hume carried on the attack into the field of causal connections. His conclusions were that, however useful these concepts might be for practical ends, they could not be considered as valid knowledge. In fact they can be accounted for by the mental operations of association. In Kant also these two concepts are the most important ones which he discusses, and when he refers elsewhere to the categories, he chooses these two as examples. Paulsen thinks that the others are blind windows.[12]

[12] Paulsen, F., *Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine*, p. 172.

The approach of Kant to the problem of substance was not quite the same as the English empiricists. They were inquiring as to whether substance was knowable, and on the ground of its being an entirely unknown substratum, dispensed with the necessity of supposing it to exist. Kant's inquiry was as to whether the concept of substance is a principle necessarily implied in thinking. His conclusion was that it is essential even from the empirical point of view. Experience furnishes us with constantly changing data. But it would be impossible to conceive of change itself apart from a principle of permanence underlying change. This principle of permanence is substance. All that is meant by substance is that which abides or persists throughout the vicissitudes of experience and time. It is not something over and above its manifestations, but it is that principle of permanence without which thoughts of change are impossible. It is a ground of the possibility of an identity within the mind by which successive experiences become explicable.

> In phenomena there must be found a substratum which represents time in general, and in which all change or coexistence can be perceived by means of the relation of the phenomena to it. The substratum of all reality, that is of all that pertains to existence, can be cogitated only as a determination of substance. Consequently the permanent, in relation to which alone can all relations of time in phenomena be determined, is substance in the world of phenomena, that which, as the substratum of all change, remains ever the same.[13]

Kant used the phenomena of change also to rehabilitate the concept of causality which had suffered so badly at the hands of Hume. Hume had regarded it as a subjective conclusion based on the observation of succession. Seeing certain facts habitually joined in time, he regarded them as necessarily or causally related, but such a conclusion is a positive disservice to metaphysics. Kant maintained that it is a category that could not be derived from mere observation of successive ex-

[13] *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 137.

periences, but is an *a priori* function of the understanding, that is, a means of knowing rather than an object of knowledge. Hume's trouble was due to an inability to perceive the distinction between succession in apprehension and the apprehension of succession. For example if I look at a house and successively look at the roof and one of the doors, these are two successive acts of apprehension. But if I see a ship floating down the stream of a river,

> my perception of its place lower down follows upon my perception of its place higher up the course of the river and it is impossible that in apprehension of the phenomenon, the vessel should be perceived first below and afterward higher up the stream. Here, therefore, the order in the sequence of perceptions in apprehension is determined; and by this order apprehension is regulated. [14]

In the example of the house, the difference is due to me; the sequence is subjective. In the example of the ship, the difference is due to the ship; the sequence is objective. Kant concludes that in the second instance there is necessity in the sequence. The connections which we make mentally are necessarily made. In actual experience we never do attribute to an object the idea of succession or causality unless there is something in the experience which compels us to observe the sequence of perceptions. It is the interplay of perception and memory that lies back of this necessity. In perception we only make contact with a small portion of reality. Memory increases the extent of reality that we can apprehend; it helps us to synthesize experiences of various occasions.

Were it not for the category of causality our conception of reality would be fragmentary. "Experience is only possible by means of the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions." If we had to depend on perception alone, the fragmentary character of our knowledge would be inevitable. The only way to avoid this is by thinking of reality as a whole, connected by an all-embracing space and all-embracing time.

[14] *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 144.

Our experience can only take on the character of consistency as we think of the continuous system of changes being determined in time. What is the determining force? It is an *a priori* principle of the understanding to think that an event is determined by the nature of that which precedes it in the time order. This is the meaning of the category of causality. If any event be regarded as an objective occurrence, it is necessary to think of it as anteceded by some other event that it follows regularly. Every event has a cause, something which it follows necessarily and regularly. For all experience, for the possibility of experience, and for the understanding of experience, the causal category must be admitted.

As time contains the sensuous condition *a priori* of the possibility of a continuous progression of that which exists to that which follows it, the understanding, by virtue of the unity of apperception, contains the condition *a priori* of the possibility of a continuous determination of the position in time of all phenomena, and this by means of a series of causes and effects, the former of which necessitates the sequence of the latter, and thereby renders universally and for all time, and by consequence, objectively, valid the empirical cognitions of the relations of time. [15]

Thus did Kant appeal from experience to reason, to support the two chief categories of substance and causality.

The concepts of substance and cause belong to a higher order than the data from which such relations are implied. The data belong to the raw material of knowledge, i. e., the formless manifold of perception which is commonly supposed to be passively received. But concepts which imply a connection imply also a functional synthesis which is the work of the understanding. This is what Kant meant by an "apperceptive synthesis." Hume was wrong in considering that experiences are simply associated in a time order. For knowledge there must be a unity of which the subject is aware, and which is due to his own activity. This unity is qualitative, not quantitative; transcendental, not empirical; dynamic, not static. All

[15] *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 155.

synthetic knowledge whether empirical or *a priori* will demand the functioning of three factors: (1) There must be a manifold of perception; (2) there must be a synthesis of the elements of the manifold, the work of the imagination; and (3) the synthesis so effected must be brought under a concept which shows that the unity is necessary and universal.

This doctrine of apperceptive synthesis is the heart of Kant's theory of knowledge. Experience can give us nothing but a series of disconnected or loosely connected fragments, "Perceptions without conceptions are blind." But by apperceptive synthesis the reason cements together the materials of knowledge, and a structural unity is the outcome. For Kant the characteristic element of all cognition is synthesis. Every judgment implies it. In fact he defines a judgment as "nothing but the mode of bringing given conditions under the objective unity of apperception." [16] In no other way can a judgment achieve any objective validity. This shows us the reason that Kant held the logical functions of judgment to be so essential to a theory of knowledge which in turn was essential to metaphysics. By the logical functions of judgment alone can there be effected a union in consciousness. Logic provided a convenient classification of the judgments which he carried over into the categories, as the abstract forms in which apperceptive synthesis takes place. This was an exceedingly important and fruitful contribution to philosophical thought, for through it the possibility of a coherent view of life and the world was made possible. In Kant's system this synthetic or integrating activity is seen operative from the lower or perceptual levels of experience in all their aspects, right through to the higher levels of human reasoning.

At the same time we have to admit that Kant proved too much by his thesis. He went so far as to say that "the synthetic principles of the understanding are the necessary conditions of the possibility of experience at all, and therefore of

[16] Ibid, p. 87.

the possibility of the objects of experience themselves as such." As Ward says: [17]

> Had he been content with saying that they are a *sine qua non* of *systematic* experience nobody would object. But he went further than this. "The understanding," he roundly maintained, "is itself the source of the laws of nature. All empirical laws are only special determinations of the pure laws of the understanding."

This is, of course, in harmony with his position, to which reference has already been made, that the understanding does not derive its laws from nature, but prescribes them to it. At the same time Kant was very careful to say that he was not following the good Berkeley in his contention that the existence of objects in space is false and impossible.[18] By prescribing laws to nature, he meant that every event that takes place is hypothetically necessary. There are rules of necessary existence that we call laws without which nature herself could not possibly exist. "Necessity in nature is not blind" [19] but is guided by intelligence. The grounds for her laws are the necessary conditions of the apperceptive synthesis of the manifold of experience. It is reason that makes the cosmos. In his *Prolegomena to Every Future Metaphysical System* he asserted that Reason must be either Cæsar or nothing, by which, says Ward, "he spoiled a good case for a constitutional monarchy." [20]

In the second part of the *Analytic* Kant develops his well-known doctrine of the division of all objects into phenomena and noumena. Even in the *Æsthetic* he had been at pains to point out that we see objects through the spectacles of space and time, but not really as they are in themselves. The critique of the understanding emphasizes this point, for it shows that we bring to our intuition of things a whole set of mental forms or categories which are the grounds of knowledge. Without

[17] James Ward, *A Study of Kant*, p. 65.
[18] *Critique*, p. 166.
[19] Ibid., p. 170.
[20] Ward, *A Study of Kant*, p. 60.

them experience itself would be denied to us. When the sensibility perceives objects, it of necessity changes them because of the manner in which it perceives, the predetermined manner of perception. So when we perceive them, they already have stamped upon them the marks of space and time, and the logical forms which we impose upon them in thinking. They are thus not merely objects. They are *phenomena.* By a phenomenon Kant means a thing which has become an object of our sensuous intuition. In distinction from the phenomenon he posits also a noumenon or an object of non-sensuous intuition.[21] But he proceeds to inform us that this peculiar mode of intuition does not belong to us, in fact we have no notion of the possibility of such an intuition. Thus by very definition he implies an important distinction for a theory of knowledge. We can know phenomena only; noumena, or things-in-themselves are beyond the range of human cognition. When in the physical sciences we talk about things, Kant says our references are to phenomena only, because the things with which we have to deal are as they are known to us through the intuitive forms of time and space. Our human knowledge is confined to sensations, to the phenomenal which becomes for us the datum for science and for our world of reality. But positive science, he maintains, does not satisfy the human desire to know, just because it has such limits placed upon it. There is no reason why we should not posit the existence of things which are transcendental to our world of sense-perception, and which have causal relationship to our world. Indeed if we assume, with Kant, that the categories of relation possess validity, it follows that the affections of the mind that we call sensations or phenomena must have been set up by real objects. These real objects are themselves unknowable, and yet it is inescapable that we posit their existence. The thing-in-itself is for Kant the supersensible abstraction of the world of nature, the ground of the phenomenal world, and yet he cannot admit

[21] *Critique,* p. 185.

that its activity is causal. Its relation to the phenomenal world is one of logical necessity rather than physical cause. It is quite impossible for the categories to have any application beyond the limits of experience. But it is possible that there are intelligible existences of which our sensuous intuition can give us no information. Further he maintains that the conception of such noumenal existences is necessary

> to restrain sensuous intuition within the bounds of phenomena, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensuous cognition; for things-in-themselves which lie beyond its province, are called noumena, for the very purpose of indicating that this cognition does not extend its application to all that the understanding thinks. [22]

Kant maintained that there are three stages of intelligence: sensibility, understanding, and reason. Sensibility is the capacity for receiving sensations through the forms of time and space. The understanding is the faculty of thinking in terms of concepts, or categories corresponding to the logical forms of the judgment. Reason is that faculty that enables us to pass beyond the world of experience to the supersensuous world of things-in-themselves. The world is an intelligible world for the archetyped intellect of God. This world as it exists in God's thought manifests itself in our human, changing, sensuous world. That is, the phenomenal world is related to the noumenal as appearances or manifestations to the reality they manifest. It was this idea of the existence of a transsubjective reality that made the world of phenomena intelligible for Kant. The thing-in-itself was a necessary object of thought, and yet, since human thought gains content only by means of sense-perception, it is a contentless thought. Kant's description of it is couched almost exclusively in negative terms, something like the Upanishadic conceptions of the *nirguna Brāhman*. The divine intelligence is unknowable and unrealizable, and yet is an indispensable concept of comprehending the nature of human understanding. Though the pure theo-

[22] *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 187.

retical reason is unable to give it any content, the practical reason assures us that the concept is true and valid, and even the theoretical reason admits its necessity. Without the concept of an intelligible, noumenal world, the world as it exists in the mind of God, the world of sense or phenomenal world would be an incoherent collection of objects. By positing the world of things-in-themselves, Kant hoped to give coherency to our knowledge of the universe. It was an effort to secure freedom from the limitations of sense-perception which had landed Hume in hopeless scepticism.

Kant summarized the three divisions of the *Critique* in his *Prolegomena* as solutions of the problems, (1) How is mathematics possible? (2) How is pure science of nature possible? and (3) How is metaphysics possible as a natural disposition of the mind? The *Dialectic* is concerned with the third question, and its answer is that the possibility of metaphysics in the meaning of inquiring concerning trans-experiential objects is impossible as a science, and yet that such problems arise from the nature of human reason. The progress of science involves an expansion of human knowledge, yet there is always an unexplained residuum. Kant believed that knowledge ought so to be extended as to transcend the limitations of sense-experience, and to inquire into the conditions that make it possible. This took him into an investigation of the ideals which guide knowledge, to which end he made use of the forms of the syllogism. The *Dialectic* has three chief divisions. The first or *Rational Psychology* expounds the doctrine of the unity of the knowing self. The second or *Rational Cosmology* deals with the ideas of reason as they culminate in the antinomies. The third or *Rational Theology* is concerned to propound a view of the world which will be big enough to include the world as known and the mind as knower. This leads him to deal with the great main objects of metaphysical study: God, Freedom, and Immortality.

In the *Rational Psychology* Kant treats the unity of self-

consciousness as purely functional. Since knowing implies a unity, the nature of the soul must be such as to make possible that unity. The soul is not given to us in sense-perception, but its unity is realized in the business of relating the manifold of inner experience. Here again the concept of substance is applicable, for without something permanent the manifold of experience would be impossible. The soul is a simple substance, unchanged by the changes in the matter it knows. Immortality itself is functionally understood. Kant's psychology led him to identify the idea of a soul or substance with that of the appercipient self. "I think," says Kant, "is the only text of rational psychology from which it must develop its whole system." [23] and the system he developed was one that transcended experience since it was based solely on the universal elements of all inner experiences, viz., the unity of self-consciousness.

The *Rational Cosmology* is an effort to examine the various attempts of the mind to escape from the limits imposed by the sensibility so as to obtain knowledge of things-in-themselves. Every time the attempt is made, the mind falls back in the despair of antinomies. For example, if we try to know whether the world is finite or infinite, we encounter reasons in support and others in refutation of both hypotheses. So too if our inquiry concerns the relation of a compound substance and its component parts, we encounter an antinomy. Again if we inquire as to whether causality according to natural law is the only causality, or whether there be freedom also, we find reasons for and against both the arguments. Finally we may find support for either affirming or denying the existence of an absolutely necessary Being belonging to the world. Does each antinomy represent a *cul-de-sac* for reason? Kant replies that there is a way to overcome our difficulty, that is by remembering that space, time, and causality are themselves modes of perception and conception which must enter our experience, but are

[23] *Critique*, p. 238.

none of them independent of experience. They are necessary for the interpretation of experience, but philosophy must never forget that they are functional modes of interpretation and not entities having independent existence. They belong to the world of phenomena, not noumena.

The *Rational Theology,* or third part of the *Dialectic,* examines the so-called proofs for the existence of God. Kant first criticized the ontological argument on the ground of formalism. The idea of existence is not a necessary predicate of perfection, so my idea of the existence of an absolutely perfect being does not prove that such a being exists. "A man can as little increase his knowledge of reality from mere ideas as a merchant can increase his property by adding ciphers to the written statement of his account." [24] The cosmological argument made a wrong use of the category of causality. According to Kant that was applicable to phenomena only. The cosmological argument applies it to the noumenal world where there is freedom. Even if we use the argument, it leaves unexplained the First Cause with which the philosopher begins the argument. Moreover if we use the analogy of a finite world, the only logical conclusion is that it has a finite cause. The third proof Kant called the physico-theological. It is the familiar argument from design, and received more respectful treatment at Kant's hands than the other two. Yet he contended that "All that the argument from design can possibly prove is an architect of the world, who is very much limited by the adaptability of the material in which he works," [25] that is, it proves no more than a finite designer. It would seem as though the conclusion of Kant's criticism was in the main negative. But he had a purpose in his mind, viz., that of establishing the thesis that the knowledge of God which is the concern of religion is not attainable by intellectual means. In the *Critique of Practical Reason* he shows more clearly than in this *Critique* that the knowledge of God is the outcome of

[24] *Critique,* p. 368. [25] Ibid., p. 385.

moral experience. God is known and his existence implied in the moral life. This is the meaning of his famous dictum, "I must destroy knowledge to make room for faith." [26] If we were to stop with the *Critique of Pure Reason,* we would get too much of Kant's negative views in regard to the reason. In the *Critique of Practical Reason* he assures us of the authority of reason in the practise of morality. When dealing with the antinomies he discusses to some extent the problem of freedom. The understanding, he maintains, is unable to transcend the forms of thought which include causality, an endless chain of cause and effect relations. That did not satisfy the reason which in the dawn of philosophy posited a First Cause, himself uncaused, and free. That would mean a dilemma. You have determination in the phenomenal world, and freedom only in the noumenal. At all events the theoretical reason suggests the possibility of freedom. But the practical reason insists on it. The moral imperative implies moral possibility or freedom. And the endeavor to put the moral imperative into practise gives us our knowledge, our assurance that we are free.[27] Although it may be denied to us to know what are the full implications of our freedom, still our moral experience gives us an assurance that is true, an assurance that rests on our knowledge of the deeper nature of reality. Kant regarded the *Critique of Practical Reason* as the crown of his philosophical system. The primacy of the practical reason was beyond all doubt for him. And it was through it that he attained a kind of higher knowledge of freedom, immortality, and God. Only in the sphere of the moral life does man come into immediate relation with the world of noumena. Thus Kant made his ethics a handmaid of his metaphysics.

In conclusion let it be noted that the great advance that Kant was able to make in the philosophy of knowledge was due in considerable measure to his psychological acumen. Yet, if

[26] Ibid., Preface to the Second Edition, p. xxxv.

[27] "Freedom is the *ratio essendi* of the moral law, while the moral law is the *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom." *Critique of Practical Reason,* Abbott's translation, p. 88n.

his system is to be criticized, its chief defect is on this side. To be sure the scientific study of the mental life has made great strides since his day. We know that the processes whereby we perceive external objects are just as surely mental as the thought processes from which *a priori* judgments arise. Unhappily Kant recognized the active element of the mental life only in the understanding and reason. His conception of objects as "given" in perception suggests a passive attitude during which outside things operate actively on the sensibility. His analysis of the mental life needs to be carried a stage further back. There is another element of the mental life which the psychology of the Kantian period woefully neglected, namely, that the primary characteristic of the human mind is conation rather than cognition. To be sure, these phases are correlative, and Kant in the second *Critique* recognized that the active phase was a *sine qua non* for metaphysics and religion. But he did not give due recognition to the fact that the knowing subject has muscles and glands as well as organs of sense, effectors as well as receptors, operating from the very beginning of life. Kant said that the fundamental postulate of psychology is: "I think"; modern philosophy is inclined to change it to "I strive." His theory of the nature of consciousness is perhaps the least satisfactory element in all his philosophy, partly because he was heir to the current faculty interpretations and partly because of his fatal neglect of the voluntary element in the groundwork of knowledge. The mind is ceaselessly active, even when it is sitting in judgment on its own activities. Knowledge cannot be critically examined as something apart from the knowing activity, the way that Kant attempted. As Hegel pointed out, Kant's procedure is analogous to that of a man who resolves not to enter the water till he has learned to swim.

On the other hand, we must cordially recognize that the critical method of Kant was a great and powerful force working in the interests of freedom. Philosophy had suffered first

from religious dogmatism, and then from rationalistic dogmatism. But Kant's attack utterly destroyed the power of dogmatism in whatever form it appeared. Whether it raised its head as spiritualism or as materialism, whether it appeared in theistic or in atheistic guise, he was relentless in his criticism. The human reason is not its own master. It is not "either Cæsar or nothing." Metaphysics, which had been regarded as the great achievement of the human reason, was now seen to be impossible without the cooperation of the practical reason. Sham knowledge was destroyed that rational faith might flourish.

It was the merit of Kant to overcome, after a critical examination, the extreme conclusions of both rationalism and empiricism. Cartesian rationalism had left an unbridged chasm between matters of fact and the truths of reason, and even Locke had been unable to solve the problem. Moreover rationalism had failed to satisfy because of its barren formalism which Hume had already exposed. Hume, however, had gone to the opposite extreme, and allowed his empiricism such unrestricted liberty that it carried him over to scepticism. A new method was created for the philosophy of knowledge by the Kantian doctrine of the synthetic unity of apperception. The fundamental fact of consciousness is not analysis but synthesis. Kant's predecessors were inclined to neglect the fact that the mind was active. Even Kant, when he dealt with sense-perception, was prone to treat it as passive, and talked about "the given" in perception. But in his inquiry into the understanding he presented an active mind, and its chief activity is apperceptive synthesis. Furthermore this synthesizing process is not due to accidental associations, but to certain mental principles that make knowledge possible. The empiricists thought that knowledge was content only; Kant interpreted it as a synthesis of matter and form. Experience provides the matter; the mind itself furnishes the form. This is fundamental to the understanding of cognition.

WHY TECHNICAL SCHOLARSHIP?

A Theological Professor Looks at His Task

MORTON S. ENSLIN

In this day of emphasis upon the immediate and the practical this is no idle question. Even many of the colleges and universities are yielding to the insistent demands of their patrons, the students, that their college fit them to have a high and immediate market value. The emergence of a large number of distinctly "practical" courses in the curriculum is tending to make what were centers of sound learning and culture into vocational schools. The ideal of the educated man who could take his place in the world of men with a certain poise and reserve, who had struck his roots deep and was content to grow as an oak instead of a mushroom, seems to have vanished along with many other ideals of an effete past. Why bother about the Greeks and the Romans and their leisurely pursuits, when there are such challenges today? Why bother to read Virgil or Horace, who didn't even know how to make two lines rhyme, when we have red-blooded, snappy poets like Walt Mason with rippling rhymes that sound like poetry? And if we do find it necessary to read the old timers, haven't we got perfectly good translations written in honest English—or better yet one hundred per cent. American—that we don't have to slave over?

All the hours wasted thumbing lexicons and rearranging silly long Latin sentences with their habitual impoliteness to the straggling verb could so much better be employed in learning how to discover a prospective customer's weak spots or a good line of selling talk—that is, in more dignified jargon, the psychology of salesmanship. Even the minority who are not planning on becoming bond salesmen but are contemplating one of the other learned professions do not wish to dally too long among the flowers. So a most ingenious device has been

discovered. If you are planning to become a doctor you take certain courses in college which before these days of efficiency were offered in the medical schools, and thus skilfully hurdle a year or so's preparation. Or, if you be contemplating the ministry, courses somewhat inelegantly but vigorously referred to as " Bib Lit " count equally toward an A. B. and B. D., and approaching the seminary you demand credit for the previous work under threats of departing to more generous shades of learning unless satisfactory terms be offered.

This whole attitude finds expression in the theological seminaries as well. The quaint and archaic longing, expressed by the founders of one school of learning, " to advance learning and perpetuate it to posterity; dreading to leave an illiterate ministry to the churches, when our present ministers shall lie in the dust," is apparently giving way to the more modern and efficient desire to turn out parish and social engineers. And the subjects studied, or examined, should directly contribute. Accordingly there is a great desire felt for lectures rich in sermonic material, and the material ought to be ready at hand for the coming Sunday. Just as carpenters can now buy their lumber ready cut, planed, notched, and shellacked, all ready for the nails, so with two sermons to be prepared in addition to reading and classroom routine it is not surprising that a lecture which provides for one or both of these needs is highly desired. Of course, one solution would be not to preach until after graduation, but while probably some churches would not sorrow as those without hope if this were the practice, there are practical difficulties. To be sure, medical students do not normally engage in separate practice or law students in court procedure before graduation, but it is felt for some reason or other that the situation is different with the preacher.

But while the desire to find predigested material ready to hand is most natural, it is not unfreighted with dangers. Aside from the questionable propriety of using some one else's sermon —and an oral one is just as real property as one on the printed

page—there is the problem of continuing after the spoon-feeding stops. It is easy to say that free from the demands of classroom attendance and prescribed reading it will be possible to prepare them then. As a matter of fact the deluge of synthetic material from so-called " sermon-foundries " proves that habits once begun are not readily broken. A publisher recently advertised his product: " Nowhere will you find such heart-rending revival sermons. Try them " . . . and other of his wares were characterized as " popular," " striking," " full of pep," " unusual," and " superior." If there is one quality that a theological seminary should emphasize, it is honesty which causes its students to turn away in horror from such chicanery and deceit.

The student who emerges from a school whose aim has been to provide him his sermons ready made might just as well have saved his three years' time and instead have purchased annually Doran's *Minister's Manual.* The purpose of the seminary is to help men learn to preach, not to provide records to put on turntables.

Nor is this pious protest far afield from the title of this essay: Why Technical Scholarship? The fact that so many men in teachers' chairs are allowing themselves to be cajoled into becoming babbling brooks is one of the depressing notes in this present situation. When we awake to a realization that seminaries, even those without formal connection with a university, are actually educational institutions, charged with a sacred responsibility of developing their students' brains as well as lungs, there will be some prospect that the ministry may in the future regain the dignity of a learned profession.

I am not attempting here to consider the specific tasks of the various departments of a modern seminary. My purpose is restricted to the field of my own interest, New Testament. Scholarly interest and scientific research into these records of the past are not remote from human interests and needs today. The Bible is still likely to remain a center of interest

and inspiration for a large proportion of Christians for yet some time, in spite of the doubts which are being expressed in this regard, and not in whispers. Since this is the apparent situation, it behooves the minister to know this field. But how shortsighted is he who would use it as an arsenal containing weapons to demolish his opponents or as a text-book of science or of conduct, replete with answers for his problems. To use the Bible in this way is not only to degrade it, but to make of it, to use Pauline diction, "an instrument of sin." On the contrary, how it glows when we view it as the moving and inspiring record of the men and women who labored in the past and whose labors we are striving to carry on. The man or woman who can read this narrative of the past, can watch these forbears of ours grappling with their problems, sometimes falling, sometimes standing erect, striving, often mistakenly but with passionate honesty to make possible for others the joy that had come to them—the man who fails to be moved to the depths of his being by this story—not the story that the letters spell out, but the one that shines through them—and who does not find himself nerved on to grapple with his problems as they did with theirs—unhappy is such a man.

And this story is not yet known to us. For nearly two thousand years we have been seeking to read it, yet how many of its pages are still dark today. The richest and most rewarding discoveries are often not the words which the men who penned the narratives—moving as they often are—scratched on the fragile leaves of papyri, but those which moved them to write as they did but which could not find utterance. Not what they wrote, but what they sought, ofttimes in vain, to express.

It is only as we seek to live again in the first century, to walk the countryside of Galilee with Jesus and Peter and John, to trudge with Paul along the upper road to Ephesus or the Appian Way to Rome, to move about in the early church with

Hermas or to stand with that doughty Christian, Justin, as he penned his protests to Antoninus Pius and Aurelius, that we begin to realize what it was all about. And this appreciation can not come through reading of the New Testament alone—certainly it can not come by the method beloved by Christian Endeavor experts, a chapter a day (whether you feel like it or not—preferably the latter) and three chapters on Sunday. It comes as the result of familiarizing ourselves with the world of that day, of realizing that the Christian beginnings are not a chapter apart, and then of studying the biblical narratives as we would study any other documents of the past, examining the reported sayings and doings of Jesus as we would those of Socrates or Plato. Then and only then does the scene become real.

And this is the task which the technical scholar sets for himself. Not to carp and find fault and search for flaws, not to varnish over cracks or apologize for mistakes, but to seek honestly to let the records speak for themselves. It would seem unnecessary to remark that the probability is that those who are devoting their lives to this task are for the most part as interested in their subject and are moved by as deep a love for the records into which they delve as are those who spend themselves in other fields.

Two general fields of investigation lie open to the student: those of textual and historical criticism. It needs hardly be remarked that criticism does not imply faultfinding or the avid search for flaws. It is a perfectly respectable and colorless term for careful, scientific examination and observation. As Dryden happily remarked, "By *criticism,* as it was first instituted by Aristotle, was meant a standard of judging well."

The practical value of textual criticism is obvious. If we had the twenty-seven documents which came from the writers of our New Testament, there would be no need of textual criticism, for all the textual critic wants to know is, "What did the author write?" He is blissfully unconcerned with the

when, where, or why he wrote. But these original documents have unhappily long since disappeared. Aside from a few meager fragments of papyrus, themselves copies of copies, and containing but a few verses, the earliest copies we possess are not earlier than the fourth century. How many times had scribes put pen to paper between the time when Paul and his fellow Christians wrote and the scribes of the Codex Vaticanus and Codex Sinaiticus produced their magnificent vellums! From then on the copies were numerous. Briefly, we have more than three thousand Greek manuscripts which give in whole or part our New Testament; more than eight thousand which preserve the Latin version—called the Vulgate—of Jerome; and at least one thousand more copies in other ancient tongues, Syriac, Coptic, Armenian, Ethiopic, Georgian, or Gothic. In short, at least twelve thousand copies, no two of which are precisely alike. At a conservative figure more than one hundred and eighty thousand variant readings occur. Many, the large majority, are trivial, but others are of tremendous importance. Out of this vast host of witnesses the textual critic seeks to reconstruct what the original writers wrote.

Nor are these variations surprising. The scribes were human, and they were paid to do what they did. Regularly they copied what they had before them, letter by letter, with little regard for the sense. And of course errors crept in. At other times intentional corrections of what seemed to the scribe an error, or a marginal comment which he mistook for an accidentally omitted phrase—all these crept in. Out of this confusion and contradiction some semblance of order must be achieved. And so textual criticism is the first step toward knowing the New Testament. We must have before us the text—or as near to it as can be approximated—before we can hope to start. As I said, many of the differences are trivial, a trifling variation in the order of the words—with no appreciable difference in meaning—or a minor deviation in spelling.

Others are very different, and are of the utmost importance. For example, the oldest Syriac version is possibly based on a Greek text which read in Matthew 1: 16: "Jacob begat Joseph. Joseph, to whom the virgin Mary was espoused, begat Jesus, the one called Christ." Obviously a profitable discussion of the birth stories must take this into consideration. Or again there are occasional passages which are omitted by one type of text. Now omissions are not uncommon, but in this type of text they are; it is what is known as a full or paraphrastic text. Accordingly intentional omissions in this type of text are always suspicious. And Doctor Hort, one of the ablest textual critics who ever lived, regularly printed those passages in double brackets, as almost certainly not a part of the original documents. It is obvious that the historian will be very unwilling to use such passages in seeking to understand the history. Occasionally a tiny change will greatly affect the meaning of the passage. In Romans 5: 1 the American Revised version reads, "Being therefore justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ." But in the margin it says, "Many ancient authorities read, 'Let us have.'" The difference in Greek is trivial, *o* or *ω*. Probably at the time Paul lived the two letters were pronounced the same. In working on a very important Greek manuscript a year or so ago, I found the text apparently reading *o*, but being suspicious and examining it with a magnifying glass it was apparent that the original scribe of that manuscript had written *ω* and that a late scribe thought he knew more about it and so skilfully altered the *ω* to *o*, with the result that it was almost undiscernible to the naked eye. And it is not too much to say that to an extent the whole interpretation of the epistle depends on the reading adopted. Is it that Paul is saying, "Because we are justified by faith we are to strive after peace with God," or, "Because we are justified by God we are in a state of peace with him; i. e., that the feeling of calm and tranquillity that we now are in, as over against our despairing

doubt and sense of isolation, proves that we have been accepted by God?" Certainly no one will question the importance of this distinction. Or again in the so-called Apostolic decree of Acts 15, some manuscripts contain a fourfold prohibition "from the pollution of idols, from fornication, from what is strangled, and from blood" others omit "from what is strangled." The inclusion of the phrase would apparently suggest it was a ceremonial prohibition, its omission a moral. So one might go on endlessly. Obviously before we can really understand what the authors sought to express we must know what they actually wrote. Much splendid work has been done. The texts of Westcott and Hort and Nestle are both admirable in many ways, but by no means all has been accomplished. One of the obvious weaknesses of the King James version is that it is a translation of a text based on a very limited number of manuscripts, themselves decidedly inferior and comparatively late. The science of textual criticism had not been born, and the most ancient documents had not been discovered. Regardless of difference in diction, the King Jamés is obviously inferior to the American Revised version so far as accuracy in approximating what the original authors wrote is concerned. Just as advances have been made since 1611, so we can be certain that in the future much more work will be done in pushing toward that ideal goal, the *ipsissima verba* of the original writers, and many a page of church history will be rewritten as a result of this quest, which almost ludicrously is considered by so many as a dry-as-dust game of hide-and-seek played by myopic gentlemen with prismatic glasses.

The higher critic starts in where the textual critic leaves off. Much prejudice has arisen because of the term higher criticism. As I have mentioned above, criticism has too often been understood in the adverse sense of flaw-seeking and fault-finding, while the term "higher" seemed an unwarranted arrogance, as if these self-appointed critics set themselves as superior to the Bible. Of course, we all know better, but it is amazing how

true the proverb is, "A lie circles the globe while truth is getting its boots on." This misconception still prevails in many quarters. Of course, the term "higher" by no means implies a fancied superiority to the original writers, but merely is used in contradistinction to "lower" criticism. It is concerned with questions higher up the stream. The textual or lower critic is at the river's mouth, his interest, the material as it comes from the writers' pens; the higher critic is concerned with earlier questions: Who was the author, where did he live, when did he write, why, what sources of information did he have? Had his science been known as "literary and historical research" instead of higher criticism, much ink might have been saved and rancor avoided.

Another point should be observed. To achieve any real and lasting result the literary critic must strive to be as objective and honest as possible. Of course, there is always the human equation to be reckoned, and a completely unbiased individual can not exist. Science tells us that it will always be impossible to attain the absolute zero, for, if we did, everything would fall apart. So probably in the individual. The man who was completely free from all bias would probably no longer remain an individual. But just as in physics we can get pretty cold, so the literary investigator can achieve a pretty fair degree of mental honesty. At any rate he can refrain from weighing his hand along with the object in the scale, in order to be sure that the balance will dip! So the critic who starts out with apologetic purpose to defend or antagonistic purpose to destroy is under a handicap. He *may* in spite of his object be able to read the scale aright, but he will always be inclined to shade the reading a bit. Happy the man who prefers to allow his findings to determine his feelings, rather than his feelings his findings! The church will be obliged, willy nilly, to realize this as the years go by. Results which are viewed with wrath today will be accepted as common place tomorrow. Of course, here as elsewhere in religion, it may

be well to have in mind that with some Christians, as it is said to be with the Lord, a day is as a thousand years. For example, some Christians in Tennessee recently became decidedly alarmed by their discovery that a man named Darwin had written a most blasphemous book; and I have heard of a professor of Old Testament who some time ago entered his class in high dudgeon because a godless German named Graf had raised his voice against Moses.

Actually, however, many of the findings which investigators, thrilling in their quest in this fascinating land, are making, although they may at first cause the same shiver and gooseflesh a cold bath does, are of a character when rightly appreciated to make no Christian ashamed of his heritage. Much research has been carried on regarding the person of Jesus of Nazareth, and to many the results have been awful. So much of the material we had become accustomed to has been shown to be decoration and adornment. Yet the fact remains that while much of what we thought he had said and done must be seen as the composition of his worshipers bringing their gold and frankincense and myrrh, there yet stands one whom not alone his own followers but we feel to have been worthy of their highest praise. In the light of his courage and devotion, his loyalty to the light as it came to him, his ability to arouse in those with whom he came in contact a deathless devotion, our queries regarding the way this saying or that attributed to him meets this problem or that with which we find ourselves confronted pale into insignificance, and we find ourselves humbled and longing to meet our problems with the same resoluteness and simplicity as he did his in Palestine twenty centuries ago.

Not only does modern investigation reveal Jesus as a tremendously potent figure whom we can respect and love as well as take for granted, but it also serves a purpose as practical as any can desire. Many Christians may not be aware of the fact that for more than thirty years many alienists and

pathologists have seen in Jesus of Nazareth a legitimate specimen for their analysis, and have rendered various diagnoses—epileptic, paranoiac, morbid degenerate. The scandalized protests of tearful Christians are of no consequence here. But the higher critic and he alone is in the position to spike these guns, and has done so with great effectiveness, by showing that when one recognizes the composite nature of the Gospels, the differences between the points of view of the synoptists and the Fourth Gospel, the basis for the pathological diagnoses vanishes. In this connection it is to be emphasized that any unprejudiced reader of the four Gospels, if compelled to believe that they were four parallel mutually independent chronicles of eye-witnesses, could hardly avoid conclusions akin to those of the alienists. So here we have but another of the cases—and they are legion—where the higher critics have saved Jesus from his friends.

Another and perhaps the most interesting of the results of modern criticism is that relating to the changing nature—development—of early Christianity. For many years it has been evident that there was a vast difference between the nature of the message of Jesus and that of Paul, or to use a convenient anachronism, the first and subsequent acts of Christianity. This discovery has caused much heartburn, and passionate pleas have occasionally been made, " Back to Jesus." At other times this discovery has resulted in unsparing condemnation of Paul and his fellows for perverting the simple gospel stream. But the meaning was the same in both protests. " Back to Jesus " has usually had as its kernel "Away from Paul."

But if modern scholarship has shown us anything, it is that this criticism is at best very faulty and short-sighted. This is not meant to imply there was not a change. Indeed there was. Never in the history of Christian thought has there been a development as rapid and revolutionary as that which took place in the first few decades following Calvary. Had Jesus attended a church service in Corinth in the year 54, I fancy

he would have been astounded, and as he departed from the door would have shaken his head in amazement: Is this the fruit of my months in Galilee! A change, yes; but was it for the worse? One thing is very certain. Had there been no change, there would have been no Christianity. Regardless of the intrinsic value of a teaching, unless men know it it can exercise no influence. The revolutionary challenge of Jesus was especially adapted to the Palestine of his day. If it had not been, he probably would not have given it, for if ever a man was the child of his environment that man was Jesus of Nazareth. But it was not a message, in the form in which he announced it, that would have exerted any appreciable influence on the outside world. Judaism for centuries had been known; there had been a constant flow of proselytes; but because of its nature it was not a gospel for the many. Because it was an old, proud, and established religion it could invite—it would not seek nor change. The challenge of Jesus with its insistence on repentance, with its content, the impending change, would have fallen on deaf ears in any portion other than Palestine of the Mediterranean basin. The Greek and Roman, like Gallio, "cared for none of these things." Salvation, security, hope amidst the crumbling ruins of the older religions—after all these did the Gentiles seek. And it was because this new movement, getting new life into it, was able by a series of historical accidents to break away from—or be thrust outside of—Judaism that Christianity triumphed as it did. Unhampered by a traditional past it was far-sighted enough under the guidance of such men as Paul to see that the aims and longings of every human heart were legitimate. That it was not necessary for Gentiles to banish their aims and aspirations, their hopes and longings, and to become Jews, but that the gospel of Christ was broad enough and deep enough to meet and satisfy the longing of every human heart. That was the profoundest lesson the early church could have learned. And so, then as now, the pew molded the pulpit fully

as much as did the pulpit the pew. As the months and years went by, the nature of the teaching was changing. The most convincing proof that Christianity did adapt itself to its environment, and provided in acceptable form that assurance and security that men were questing for is that Constantine, who perhaps lacked no quality more conspicuously than piety, saw emblazoned in the sky a cross and heard the congenial word that his campaign would be successful. Had Christianity not finally won out over her neck-and-neck rival Mithraism, it is extremely likely that he would have seen a torch, or perhaps even a helmet.

Facts like these and many others the historian sees revealed as he pushes aside the veil of the years, and he would publish them regardless of their homiletic value today, simply because they are true. Happy, however, the man who can see a practical advantage from doing what he would have done anyway. The man to whom the first centuries of the church are real, not Scriptural panoramas; who can read between the lines, not only what they said, but what they sought in vain to express; who sees the narrow provincialism giving way before the onward sweep of men like Paul sure that the love of Christ was " wider than the wideness of the sea "; that every worthy longing of the human heart could find its fulfilment in him—the man who can read that story and yet feel the need of ready-made sermons, may make a good arbiter in disputes between some modern Euodia and Syntyche, may be indefatigable in ringing door-bells and addressing Rotary Clubs, but he will never preach sermons of depth and power, even though the outline is communicated to him in words of one syllable and his voice be tuned to his professor's key.

MAKING WORSHIP ETHICAL IN TEMPER

Professor EARL E. SPEICHER
Northland College

THE difficulties involved in providing opportunity for public worship are not always appreciated nor understood. "Worship in spirit and in truth" is a consummation devoutly to be wished, but not easily attained. Nevertheless it ought to be the earnest endeavor of the churches to provide for and incite to such worship. If they are ineffective in cultivating a virile and dynamic spiritual experience, as a basis and stimulus for Christian character, they falter in the first reach of their responsibility, for the stimulation and guidance of Christian conduct is, we believe, the churches' highest mission, and in the future they will be expected to be more and more effective at this point or emphasize failure at a critical point.

In view, also, of the trend toward institutional specialization, the churches will be wise to limit somewhat their range of activities and concentrate on those for which they are especially adapted. Many activities once the sole responsibility of the churches have been taken over by other agencies, and are being discharged in many cases with greater efficiency by these new institutions.

This tendency, if encouraged, will leave to the churches the more distinctively religious duties, thereby making possible not only greater effectiveness in this limited field, but also a greater opportunity to render these distinctive contributions for which, we believe, the churches have been providentially appointed and ordained. Even teaching religion, in so far as it means merely dissemination of information, may, and perhaps must, be shared with other agencies; so also much of the work coming under the head of social service; but the function of ministering to the spiritual needs of men and of lifting conduct through religious motivation to even higher planes is the great

objective of the churches—a task requiring a specialized institution and an expertly trained personnel.

To strengthen the work of the churches at this point would seem to be both good strategy and good religion. In fact nothing would so establish the position and prestige of the churches in the eyes of the world as concentration upon worship and a distinctively religious program.

It may be added parenthetically that further concentration upon worship does not, and should not, mean any easing up in the churches' effort to establish a kingdom of righteousness; in fact the chief purpose of this program would be to undergird and motivate *all* the varied endeavors toward this end, and thus to make effective the ethical teaching of the churches. Worship without sincerity of ethical motive is superstition; ethics without genuine religious experience and consciousness of cosmic significance lacks dynamic and power. The quest for a redeemed world needs the enthusiasm and the vision which comes from religion.

Furthermore, the trends of our industrial and machine age are placing a terrific strain upon moral and ethical standards. One wonders whether society with its present moral equipment can withstand the impact of this modern industrial and economic expansion. The mounting standards of living, the increase of leisure, the commercialization of amusements and recreation, the ruthless economic competition which this insane race for wealth is creating requires a degree of ethically responsible balance on the part of the masses far greater than at any period in the history of the world.

Something, therefore, should be done by the churches in a special way to meet the emergency; something to reenforce and strengthen ethical standards and moral good-will. They should endeavor to inspire society to be rid of the evils which have become so threatening to the orderly processes of government and stability of our institutions. Through worship they have an indispensable contribution to make to this end.

I

Worship has not always served an ethical purpose. In fact, here has been the most persistent difficulty. Always the tendency has been and is to lose sight of "justice, and mercy, and faith." It is one of the risks of institutional practise. Routine and uniformity always tend to develop inertness and to dull personal responsibility. Well did the prophet Amos warn his contemporaries: "I hate, I despise your feasts, and I will take no delight in your solemn assemblies. Yea, though ye offer me your burnt-offerings and meal-offerings, I will not accept them; neither will I regard the peace-offerings of your fat beasts. Take away from me the noise of thy songs; for I will not hear the melody of thy viols. But let justice roll down as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream."

Study of worship programs in the churches reveals a surprising amount of repetition. Orders of worship vary little over long periods of time, adhering in most cases to denominational standards. Much use is made of such items as the Lord's Prayer, Apostles' Creed, Responsive Readings in church hymnal, and of a rather limited range of hymns. Such persistent repetition must eventually fail to arouse the originally intended response and thereby to function in the desired way. The whole question, as to how essential repetition is in public worship and to what extent it should be used, should receive careful study.

But more important than the element of repetition are the material and aids used in the program of worship. As now constituted, the bulk of material has been inherited from the past—a product of Christian and Jewish experience in periods of history very different from ours with wholly different intellectual outlooks. Consequently much of this material appears foreign and unreal to the modern mind, reflecting the intellectual backgrounds and religious problems of former times. Public worship will increase in effectiveness, if the material and

aids used are appropriate and meaningful to modern experience. The foregoing applies especially to theological forms and hymnology. Primary spiritual truth as presented by the Bible provides first-rate material; it is universal in its application to human experience. And there are fundamental religious needs which perhaps will always remain the same. These elements are constant and permanent and should therefore be used in every program of worship. But there are also transitory elements which are continually changing and which must also find a place in the program of worship, if worship is to be geared to modern living. For example, the same God is worshiped, but the situations in which men live and the problems which agitate their minds are continually changing. God is the unchanging factor of personal experience and there is the same need of salvation; but God is conceived in different terms and men are in need of being saved from ever newly emerging evils produced by a developing civilization. Thus God remains the central fact of the universe, but he is viewed from the ever-shifting angle of personal experience. Public worship must be responsive to this changing experience, if it is to retain vitality and ethical imperative.

Worship, then, is not for worship's sake but rather for the purpose of serving individual and corporate needs. *From the Christian point of view, worship is not primarily an act of self-abasement to enhance the prestige of Deity,* but *rather an endeavor to relate oneself to the Supreme Power in such a way as will make for righteousness. The end is personal and social.* Consequently it is supremely important that worship be conscious of the needs it seeks to serve, in order to be real as well as spiritual, for spirituality lies in the same direction as reality and, in the final analysis, is identical with reality.

II

Granting that the ultimate objective of worship is ethical and at the same time spiritual, what are the mediate objectives

and how are they to be discovered? To answer these questions one must go to the folks who are to profit by worship.

Ostensibly folks go to church just as they go to school or to a physician or to a bank or to an attorney-at-law, for some distinct purpose, and with the expectation of receiving some benefit or satisfaction. It is therefore important for those who administer the service of worship to discover what needs they should serve. What do folks need that religion can supply? That men need religion is beyond cavil, but the discovery of the specific needs of men today, and the varied and subtle forms which these needs take in the complexity of modern life, requires not only a new technique but a new attitude. The churches must be responsive to contemporary life and sensitive to the religious needs of the present ongoing Christian experience. Especially should they help at the points of stress and strain where the ideals of religion come into conflict with the actual trends of modern life. Worship should give courage, imagination, and vision to those who are earnestly endeavoring to be loyal to the ideals of Jesus in a world which is only lukewarm or even hostile to his teaching.

The business of the churches, therefore, is, having discovered the needs they should serve, then to develop a program in accordance with these needs. For example, the physician has his technique for diagnosis of disease. The school-teacher has facilities at hand for the discovery of native ability, aptitudes, interests, and actual achievement of his pupils, and can use this information as a basis for adapting his methods and instruction to the actual needs and requirements of his pupils.

The same sort of knowledge and systematic procedure are required in building up a program of worship which will serve specific purposes and satisfy personal needs. Such a fact-finding procedure is entirely in line with what alert pastors have been doing for a long time. But they would welcome, I am sure, a more adequate technique whereby such information might be more thoroughly and systematically gathered and

made available. In building a program of worship and in general in rendering such service as belongs to the work of the pastor, such material would be invaluable.

To be sure, this places additional responsibility upon the now overworked pastor but, be it remembered, these new duties, if they be new, are directly concerned with the central task of the pastor's whole job. Perhaps the office of deacon might be given a new lease of life through enlistment in this purely spiritual service. A little more work for the deacons and a little less pressure from the finance committee might be a wholesome shift in many churches. In any case the essentially spiritual program of the churches should receive first and primary attention.

To this end a survey, as suggested above, thoroughly executed and constantly checked will reveal the churches' task and will provide a foundation and a guide for the development of a religious program in accordance with actual needs of the people who are to be served. For whatever the churches have been doing, and they have been doing a great work, they have not, I think, been serving the personal religious needs of the people to the extent they should and as they must if institutional Christianity is to continue to prosper. The personal needs of men in religion are not being served as they have a right to expect. In many cases they turn away from the churches in disappointment; they are hungry for spiritual food, but are not being satisfied. They go to church with their doubts and discouragements, weary and worn from the exacting demands of our every-day life. They crave spiritual recreation, vision, and imagination to see far and beyond their own little circle of activity and interests; they need assurance and hope.

And who will say the churches are adequately providing for these varied needs? In fact much of the restlessness and growing indifference within the churches is caused by a feeling that the churches are not sufficiently responsive to these needs.

On the other hand, religion is one of the greatest powers in the world; and if the cultivation of the religious life is made central in the program of the churches, and the resources of religion are made available in this age which so sorely needs these ministrations, the churches will be filled to overflowing.

III

In the preceding section we have tried to point out the advantages of discovering the needs and objectives of worship in the experiences and from the point of view of the worshiper, in order to set up a program of worship which will aid *in the production of worshipful experience that is significant and ethically efficacious.* We pass now to another phase of reality in worship, namely, the process and method of conducting worship.

Following the same point of view, our first concern here is that of guarding and preserving intact the original and foundation experience of the worshiper, particularly his consciousness of the needs that motivate his worship, and of stimulating and guiding this underlying experience in such a way as will bring to him the highest and richest rewards for his effort. Worship becomes efficacious through and by one's experience, whatever external elements may enter into that experience. Religion cannot be " put across "; it comes up through experience, and involves the whole and not a part only of that experience. Consequently, public worship will be most effective when it attempts to stimulate, supplement, and direct the effort of the individual in his quest for the supreme values too often not associated with worship.

On the contrary, public worship which is conducted in a way which tends to submerge individual initiative and consciousness of the worshiper's own needs, or which by excessive stimulation lifts him beyond the realities of his life, making him forget ordinary mundane affairs, has the effect of retarding rather than helping the religious development of the in-

dividual. *To be ethically efficacious worship must be geared to the ongoing life of the individual.* It must use to the full the trends of individual experience and under wise direction lead the worshiper to a fuller realization of his quest.

Furthermore, public worship should not encourage a one-sided or distorted experience. One can best worship God and lay hold of spiritual realities when and if the processes of the whole mind function normally and with balance. To be sure, worship represents a special attitude and a unique experience and thereby requires a distinct approach, but the actual objectives of worship are best realized not by ignoring any phase of the mind but rather by directing the whole mind toward the objectives of worship. Much harm has resulted from emotionalism at one extreme and intellectualism at the other. The former usually lacks ethical seriousness and intelligent direction; the latter is apt to be too optimistic in and too apologetic for the status quo. Both tend to divorce religion and life. And both tendencies have been represented in the Protestant movement, and to a greater or less extent they continue to affect the attitude of the churches toward worship.

A more subtle phase of the intellectualistic attitude of Protestantism toward religion, which makes for unreality in worship, is the overemphasis upon indoctrination and a consequent neglect in cultivating a vitalizing religious experience. Luther's dictum, "The just shall live by *faith,*" was later interpreted to mean intellectual assent in right belief or sound doctrine. With this theological interpretation of religion it was but natural that one of the chief interests of the Protestant churches should have become that of indoctrinating the people in the theology of the sects. Furthermore, given a system of doctrine which had become fixed and authoritative, and necessary to salvation, it was again but natural that the churches should want it preserved and passed on in its pristine form. This not only magnified the teaching function of the churches at the expense of worship, but demanded a form of pedagogy

in harmony with a program of " putting across " this theology —which incidently is not adapted to the cultivation of reality in worship.

The sermon of course became the chief instrument in carrying forward this program. The sermon still holds the center of attention not only in the weekly church service but in the whole program of the churches. Worship is incidental. It is interesting to see how the hymns, Scripture, and other parts of the regular church service are selected quite commonly to fit the theme of the sermon. The supreme effort of the minister is to preach a message. So it is not by accident that the weekly church service has become known as a " preaching service." The doctrinal and intellectualistic interests of the churches have crowded worship to one side.

So there is a conflict here—a conflict which need not and should not exist; but a conflict nevertheless, representing two very different approaches to religion. It is a conflict of emphasis and of method. True to Protestantism's historical interpretation of religion in terms of rationalistic leanings, the churches are endeavoring, with some exceptions of course, to provide an education *about* religion. And on the basis of method this procedure is very much open to question. Certainly if one wants an education that is dynamic and operative as a conduct-control, it is ineffective. To achieve the objectives of worship and of religion generally it must be an education *in* religion.

There is a difference between religion ideas and ideas about religion. Religion in the truest sense is not interested primarily in ideas about religion, for religion is an art not a science. Ideas are an aid and clear thinking is indispensable. But the point is that the man of religion is interested first in the practise of religion and only secondly, if at all, in formulating and systematizing ideas about religion. Jesus was a perfect example of the religious approach. He was not interested in what we would call academic questions about religion.

He expounded no theology, nor added materially to the world's theories of religion. We have no systematic presentation of any abstract problem of religion in the extant teachings of Jesus. He was too busy living religion to discuss it. He was neither a philosopher, nor a theologian, nor even a teacher in an academic sense. He was an experimentalist in religion. What he taught was forged in the white heat of his experience and was a product or at least tested by that experience. His devotional life did not wait upon a clarification of his idea of God; he was meanwhile very conscious of a vital and sustaining relationship to God.

In some such way worship when it is real is education in religion; for it provides an awakened sense of responsibility, ties the soul up with the real world by an awakened conscience, and enlists men in the task of building a better world and the cultivation of a closer union with God and his purpose. One of the supreme needs of our modern world is a religious experience which will irradiate the whole of life and give it cosmic significance. Such adjustment to the Supreme Personality is the final objective of religion, as it is the ultimate achievement of human destiny. Thus by cultivating in worship a real, vital, and genuine religious experience, the churches have the high privilege of making a great contribution toward this end.

THE ATTITUDE OF AMERICAN BAPTISTS TO CHURCH HOLY DAYS

R. E. E. HARKNESS

In making such a study one must begin, presumably, with Roger Williams, traditionally America's first Baptist, though never immersed. In all his writings, however, no specific reference is to be found to Christmas or Easter. Nevertheless, we may form our estimate of his attitude from our knowledge of the Pilgrims, with whom he associated and to whom he was closely akin, who on that first Christmas day in America, December 25, 1620, deliberately "went on shore, some to fell timber, some to rive, some to saw, and some to carry," in order to show their contempt for the sacredness of the day. Moreover, though his writings make no mention of these days, they are sufficiently full of a horror of all things Romish as to indicate his abhorrence of any observance of them.

And this seems to be the attitude of Baptists in general throughout New England during the colonial period and even much later. So critical were they of the Roman Church in every particular that they scrupulously avoided any semblance of its forms and practise, consequently making any direct reference to these days unnecessary.

It is among the Baptists of the middle colonies that we discover the first expression of their attitude in this regard. Rev. David Jones, member of a Baptist family of many generations, whose descendants are still prominent in the Philadelphia area, was a missionary to the Shawnee and Delaware Indians in 1772-73. In his diary under date of Monday, February 15, 1773, he laments that some of his Indians have been taught the necessity of observing Easter, declaring: "My soul was filled with horror to think that mortal man should presume to teach a heathen religiously to observe what God Almighty never taught him as any part of his will." He then launches into an attack

upon the sinfulness of making these days holy. Christmas "may with more propriety be called popemas." "'Tis certain," he says, "that Christ never intended any singular homage to be paid to the day of his birth, which is plain from there being no records of it in the holy scripture." "Will it be uncharitable, then," he asks, "to call such as uphold the reliques of popery, the *worshippers* of the beast in these particulars?"

Another significant illustration is discovered in the memoirs of John Mason Peck, pioneer Baptist missionary to Illinois. In his diary, December twenty-fifth is recorded year after year without any indication whatever that it is Christmas Day. For instance, in 1823 we find him, according to his own reports, holding meetings on the evening of December twenty-fourth, and traveling all the next day to some other appointment. In fact, there is not the slightest hint in his entire journal, kept to within a few days of his death in 1858, of any special recognition or celebration of either of these seasons. There is, however, a note of the observance of our national Thanksgiving Day, November 26, 1856.

These three men, each something of a leader within his own century and his own section of the country, may be considered as representing the attitude of certain Baptists toward the Holy Days of the Church, down to the middle of the past century. Were they true representatives of the denomination in general? When, then, did the Baptists begin to observe these days in a religious way? What is the history of that transformation within the Baptist fold from the days of Peck to those of 1930, with their present Christmas tree exercises and pageants, their Lenten observances, Passion Week noon-day meditations, and their increasing emphasis upon Easter services of worship and consecration?

Perhaps to make a thorough study of the subject it will be well, as has already been intimated, to divide the territory into four main sections: New England; the Middle Atlantic; the Southern, and the Mid-West.

I

Turning first to New England we find that the Old Pilgrim-Puritan attitude continues to a very late date. It may be said that the great religious feast day of that section was Thanksgiving Day, observed in private home and church the last Thursday of each November. Another day, however, of sacred observance by the churches throughout all New England, was Forefathers' Day, by some celebrated on December 21 and by others on December 22, which seems to have satisfied the needs of the people for festival occasions.

Thus not until a very late date is Christmas observed in either home or church by the Puritan descendants. *The Christian Reflector,* the Baptist weekly of Boston, seemingly never refers to Christmas until the issue of January 4, 1844, which carries an advertisement for Christmas and New Year presents of muffs and boas. A similar one appears in the issue of December 19, 1844, but the next year, December 18, 1845, we find an editorial in answer to a correspondent's question as to whether there is any satisfactory evidence that Jesus was born December 25, and whether early Christians commemorated the day. "The conflicting opinions of men on the subject," says the editor, "show that the time is shrouded in uncertainty." The word itself, Christ and Mass, is evidence of its origin. "Why, then, will Bible Christians perpetuate an error that had its rise from the spirit of religious despotism, the observance of which is attended with much more evil than good, as might be easily proved?"

The edition which appeared the following week, under date of December 25, makes no reference whatever to the fact that it is Christmas Day.

Indeed it is not until the late eighties that the day begins to receive recognition by the churches, though little Christmas stories for the children, of high moral teaching, are to be found in the religious press somewhat earlier. Thus under date of

January 3, 1889, we read: "We cannot conceal the fact that year after year in Puritan New England the glory of Thanksgiving is paling before the increasing honors we pay to Christmas. In most of the Baptist churches, last Sunday, sermons were preached upon the birth of our Saviour, and what is not so well, in many of them the musical services were so prolonged as to encroach seriously upon the time to be given to the sermon." Not until this same year of 1889 do we find any such report as this, that "The First Church of New Haven observed Christmas Sunday with a Christmas sermon and tasteful church decorations." And not for some years do reports of Sunday-school Christmas trees become general.

As to Easter, we discover that in almost every New England State for many years a Fast Day was appointed by the governor, usually to be held early in April. Analogous to the effect of Forefathers' Day upon Christmas this may have deferred the observance of Easter, since as late as 1875 we meet with a denunciatory reference to the day, and not until 1885 may we read such a report as the following from the Baptists of Boston: "Our own churches are coming more and more every year into imitation of their neighbors in a free use of flowers and music, but in all cases, I believe, they rely only on the preached word and the promised Spirit to move and save souls." Which is a gentle Baptist rebuke to their Episcopalian brethren in the old Puritan center.

However, we learn that in 1890 the church in Webster, Mass., had a wonderful Easter service of beauty and blessing. But most remarkable for that period, and the earliest report for any section, is the announcement that in this same year of 1890 "Rev. T. E. Busfield of Bangor, Me., began extra meetings the week before Easter, taking up the events in our Saviour's life which occurred on the given day of the week."

In New England, then, there was no general observance of either of these days by the Baptist churches until the nineties of the last century.

II

In the Mid-Atlantic States a more liberal attitude is discernible at a much earlier period. The first mention of the day in the Baptist periodicals for New York, appears in the *Examiner and Chronicle* under date of January 5, 1865, which reports that various churches remembered their pastors with gifts during the holiday season of Christmas and New Year's. This seems to have been a custom of fairly long standing with little distinction between the two days being made, the "Christmas" festival so called often being held on New Year's Eve. In this issue also occurs a report of a public-school Christmas tree, which evidently was something new since it emphasizes that there was a green tree set up with wax tapers upon it. In the December issues of this year we discover Christmas stories and poems for the first time, and in the issue of December 28, 1865, is a note that "all the business houses of the city (New York) were closed throughout the Day."

Though Christmas may thus have been a home day among New York Baptists rather early in the latter half of the nineteenth century, it does not become a Sunday-school or church day until the seventies. In 1870 the *Examiner* editorially remarks: "No intelligent person supposes nowadays that our Saviour was born on the 25th of December." "If therefore, Christmas as a *religious* observance is a 'human institution savoring of Papistical will-worship' as the old Puritans styled it," nevertheless "in its social aspect Christmas-tide is altogether as unobjectionable as it is delightful," thus, "as a social holiday let us make it a 'Merry Christmas' in good sooth to every heart that we can reach by words and deeds of kindness and Christian love."

The earliest report met with of its "religious observance" is of a "rare Christmas celebration" on the evening of December 30, 1872, when scholars and teachers of the Sunday school of the First Baptist Church, Plainfield, N. J., exchanged gifts.

But in 1875 when such reports have become numerous, the *Examiner* is careful to warn against the danger. Let the children be taught it is more blessed to give than to receive. In 1876 this same editor says it is very well to observe some day as an anniversary of the birth of Jesus but children should not be taught that December the twenty-fifth is " the veritable day." Even in 1880, when Sunday-school trees are general, he puts himself on record as opposing the *religious observance* of the day though he sees no reason why it should not be enjoyed as a *social institution.*

Pennsylvania gives evidence of even an earlier date for social or family celebration. *The Baptist Record,* Philadelphia, January 4, 1843, says: " Indeed for its religious observance it is impossible to offer any reasons, that are sound either in history or theology; but we confess that numerous pleasing associations always render the return of the season welcome to our mind. We can hail it as the day for cakes and carols, gifts and greetings, family gatherings and festive cheerfulness." And in the issue of December 25, 1844, this editor half apologizes for wishing his " readers a Happy Christmas . . . in conformity with a very innocent and pleasant practise."

It is not until the later sixties that we read of the church celebrations and even then there is not unanimous accord. In 1865 churches and Sunday schools remember their pastors and superintendents with holiday gifts. Christmas stories and advertisements are to be found. By '67 and '68 there are a number of reports of Sunday-school Christmas trees with presents and programs. But *The National Baptist,* Philadelphia, of 1866 and again of '69, fears the innovation and warns against it: " We have no special objection to Christmas as a domestic and social holiday. . . But to assume our festival of Christmas as the real birthday of Christ is merely an assumption against a host of probabilities and to give it any peculiar religious significance is an absurdity and impertinence."

Yet the very next year, 1870, this same paper states: " We

have been called upon to chronicle a number of social Sunday-school entertainments, and it has been an agreeable task," for such occasions "judiciously managed often become a means of grace, as they strengthen the ties that bind the pupils to the school and the sanctuary." So the custom grew. In this decade we meet with the practise of the children bringing gifts for the poor. But in 1881 Sunday schools in Pittsburgh go to the extreme, with Santa Claus coming down the chimney with his pack or arriving to the accompaniment of the jangling thrill of sleigh-bells.

Easter observance has a later date in these Mid-Atlantic churches. Not until April, 1875, do we find the New York *Examiner* reporting: "Easter is coming to be honored by the non-liturgical churches, after a fashion"; but a long editorial argues against its adoption lest the churches "annex the whole series of 'movable feasts.'" And it adds, "As a step in that direction we have already heard of a 'Palm Sunday' sermon from a Baptist pulpit," which formalism the *Examiner* decries.

But the *Baptist Weekly* of New York on April 1, 1880, favorably comments on the fact that "Easter Sunday seems every year to gain more recognition." "Too generally," it believes, "men think of the crucified, dead, Christ, and it is well if they are reminded of the living Jesus ready to save."

By 1885 the *Examiner* concludes that it is perfectly proper to observe the day though care should be taken to avoid the gay display of flowers and choral music, but by 1889 even this paper says it cannot "see how any one should object to the due observance of the anniversary of the Lord's resurrection who considers it quite proper to observe the anniversary of Washington's birth."

In Philadelphia the First Church as early as 1880, under the pastorate of Dr. George Dana Boardman, was doing the unorthodox thing of holding Good Friday services at "three in the afternoon," and special Easter services upon the following Sunday were thus reported: "the pulpit was beautifully

decorated with growing plants and fragrant flowers, and joyous anthems and chants were sung by the choir and congregation."

In 1882, however, President H. G. Weston, of Crozer Theological Seminary, very weightily argued against the observance of the day. Every Sunday, said he, commemorates the resurrection, and therefore he found it ever impossible to preach a special Easter sermon.

Nevertheless the custom became quite general as early as 1883, a commentary perhaps upon the influence of a Seminary upon its students. In the *Standard* (Chicago) of March 29, 1883, we find a letter from a Philadelphia correspondent:

> More is being made every year of Easter day. It is no uncommon thing for churches to give orders to florists, the filling of which must cost hundreds of dollars. One church had a floral dove measuring from tip to tip of wings over five feet. Another a full-sized tomb made of flowers over which was the legend in flowers, "He is not here but is risen" . . . What would our forefathers say? And what would they say to the celebrating at three o'clock on Good Friday the anniversary of the crucifixion of our Lord?

Grace Church, Philadelphia, announced in *The National Baptist* of April 10, 1884, that forty or more were to be baptized on Easter Sunday, "an appropriate observance," it adds, "for the day." This is perhaps the first indication of the recognition of the day by this church inasmuch as heretofore it had been somewhat critical toward the conduct of the First Church in this respect. However, in the issue of April 24, The Memorial Baptist Church, Philadelphia, reports that on Easter

> special services were held in the morning, the leading thought of which was the Risen Christ. Choice flowering plants and shrubs were massed effectively upon the spacious pulpit. Upon the great arch below the organ loft the legend "He is Risen" was blazoned in large letters composed of beautiful flowers. Pendant from the arch hung a lovely floral design, a white cross with the victor's crown at its foot.

Such decorations and detailed report concerning them indicates, no doubt, that the custom was quite new.

By 1890, this same Baptist journal reports:

> It has become quite a custom with our Philadelphia churches to give some recognition to Easter Sunday. On this Easter, some of the churches had elaborate floral decorations and special music. In perhaps every church the sermon was upon the resurrection. Many of the churches had baptisms and special exercises were also held in many of the Sunday schools.

And it concludes, "We heartily rejoice in the widely spreading observance of the Easter festival."

Yet at the meeting of the Baptist Congress, held in the First Baptist Church, Philadelphia, May 19, 1892, the entire first evening session was given over to a discussion of this subject under the topic: "The Christian Year—How far is its recognition advisable?" The first paper was read by Dr. H. G. Weston, D. D., President of Crozer Theological Seminary, who again declared his opposition to any observance of these days. In this he was ably supported by Rev. James W. Willmarth, D. D., of Philadelphia. Arrayed against these two were four of the flaming youth within the ministry who dared risk their futures by championing the more liberal and progressive custom: Rev. W. H. P. Faunce, then of the Fifth Avenue Baptist Church, New York City; Rev. Robert S. MacArthur, D. D., Calvary Baptist Church, New York City; Rev. George Dana Boardman, D. D., First Baptist Church, Philadelphia, and Rev. S. B. Meeser, then of Paterson, N. J., and many others in private conversation.

III

In the Southern States it is evident the Baptists celebrated Christmas as a home festival, if not as a religious occasion, much earlier than did their brethren of the North. It was long the custom of the people to "pound" their minister at that season, that is, to "surprise" him with an evening of gaiety and bountiful gifts of food and farm products. A correspondent to the Boston *Christian Reflector,* thus writes from Baltimore, Md., December 25, 1845:

This is Christmas Day, and it is observed much in the manner of a Yankee Fourth of July and a Thanksgiving combined. Romanism has shaded itself into Protestantism, so that religious services are held in many of the Protestant churches other than the Episcopal. We would recommend to the Baptist clergy of this city the propriety of discussing the obligations to observe this popish custom, and if they cannot succeed in doing so to their satisfaction, to discontinue it, and place it alongside the other traditions of men.

In the same issue we read a letter from their Washington correspondent:

Both Houses of Congress adjourned from Monday till Thursday for the purpose of having a "Merry Christmas." In this region, Christmas is observed more than any other day in the year—that is, in some way or other, but it has seemed more like a Fourth of July, than the day that commemorates the birth of the Saviour of the world.

By 1858 some Sunday schools are holding festivals with singing and other merrymaking, and in the early sixties Christmas trees, with exchange of gifts, are quite general. The Puritan objection to it as of pagan origin does not seem to rise, and the only appeal is that instead of being merely a day of unrestrained joy and gaiety it should be filled with the Christ spirit of good-will and concern for others. But it may be here noted that this custom of celebrating Christmas by fireworks and similar noisy demonstrations still prevails in the Southland.

Strange as it may seem, the Baptists of these States were much more opposed to the observance of Easter than they were to Christmas. *The Religious Herald* of Richmond, Va., April 24, 1890, gives a long history of Easter and characterizes it as pagan and Romanized. "Let Baptists," it exclaims, "who have borrowed nothing from Rome and who therefore are under no obligations to her, stand aloof from all this baptized Paganism." In the issue of April 21, 1892, a correspondent from Roanoke sarcastically refers to the women and maidens clad "in spring fabrics" shivering in the conformist churches, where "flowers, fashions, and artistic music took precedence."

But he is glad to report that large congregations attended the Baptist church even though only "plain but excellent music was rendered" and "only a small cutglass dish of flowers was visible on the table in front of the pulpit."

Even as late as 1900 this paper editorially states: "We know no good reason why Baptist churches should observe Easter. . . We do not need Easter as a festival of His resurrection. That is commemorated every Lord's Day."

Nor to this present day does this influential Virginia State paper refer to that particular Sunday as "Easter Sunday." Although the issues of the Christmas season are full of Christmas stories, announcements, and reports, Easter is scarcely recognized. Out of some fifty church reports appearing in the number for April 4, 1929, only eight or ten at the most made any reference to Easter by name or mentioned special services such as cantatas or musicales.

The Baptist Courier, Greenville, S. C., April 19, 1928, giving the history of Easter, concludes: "How can we in this day of light and integrity perpetuate this chicanery? We honor Christ every 'first day of the week.' The present Easter comprises devotion to vanity and lust of the flesh almost to the extinction of Divine Worship at the Altar of Fashion." Thus in this paper church reports do not refer to Easter though notices of Christmas exercises are quite general.

Finally, *The Christian Index* of Atlanta, Ga., in 1929, giving a whole issue to Christmas stories, poems, and Sunday-school announcements has but one or two reports of Easter observances when that season of the year appears. In none of these Southern papers, as may be conjectured, is there any report of the celebration of Lent, Holy Week, or Good Friday by the Baptist churches.

IV

In the Mid-West, from the earliest references to the day there seems to have been but slight opposition to its religious

observance. *The Standard,* January 9, 1868, reports that " the Fifth Church, Chicago, held their holiday festival on New Year's Eve, and had a good time. The main school met in the audience room of the church, and completely filled the room. The Christmas tree was a perfect beauty, and well filled with presents for many of the teachers and scholars."

The Journal and Messenger, of Cincinnati, Ohio, in 1872, '73, and '74, carries reports of Sunday schools throughout Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois holding reunions at this season and numerous Christmas tree exercises, the beautiful green tree, of course, being full or laden with all manner of fruits for such an occasion. And *The Standard* of 1874 speaking of the celebration editorially says: " It is the very spirit of the gospel, and it would be no profane fancy that should seem to see the lovely Christ-Child mingling in the group around the Christmas tree, or the form that was once so familiar in the home of Bethany, seated at the board."

However, a Mr. Watson in a letter to *The Standard* of January 6, 1876, raises an objection to such sentiments and to a Christmas sermon by Rev. A. L. Vail, in which the preacher said: " If you have not accepted Jesus there can be no Merry Christmas for you. But to you who have accepted him I do say, Merry Christmas." The argument of the writer is that the day being a pagan one no Christian should observe it. To which a reply is made by a Mr. J. H. Andrews in the following week. Christmas, he affirms, was observed by the early Christians before the Roman Church was established. And he points out that to reject the day because of the suffix " mass " in the name should logically compel us to reject the days of the week and refuse to observe Sunday. So also we should not use or speak of " steeples " since it is of Persian origin. " We celebrate," he concludes, " the *fact* not the *time* of Christ's birth."

Again the celebration of Easter comes at a later date. The first reference to it found in *The Standard* is in a letter

from its New York correspondent, March 9, 1882: "For these 'times and seasons' as such," he remarks, "we have not one particle of regard, but it is quite possible for a pastor to take advantage of them for deepening religious impressions and leading some to confess Christ. . . Let us use all helpful means to lead men to the Saviour."

In this year also Doctor Lorimer, of the Immanuel Baptist Church, Chicago, "remembered Easter with a sermon appropriate to the day" and is recorded as saying that "Easter Sunday is particularly a Baptist day, as baptism so forcibly symbolizes the resurrection." Memorial Church also had special services upon this Easter with two appropriate sermons and floral decorations.

However, *The Standard,* April 13, 1882, editorially ridicules Easter as a "Sunday of Joy—joy at the thought Lent is over at last." It objects to the celebration of the Day because we do not know the day of the Resurrection and moreover every Lord's Day commemorates that. "We should wish to think of the Saviour's resurrection oftener than once a year," it protests.

Yet the following year this same editor writes: "From the stately cathedral to the modest meeting-house of pious Puritans there will be evidence next Sabbath that something unusual is taking place." In the former, floral decorations, lordly chants, and pompous ceremonials. In the latter, a timid boquet[sic], a handful of humble spring flowers, songs about the Risen One, and preaching delicately touching on the resurrection.

"This growing respect for the day is not due" to any belief on the part of Protestants that the day is holy, but because "their grandest hopes regarding their souls" are associated with this season. As to its observance each one must "be persuaded in his own mind," but whether one approves or disapproves its special recognition, "let him ponder anew the precious truth which it hallows."

The Journal and Messenger of March 21, 1883, contrary to *The Standard* of the preceding year, declares that "of all anniversaries, or sacred days, observed by the Romish and some Protestant churches, Easter . . . is the most thoroughly justified." It welcomes, then, reports from the schools and churches, and thereafter its pages, each year at this season, tell the story of special gatherings, beautiful decorations, and numerous baptisms.

It is in this paper, April 9, 1884, we first meet with the suggestion that a special Easter offering be taken on that day for "the Society that is sending missionaries to the heathen."

V

Surveying, then, our study we discover among the early Baptists generally an attitude of hostility toward the observance of these days. We also notice that when their observance becomes customary it differs as to time of origin and mode according to the natural and social sections of the country.

In New England Christmas celebration is of a comparatively late date owing to the strict Puritan objection to all that is Roman. Slowly the practise passed into the church through the home festivities.

In New York it became a church day much earlier than in the New England section because of the Anglican and Dutch influence. But in Pennsylvania it is earlier still and with much less religious objection, due no doubt to the older German customs. It is also worthy of note that it is throughout Pennsylvania that we very often meet with good old St. Nicholas, and it is in Pittsburgh that Santa Claus first makes his appearance at a Sunday-school celebration.

In the South, Christmas is observed at an earlier date than, perhaps, in any of the other sections. This would seem to be due to their long acquaintance with the customs of the established church which were rather readily accepted by the Baptists, the only requirement being that those customs should

be christianized. Opposition to Easter, however, as we have seen, still persists.

In the West, evidently, almost from the beginning of Baptist history there was little or no hostility expressed. There the mingling of groups of all shades of opinion, and the larger social freedom generally, tended toward greater liberty in all religious forms and activities.

Again, Easter observance is much later than Christmas in all these sections because Christmas is a social custom while Easter is not. Christmas is of the home, a child festival. When therefore for various reasons the old Calvinism weakened and the child came to be recognized, with the Sunday school finally established as a function of church ministration, the Christmas child festival of the home was carried into the Sunday school and the church. It is the little child that leads in the revolution. The editor of *The National Baptist,* December 23, 1880, tells us that down-town shopping he met "an eminent educator" with his arms full of packages. "These things seem small," said the educator, "but I shall be very glad if they help my children to have pleasant memories of their childhood when I am gone." And the same paper in 1882 lauds Christmas celebrations because, "The happiness of children has more of heaven in it than anything else on earth, and whatever contributes to it manifests the Christ spirit which Christmas inculcates."

This helps to explain the Southern attitude toward Easter as contrasted with that toward Christmas. Long accustomed to observe the latter in the home, so ancient an established practise through Anglicanism, its so-called pagan origin was forgotten. Gradually without conflict it came into the church. But Easter is still seen solely as a religious occasion with the mark of the Beast upon it. On the other hand in several of the other sections there was actually less opposition to Easter than to Christmas because of the feeling that the latter day is entirely a Romanized celebration whereas the former, Easter,

it was said, has been observed from the most primitive days of Christianity.

In concluding it is interesting to notice that an indication of this early objection to making Christmas a Holy Day is found in the fact that many Christmas-tree celebrations in the East are endowed but with the proviso that the exercise must be held on some night between Christmas and New Year's. This undoubtedly is a heritage from that transition period when the social custom was passing over into the religious, as they at that time expressed it, but with the confirmed effort to assure that the day itself should not become Romanized as holy.

SACRAMENTARIANISM

W. EVERETT HENRY
McMinnville, Oregon

MANY discussions are vitiated because of the loose use of words or the failure to note carefully the meaning assigned to certain "key" words. Let us, then, discriminate with care between the meaning here given to "sacrament" and to "symbol."

"Symbols suggest and represent; but sacraments work. They always have a dramatic and dynamic quality. They are special deeds, in which the action proceeds at two levels. Something genuinely done within the natural sphere by and to the body—a real washing, eating, touching, or anointing—involves something genuinely done within the supernatural sphere by and to the soul.[1]" Or, to put it another way, "the sacraments confer the grace which they contain." Or again: "Symbols are occasional and representative, but the sacraments are also causal; symbols merely symbolize or convey a message, but sacraments effect. Thus 'sacraments are not merely dramatic but efficient signs.'"[2]

Now with this distinction in mind let us note the place occupied by "sacraments" in the world into which Christianity came.

THE PREVALENCE OF SACRAMENTARIANISM

1. *Among the Jews*

The sacrificial system of the Jews at the beginning of the Christian era was both venerable and elaborate. In Jerusalem, the center of the nation's political and religious life, it was easily the outstanding feature of the worship of Jehovah. It reached its climax when, once each year, the high priest on the

[1] Underhill, *Man and the Supernatural*, p. 176f.
[2] Angus, *The Religious Quest of the Græco-Roman World*, p. 229.

great Day of Atonement entered the Holy of Holies and there made atonement for himself and all the people. But every day sacrifices of many kinds were offered, and many of them had to do intimately with the life of households and of individuals.

To be sure, the synagogue had become the complement of the Temple, for there the larger part of the religious activity of the people was carried on. And it may be, that the synagogue had also become, to some degree, the competitor of the Temple. The exposition of Scripture and tradition, the most prominent feature of the synagogue worship, tended to place the rabbi and the scribe at least on a par with the priest in the estimation of the people. Also there had come into recognition a "class of acts serving a function similar to animal sacrifices, but belonging to a higher order," [8] such as the merits of the forefathers, and especially the sufferings and death of the righteous as foreshadowed in Isaiah 53. Yet the sacrificial system must not be thought of as lightly regarded by the Jews of our Lord's day. It was still central in their conception of acceptable worship.

Just what, then, was the Jewish conception of sacrifice? Were the offerings to them mere "symbols," or were at least some of them understood as "sacraments?"

The burnt-offering was not connected with any particular form of transgression. It was an appropriate means of approach to God to be used by a people or by individual persons who were sensible of God's majesty and holiness, and of their unworthiness in his sight. The effects of the burnt-offering were set forth from three points of view: (1) As a "savor of restgiving" (acceptable) unto God (Lev. 1:9); (2) as surrounding the offerer with a "covering" (1:4); and (3) as that which cleanses from ceremonial impurity (14:20). The purpose of the sin-offering was to remove ceremonial uncleanness (12:6, 8ff.), to serve as a "covering" for minor offenses

[8] Hastings, *Dictionary of the Bible*, s. v., "Sacrifice."

(5: 1-6), and to atone for sins of ignorance (4: 2, 22, 27). It is declared that by means of this offering a "covering" took place, and the sin of the offerer was forgiven (4: 26, 35). The acceptance of the guilt-offering secured the "covering" of the trespass and the forgiveness of the offender (6: 7).

Evidently the Old Testament presents the bloody sacrifices as essentially sacraments, and there is no evidence that during the interval "between the Testaments" this conception of them was in any wise changed. Rather the evidence goes to show that during this period the belief grew that in sacrifice the animal was substituted for the offerer, "that the offering of a life, substituted for sinners according to God's appointment, canceled the death penalty which they had incurred, and that consequently the offered blood of the sacrificial victims expiated sin as a surrogate for the life of the guilty." [4] It is quite certain, therefore, that among the Jews of Jesus' day the bloody sacrifices were thought of as "sacraments" rather than as "symbols."

2. *Among the Gentiles*

That the non-Jewish world was familiar with the sacramental idea does not need argument. It appeared in magic, "that quasi-science that could manipulate theurgic apparatus, sway or control demons, secure or retard fertility, influence the issue in love affairs, cause the death of doomed victims, even of prospective wearers of the Roman purple, and bind beyond the grave." [5] And this "bastard sister of religion," "which takes the place of religion in the view of those who have not in them the seed of religious growth," [6] was prevalent almost everywhere in the Græco-Roman world of the first century.

Sacraments were basal, also, in the mystery religions, which had been spreading rapidly from their original homes in Greece, Egypt, Asia Minor, and Persia for two hundred years

[4] Holtzman, quoted in Hastings, *Dictionary of the Bible*, s. v., "Sacrifice."
[5] Angus, op. cit., p. 134f.
[6] P. Gardner, *Religious Experience of St. Paul*, p. 67.

before Christ came. In these religions it was through the experience of initiation (and usually there were several steps in this) and ritual that the initiates obtained a revelation of the god and a union with the divine which gave assurance of a happy immortality. Some of the mystery religions practised a baptism which was held to remit the penalties of sin and to produce regeneration. The baptism of the *taurobolium* was supposed to be valid for twenty years. The Orphic initiation brought deliverance from "the wearisome painful wheel" of reincarnation and resulted in deification. In fact, "There was no ancient religion which did not allow a prominent place to sacraments." [7]

Protests Against Sacramentarianism

It is not to be supposed that the crass sacramentarianism which so largely prevailed in the ancient world had existed through the centuries without protest. In Hebrew history the prophetic voice had been lifted time and again against it. The affirmation of Samuel (1 Sam. 15:22), "Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of rams," was repeated by Isaiah (1:10ff.), Jeremiah (7:21ff.), Hosea (6:6), and Micah (6:8). It should be carefully noted, however, that the attack of the prophets was not against the sacrificial system as such, but against the exaggerated value assigned to ritual. They were finding fault with sacrifices only as these were being allowed to take the place of moral obedience to Jehovah. To say that sacrifice without a righteous life was an abomination to Jehovah hardly states accurately their position. Their contention was rather that sacrifice as a substitute for righteous living was an abomination to him. Lying back of this prophetic criticism, of course, and the real basis of it, was the patent failure of ritual acts to produce changed life.

Similar criticism of cult acts appears also in the pagan world. Expressions of it are to be found from at least four

[7] Scott, *The Gospel and Its Tributaries*, p. 124.

centuries before Christ. Plato speaks vigorously about those who, by means of sacrifices, incantations, and mysteries claimed to procure absolution not only for the living but also for the dead, and, for money, to make amends for the sins of a man's ancestors, and even to sell indulgences to those who purpose evil toward any victim, whether good or evil. Others in one form or another repeated his vigorous protest. In fact, the ancients faced the same practical enigma as do moderns with respect to sacraments. Some participated in the sacral rites and remained unchanged. If there was truly power in them, why did they not always work? Sometimes, also, those who refused these rites lived far nobler lives than those who accepted them.

Symbolism

It is not easy to say just how far the idea of " symbol " as defined above appeared in the thought of the first century. It must not have been unknown to the Jews, yet it probably did not occupy any large place in their thinking. In the non-Jewish world the word appears freely, but not with the meaning assigned to it today, and especially in this discussion. *Symbolum* was used for *sacramentum* and as synonymous with *mysterion*. " Symbol," to the ancients, did not represent the thing symbolized; in some unexplained way it was the thing itself. And in the symbol was supposed to reside a dormant power which could be evoked by correct rites because of deep and invisible correspondences. " The line of demarcation between symbol and fact was simply not drawn." [8] Symbols in the pagan world of our Lord's day were not mnemonics more or less vivid. Nor were they substitutes for other things or mere signs. "At that time ' symbol ' denoted a thing which in some kind of way really is what it signifies; but, on the other hand, according to the ideas of that period, the really heavenly element lay either in or behind the visible form without being

[8] Angus, op. cit., p. 37.

identical with it."[9] Symbols in their own right both were something and did something, did something the effect of which was not unimportant, but the nature of the action and of the effect was neither clearly defined nor too closely scrutinized.

The Christian Rites

Now here emerges a fact the full significance of which has scarcely been adequately appreciated. In the midst of a world which believed in sacraments, in whose religious activity sacramentarianism was everywhere firmly rooted and symbolism but feebly appeared, the early church wholly rejected the sacramental idea and practised only two simple symbols, baptism and the Lord's Supper.

This is a break with the current thinking of the world that is remarkable. If discernible preparation for it can be discovered anywhere it was but slight, and the relapse into sacramentarianism which so soon overtook the church strikingly emphasizes the uniqueness and significance of this revolutionizing appearance of pure symbolism. For those who claim that Jesus did not institute either baptism or the Lord's Supper this clean break with the past in inaugurating a religion without sacraments is difficult to explain. It postulates an originality and independence beyond the apostolic group, for there is not the least evidence that at any other point they made a similar contribution to the Christian system. On the other hand, it is easy to conceive of Jesus thus transcending the times in which he lived. It harmonizes with other things which he did and taught. His originality of mind was sufficient to conceive such transcendence, and his independence equal to inaugurating it. Moreover, as will become more evident later in this discussion, only the use of rites as pure symbols would harmonize with his teachings as to the nature and spiritual possibilities of man.

The only reported teachings of Jesus that even remotely suggest a sacramentarian view of the Christian rites are to be

[9] Harnack, *History of Dogma*, English translation, II, p. 144f.

found in John's Gospel, and these are doubtless properly regarded as the author's attempt to meet two dangers which were already menacing the true conception of these rites, viz., sheer sacramentarianism on the one hand and Gnosticism on the other. Water is mentioned once in connection with the new birth in John 3, but in the subsequent three references it is omitted and the Spirit is referred to as sole agent. Moreover, three truths are thrown into prominence which strongly correct any tendency toward a sacramentarian view of the rite: (1) Only Spirit can beget spirit (verse 6); (2) the Spirit works independently and inscrutably (verse 8); (3) faith in the ascended Son of man guarantees eternal life (verse 15). If verses 48-58 of the sixth chapter refer to the Lord's Supper, then again there are distinct warnings against regarding the rite as a sacrament. The preceding verses make it very plain that faith-union with Christ not only is eternal life now, but also guarantees it eschatologically. And immediately after, in conversation with his disciples, Jesus again declared that "It is the Spirit that quickeneth," and Peter's words, "Thou hast the words of eternal life," bring the mind back to the first part of the discourse and to Christ himself as the life-bestower. It seems that John, with his profound insight into the spiritual nature of Christianity, sensed a danger in the increasing reverence which was being attached to the outward observance of these rites and was deliberately presenting antidotes.

Sacramentarianism in the Church

But John's efforts to stay the incoming of sacramentarianism into the church accomplished no more than to put off for a while the "evil day." Many influences contributed to the progressive materialization of the Christian rites. Doubtless, as Angus says, "the whole ancient mentality" had much to do with it. In the "ancient" mind there was a "most intimate and generally friendly" connection between religion and magic. There was manifest also a marked disinclination for abstract

thinking and a strong preference for concrete forms of thought. As noted above, symbols, to the ancients, in some unexplained way were the things symbolized. No distinction was drawn between symbol and fact, or between the subjective and the objective. Spirit was only the most attenuated matter. If the converts from Judaism introduced into the Christian church a trickling stream of sacramentarianism, the influx from the pagan world opened wide the flood-gates. The difficulty of maintaining the spirituality of the large and mixed masses who sought the benefits of the church became increasingly great. The similarity of baptism and the Lord's Supper to certain rites of the mystery religions made comparison inevitable and identification of function easy both to friends and foes of the gospel message.

So uniform and universal has been the reign of sacramentarianism in man's religious life that some regard it as practically impossible of extermination. Angus ventures this opinion: "At the cost of millennia of experimentation it was brought home to man that 'God is not to be worshiped with bulls but with a devout and righteous will,' and it will require millennia yet adequately to realize that 'neither in this mountain nor in Jerusalem shall ye worship the Father,' or that God has no decided preference for one mode or tradition of cult-acts above another." [10] Gardner speaks in still stronger terms: "For the materialization of the sacraments we need seek no origin but the constitution of human nature. The mass of mankind tends to be materialistic, dominated by that which is seen and felt, unable to recognize spiritual truth unless it is incorporated in some material vehicle." [11] With these two authorities agree also Kennedy [12] and Dill.[13] Certainly the his-

[10] Angus, op. cit., p. 165.

[11] Gardner, *Growth of Christianity*, p. 178.

[12] Sacramentalism "is no excrescence of primitive superstition, but corresponds to a permanent demand of the human consciousness, the demand that the visible and tangible should be a seal to faith of that which is unseen and eternal."—*St. Paul and the Mystery Religions*, p. 263.

[13] It is true the day will probably never come when the religion of many will not begin and end in solemn, stately rite, consecrated to the imagination by ancient use, and captivating the sense by scrupulously ordered ceremonial.—*Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, p. 603.

tory of the world thus far may be easily read in this fashion, and the history of Christianity for nineteen hundred years does not compel the surrender of such pessimism.

But it should be noted that such pessimism is incipient skepticism. Apparently Jesus believed that man was capable of rising to the point where he can worship God in spirit and in truth and will feel no need in his dealings with the Divine of any "sacramental grace"; where his utmost need of material aids will be only the simplest symbols of spiritual things. Was, then, Jesus mistaken in his conception of man? This high conception of man seems as fundamental in his teachings as his conception of God or any other basal element in his thought. And it must be admitted that if we are compelled to acknowledge that Jesus was mistaken at this point, that man cannot, as he believed, rise to these heights of spiritual attainment and insight, then confidence in the other fundamental conceptions is shaken. He may be, nay, probably is, mistaken in all these also. It is an admission so serious in its nature and consequences that only the utmost necessity can bring us to it.

The Baptist Witness

Happily that necessity does not exist. It is true that sacramentarianism overran the church in the early Christian centuries, that it held almost unbroken dominion for a thousand years or more, and that it prevails throughout the major portion of Christendom today. Yet, if not always, for at least three hundred years there has been a minority of the followers of the Christ who have regarded the Christian rites simply as symbols and in no sense sacraments, and that minority has, of late, been rapidly increasing.

It is only simple truth to say that through all these three centuries the head and front of this anti-sacramentarian movement, this movement to reinstate the Christian rites as simple "symbols" and not "sacraments," has been the people now

called Baptists. Indeed, for many decades of this period they carried the burden of the movement practically alone. Beginning as a " feeble folk," this peculiar people have increased and spread " like a green bay-tree " until today they are one of the large and influential of the Protestant (so-called) groups, numbering probably more than eleven million communicants. Their progress—and during the last century especially they have touched many races and classes of people—proves conclusively that a sacramentarian view of baptism and the Lord's Supper is not necessary to vigorous Christian living. Men can bear the burdens of life and push forward with wisdom and vigor the boundaries of the Kingdom of God and maintain high standards of spiritual life without the crutch of an outward rite that is believed *per se* to bestow an inward grace.

The growth and work of the Baptists, however, have done much more than furnish substantial proof that first century non-sacramentarian Christian life can flourish in the world today. Baptist prestige and propaganda have also weakened the hold of sacramentarianism on other Christian groups. It would not be fair, of course, to say that Baptist influence alone has brought this change. Other forces have doubtless contributed, but Baptist influence has been steady, strong, and effectual.

Yet when the growth and prestige of the Baptists and other groups who may fully share their views as to Christian rites are generously estimated, and the influence of these groups over those of dissimilar views is liberally appraised, it must still be admitted that sacramentarianism remains very securely entrenched throughout Christendom. The battle for the New Testament conception of baptism and the Lord's Supper is so far from being won that it is scarcely begun. If our Lord's conception of man is to be justified before the world and this incubus which stultifies it removed from his church, then every factor contributing toward success should in every way be conserved and strengthened.

The Baptist Witness and Church Union

All this is far from being purely academic. It has a very practical bearing on a number of things. Take, for example, the matter of church union. For many years now the acrimonious debates and ugly strife which formerly characterized denominational life have been growing less and less. More recently the harsh and offensive notes in denominational interrelationships have given place to the suave and persuasive. Considerable denominational courtship has resulted in some marriages, and the years (not yet many) have so far brought no applications for divorce. The agitation for church union is increasing and sentiment in favor of it is growing stronger and becoming more wide-spread. Whether the movement be a man-made fad or a development of the Spirit of God, its crest is yet to come.

And surely there is room for much church union. Many denominational groups could unite without visible sacrifice of principle and with great gain to the efficiency of the Kingdom. Apparently, with sufficient tolerance for some divergence of views—such tolerance as they now exercise within their denominational families—other groups could come together and find union profitable. But if this movement shall result in too much of compromise, or the ignoring of truly vital factors, then it will certainly bring disaster. Church union is like morphia. It is a good thing under many circumstances, but not to be taken indiscriminately.

Many think the immersionist groups should unite, and in their thinking make little discrimination of marked differences between them both as to things other than baptism and as to baptism itself. The difference between those who regard baptism as a " sacrament " and those who think of it simply as a symbol is far more vital than between those who disagree only as to the mode of administration. Change of mode may discredit the command and example of our Lord while keeping

intact his conception of the rite and of man, but to practise baptism by any mode as a " sacrament " is fatally to disregard all these.

It may be said that some immersionist groups which formerly were far from the Baptist position as to the ordinances of the church have come now to a close approximation of it. Wherever that has actually happened it is cause for rejoicing. It is probably also cause for appreciation of the value of the Baptist witness. By all means let the process of approximation continue, and, still more, let nothing be done to weaken the influences originating and carrying forward the process. Any union of denominational groups which involves the weakening of the witness against sacramentarianism can only be regarded as a calamity to the higher and more vital interests of the Kingdom.

And it must be borne in mind that the effectiveness of this witness against sacramentarianism may easily be weakened. Human influence is always a matter of delicate adjustment, and the effectiveness of this witness lies in the sphere of man's influence on his fellows. If ever in former years there was danger of too great emphasis on the witness against sacramentarianism, that time has now passed. The present emphasis must be maintained and probably needs strengthening rather than simple maintenance. Certainly any further lessening of the emphasis will result in weakening the witness. The same result will follow also from a clouding of the issue, and it is notoriously difficult to keep an issue clear cut. The issue may easily become obscure in dealing with minds well trained to think, and when we must needs deal with multitudes of comparatively untrained minds, as in the matter under discussion, then every effort must be made to keep the issue clear. Then again it is easy to expose the integrity of the witness to suspicion. A compromising relationship, however well-intentioned, even a compromising attitude, however graciously and carefully expressed, will most certainly entail this result. And

whatever exposes the integrity of the witness to suspicion weakens its effectiveness. That union of Baptists with other denominational groups at the present time will involve risk at all these points cannot be doubted, and the risk in reality is so great that it merges into practical certainty.

It may, therefore, well be that the popular demand for church union, combined with the gradual approach in some quarters to the Baptist position, and the increase in denominational suavity, may be bringing the Baptist leadership of today a temptation more insidious and bigger with danger than has come to our leaders in the last one hundred years. If in the hubbub of scratching pens, clicking typewriters, and well-modulated and carefully guarded speech the " still small voice " of wisdom can be heard, it will certainly counsel caution and utter refusal to be stampeded. The world still sorely needs the Baptist witness in behalf of anti-sacramentarianism and those fundamental teachings of Jesus which require in Christian rites pure symbolism.

WHO'S WHO IN THIS ISSUE

Professor Walter M. Horton, of the Department of Systematic Theology in the Graduate School of Theology at Oberlin College, is an A. B. of Harvard, M. A. of Columbia. He was awarded a Ph. D. by Columbia in 1926, having previously been granted a B. D. 1920, and S. T. M. 1923, by Union Theological Seminary. He was ordained to the Baptist ministry and served as a pastor for a short period. He studied at Paris, Strassburg, and Marburg, and was instructor in Philosophy of Religion and Systematic Theology in Union. He now is Professor of Systematic Theology in Oberlin Graduate School of Theology. As an author he has published *The Philosophy of the Abbé Bautain,* 1926, and *Theism and the Modern Mood,* 1929, reviewed in this number of The Quarterly.

Richard M. Vaughan, A. B., of Brown University, 1895, and B. D. at University of Chicago later, is occupant of the Chair of Christian Theology in The Newton Theological Institution. He served in the pastorate in Detroit, Janesville, Wis., and Berkeley, California. Turning to theological education he taught in the Berkeley Baptist Divinity School and The Pacific School of Religion. Since 1912 he has occupied the Chair of Christian Theology at Newton. He is author of *The Significance of Personality* in which he presents a world view in which religion can live and breathe, a volume to be reviewed in the next number of The Quarterly.

We take some especial pleasure in welcoming to our pages the Rabbi Leo M. Franklin of The Temple Beth El in Detroit, Michigan, since 1899. His paper on " The Jew Whom Nobody Knows " is to be followed later by one on the topic, suggested

by the editor of this QUARTERLY—"Neo-Judaism." He is a Phi Beta Kappa man of the University of Cincinnati, 1892, and D. D. from University of Detroit, 1923. He is also a Commissioner of the Detroit Public Library, trustee of the Detroit Symphony Orchestra, and Director of the World Union of Progressive Judaism since 1926.

THE paper by Professor-Elect Angus S. Woodburne of Crozer introduces the successor to the Editor in the Chair of Systematic Theology. The paper is the concluding chapter of a book just issued by him on *Epistemological Theories from Locke to Kant*. On two earlier occasions Doctor Woodburne has issued books, one of which, *Religious Attitudes,* was reviewed in this QUARTERLY when no one was anticipating that he would be a member of the Crozer faculty. An earlier volume was entitled *Human Nature and Education*. Professor Woodburne comes from the Christian College in Madras, India, where he was Professor of the Philosophy of Religion.

AS USUAL, Professor Morton S. Enslin has something to say, says it, and says it with vigor and interest. His article, "Why Technical Scholarship?" should have the carefullest consideration.

"MAKING WORSHIP ETHICAL IN TEMPER" is a plea that is timely and significant in a time when the disposition to emphasize the æsthetic in worship is so strong and so many are in peril of mistaking the satisfactions of the beautiful for the moral essentials in worship. Professor Earl E. Speicher is an alumnus of Crozer and now teaches in the department of Education and Religion in Northland College, Wisconsin.

THE alert-minded Professor of Church History in Crozer is making research in American church history well worth while. His article in this number might be a chapter in a book

of such researches. It will interest, perhaps amuse you. There is no " as it was in the beginning, is now, and forever shall be " in the history of the Baptists.

From the far Pacific Coast comes a paper of especial local interest to the Baptists and of general interest to those interested in Church Union. Rev. W. Everett Henry writes in an inquiring mood concerning the maintenance of the witness he believes is made by the separateness of the Baptists. Mr. Henry is a B. D. and Th. M. from Crozer and a D. D. of Linfield College, Oregon. He has held pastorates in West Virginia, Idaho, Washington, and Oregon. He is now pastor of First Baptist Church, McMinnville, Oregon.

NOTES AND CURRENT DISCUSSIONS

SPENSER B. MEESER

SCIENCE AND RELIGION

SCIENCE AND RELIGION may be and readily are distinguished in thought and aims; but, instead of being set in opposition, may they not be conceived as capable of synthesis in a larger and truer unity?

We may conceive Science and the knowledge it seeks, as (like magic), the effort to control and use the universe and its powers in order to make them subserve the needs of man, his comfort and his culture. Likewise we may conceive Religion and the knowledge it seeks, as (unlike magic) the effort of man to *be* controlled by and used by the will of the universe to the end of enlarging human life and lifting it to more abundant fellowship with that Will, thus to achieve the Whole that Will seeks. Of course not every religionist is so animated. There are perversions of religion, which, while still bearing the name and marks of religion, and employing some of the forms of its activities, may be called *religious*. Furthermore some religionists may even think of religion as a way of controlling the universe and making it serve their ends through the medium of superhuman powers. They may be seeking, by what seems an easy yet legitimate way, the ends science seeks in a more laborious way. We may all judge theirs a serious error, even while recognizing that many occasions arise in which such a conception seems to be justified to some very good people.

But beyond these physical and economic needs are the needs of spiritual inspiration, moral dynamic, courage, and hope, which Science does not seek to meet, scarcely professes to be able to do so, and which religion may in reason be expected to try to meet. Postulating that the Will of the universe

is Good-Will, is friendly, religion may and does give inspiration, moral dynamic, courage, and hope, which are the need, perhaps the supreme need of scientist as well as religionist in a world which Science has not yet made amenable to these needs; though it may divert man's attention from them for a time.

On the other hand, it is absurd to think that *all* scientists are motivated by the needs of human life, or the search for abstract truth. There are perversions of science, as well as of religion and both self-seekers and mountebanks, as well as ignorant sophomoric proclaimers of error among those who use the forms and quasi methods of science. Many motives, many aims, many false conceptions are to be found among those who profess to be scientific in their purpose and method.

But now, fairly understood in their ideal, are there not common and complementary elements in these ideals which would justify their inclusion in a higher synthesis? May we not think of them as the obverse and reverse of one fundamental good-will in man in fulfilment of the universe Good-Will?

Science, in brief, seeks human control of the universe to serve the needs of man. And religion, in brief, seeks to be controlled by the Will, conceived as good, for the same end—the need of man in the more inclusive sense. They are at one in their motivation. Furthermore if ever the scientist is effective in his effort to control the universe he can become so only as he is controlled by the universe Will. He knows that his effort must include knowledge of and obedience to that Will as revealed in the orders or laws of the universe. Though unaware of all the implications he seeks to be controlled, directed by that Will, or no control in knowledge or practise is possible to him.

If the scientist is concerned primarily with the physical needs and the religionist with the needs called moral and spiritual, they become complements not opponents; and it may be

hoped that this complementary relation may be increasingly recognized and acknowledged.

What men in the name of science may attempt in metaphysical speculation or religionists in like effort, constitutes the battle of the metaphysicians (which we all are, despite our professed contempt for metaphysics): but science and religion still remain complementary aspects of a noble human effort to better human life; and some of us believe that these efforts have their initiative in the activity of the universe Good-Will.

LOYALTY AND FREE PERSONALITY

"Do you belong to the Baptists, or what denomination do you belong to?" So questioned an acquaintance of recent date, and the reply was: "I do not 'belong to' any of the denominations, or to any other group of men. At present, as for many years past, I have served my fellow men and God with them all; but I 'belong to' no one save 'the One," to whom all belong, the inspiration and ideal of my service. I am not a protestant Jesuit and neither yield my individuality and its sacred prerogatives to any group allegiance, nor do I ask it of any other."

Any thoughtful person can well see that such preservation of an integral personality is a worthy ideal and that it in no wise prohibits him entering into association and cooperation with some group or any groups which, on the whole, seek the same ends and values which inspire him.

The integral personality is creative dynamic and must be free. "To belong to" may and very often, if not most often, does mean stagnation. The group has its inhibitions, whether the group be conservative or liberal—the latter quite as truly as the former. And inhibitions, however made, check, prevent the inherent capacities of a person from development. They are anti-evolutionary. They are anti-moral and anti-rational. Indeed the group exists only by virtue of the common consent

exacted of each individual as a condition of his " belong to " it. It cannot continue to exist as such unless the consent continues. If that be withheld by any individual in ever so slight a degree, he becomes an alien perforce, and no longer in the older sense " belongs to " the group.

Initiative, progress, dynamic do not arise in groups. These exist to maintain a " status quo." If the group moves to larger, more comprehensive and nobler views and aims it will be led by the individual dissenters—who serve and lead but do not " belong to " the group.

It is not for an individualism indifferent either to social interests, or to assured religious convictions that we are concerned; but for *individuals* and the whole high achievements that are possible only to an integral personality. Loyalty to a denomination or any other group, if that means consenting either to all its dogmas, or its inhibitions, or its practises, may be the basest disloyalty to the personal self.

Much is made of loyalty. National, political, and religious groups alike exalt it as a supreme virtue. We have known of no crime, international, social, or political, that has not grounded itself in a claim to *loyalty;* and no persecution or form of questionable religious practise that has not found its justification in some form of claim to *loyalty in some vague sense.*

But loyalty to what? Here is one who justifies disloyalty to a life-long friendship and a course of action inimical to his friend's highest interest, on the plea of loyalty to some dogma or institution, forgetting Lowell's too seldom remembered words:

> Man is more than institutions; better rot beneath the sod,
> Than be true to church and party, while we're doubly false to God.

Loyalty to what? Just loyalty?

It looks as if there ought to be found some large yet definite " Something " to be loyal to; or rather " Some One,"

since moral obligation arises only in the personal realm. Why not Lowell's suggestion to which all souls respond—*Man* and *God?* Or are there two loyalties in the last analysis. Who that is loyal to man—man in the whole and higher of his being—can be false to God? And one close to " the One " says that if a man says he is loyal to, i. e., loves God, and loves not his fellow men, how is he loyal or true to God, who loves all?

To belong to " the One " then is " to belong to " *all* who belong to Him. Loyalty does not consist in consenting to the inhibitions of a nation, a party, a denomination; but in open, free acceptance of the inspirations of the ideal of an ennobled humanity and the fellowship of Him who said, " to one of the least of these—to Me." For such a loyalty there can be no lesser or narrower party or creed.

Those intellectuals of a kind, who propose to abolish the validity of moral obligation along with the codes of morals they happen to find distasteful, may find some interesting material for their cogitation in a series of articles in the May and June Forum, by James Truslow Adams, before quoted in these columns, and who is one of those non-professional, but sane writers on moral and religious topics in the magazines so worthy of attention.

Defining morality " as that portion of human thought and conduct that stems from and is controlled by ' I ought ' as opposed to either ' I want ' or ' I must ' " he insists that this feeling has existed in the best specimens of mankind, civilized or savage, for thousands of years past, and that he accepts it as an original datum. Man is so thoroughly a creature of impulse, emotion, and action rather than reason, that reason appears as a late development, and we may question whether it is an innate part of human nature at all. The moral " feeling " is not to be discredited because it is such.

He appears to be especially stirred by the fact that many scientific " friends try to dodge the categorical imperative, this

sense of 'ought,' by resolving it into its origins" and by their idea that by showing how it evolved they have explained it away. Something, "a something," in the universe has originated and developed it out of emotion in the same way it has developed stars out of nebulæ. Moral law represents reality.

Social experience makes clear that society would not be found hanging together if it depended solely on its code of civil laws, or completes individualism in morals; and wherever a group of individuals exists it is essential they "be able to count definitely on certain modes of behaviour in each other. The moral *codes* may vary in different places and races, but the same is true of art. It would be foolish to claim therefore that beauty does not exist. Equally foolish is it to claim that morality is no reality because moral codes vary widely."

Since moral law covers so much more extended a field of human conduct than civil law, so much more important is the moral law and obedience to it. On the other hand, "To depend today upon reason as a sufficient guide in the whole field of conduct not governed by the civil law is like trying to take shelter under an acorn instead of an oak tree."

It is true we are all the time learning, but we are not yet equipped to undertake the remodeling of society and morals on the basis of our scientific knowledge. True, many difficulties arise in the conflict of the older moral codes and the present-day new type of life. "But that readjustment can not be made effectively in the cold light of reason and the aid of a most inadequate and confused store of scientific knowledge of human nature."

He thinks those intellectuals are fanatical who expect suddenly to remake the moral life of man on the basis of science and reason. The need today is not of experimenters, but of men who can see the whole of life. Experimenters have too narrow a view of human nature and are too much in a hurry.

Incidentally this view is confirmed in a general view of Albert Einstein who is reported also in the June *Forum* to have

said: "I do not think that science can teach men to be moral. I do not believe that a moral philosophy can ever be founded on a scientific basis. . . The content of scientific theory itself offers no moral foundation for the personal conduct of life. . . Every effort to reduce ethics to scientific formulas must fail." It is right to speak "of the moral foundations of science; but you cannot turn it round and speak of the scientific foundations of morality."

Having written of "Why Be Good?" in the May issue of *The Forum,* Mr. Adams, with the same sanity and philosophic outlook, treats, in the June issue, of "How Be Good?" Here he makes reasonable the need of a scale of values to conserve right human conduct. Mere self-expression, if in any sense a good, must have its limits or it ceases to be a good for either the self or others. These limits vary but they must be set somewhere. Men can not have both goods at once—the unbridled individual self-expression and the social welfare, which, of course, involve self-control.

Implicit in every ethical code there has always been a scale of values for the goods of life, that is based on what he calls "the subconscious wisdom of the race," and this scale must have regard to all of man's nature—the length of life rather than the moment's gratification, the abiding satisfaction as well as the intensity of the good. And all this and more is too much for one man to work out for himself in tired evenings. "Whether we like it or not, we have to accept a great deal from the past. Otherwise we shall wreck ourselves." Or again "Some body of such doctrine, such as Plato's, the Stoics' or Christ's, is essential if we are not to drift into moral anarchy. To say that the great mass of hundreds of millions can dispense with the old ethics and rule itself according to science, is, if I may say so, the sheerest drivel. Whatever may be said of some sciences, those of man and society still have to have their diapers changed every hour or so. To expect the mass of our populations to guide their lives according to the latest pro-

nouncements of a Freud, or anybody else, is to have lost all contact with reason."

How to be good then is to live a life in which we strive to rise to the highest possibilities of our *entire* nature. (Mr. Adams "confesses" that he is not a member of any church, and intensely dislikes the Apostle Paul. No doubt this is because of his misconception of Paul. He should read *The Ethics of Paul,* by Morton S. Enslin.)

And here is the heart of his discussion of "How Be Good?" "It seems to me the most sensible thing to do is to rest heavily for insight and instruction on those great teachers of the past, who summed up in their words the wisdom of the race, such as Christ and Marcus Aurelius, until greater shall arise. . . I believe that the code of morals we already possess . . . still forms not only the safest, but a *safe* guide for daily conduct."

And this because these figures, Moses, Christ, Marcus Aurelius, synthesized the moral experience of the race up to their own times; and because they have been found in human experience since to lead to "a moral life based on a realization of values in life and conduct."

BOOK REVIEWS

The Lost Tribes: A Myth. Suggestions Towards Rewriting Hebrew History. ALAN H. GODBEY, Professor of Old Testament History in Duke University. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. 1930.

THE title of this volume neither indicates its value nor quite adequately suggests the general point of view. The title is destructive, the book only so in a mild way. The question of the lost tribes was of more interest forty years ago than today, and even then it would scarcely have merited the time and energy represented in this volume. It may have selling value, and if so well and good. Those who have a predisposition to assent to the implication of the title will find Ossa piled upon Pelion, so that in the face of the evidence, there can remain no shred of doubt. Those who are inclined to dissent will be faced by an array of argumentation and an accumulation of fact, that will render quite untenable any pet hypothesis about the lost ten tribes.

The subtitle, "Suggestions Towards the Rewriting of Hebrew History," while more satisfactory as indicating tendencies in the book, lacks definiteness and direction. Either "Judaism a Religion, the Jew a Racial Complex," or "Yahwism a Religion Independent of Race" would seem to convey to the reviewer the outlook and spirit of the book more adequately than the present title. But whatever the best title might be, it is to be hoped that the book may be read by a much wider circle than those interested in the lost tribes.

The author, Dr. Alan H. Godbey, has long been known to those interested in Old Testament studies. He is an indefatigable worker and an independent scholar who for many years has been making his contribution in a constructive way to many subjects related to the Old Testament. He has been on the faculty of Duke University since its enlargement, some four years ago. The University is to be congratulated that at this early stage in its career it has given to the world a volume, showing such a wide range of scholarship and of such intrinsic worth, while the Press of Duke University may well be proud of the quality of its work.

The wide research seen in every page shows Doctor Godbey to be no novice. In the introduction he quietly assures us that fifty-five years ago Doctor Grant's *The Nestorians, or the Lost Ten Tribes,* was in his hands. In the intervening fifty-five years he has been scouring the fields of history and digging into the Semitic languages for facts concerning

Israel. The appended bibliography of forty-three pages representing the books and articles consulted in the text, indicates, in part, the industry of the author. In no sense is this long list fictitious nor does it consist of works of a superficial type. Every page is replete with evidence of careful arrangement of material gleaned from many fields and long brooding over the main themes. Indeed the volume might be termed a thesaurus, presenting a mass of material that is all germane to the central thought, whether that be the lost tribes, the Yahweh religion, or the Jew a non-Semite.

After a brief statement of the many imaginary discoveries of the lost tribes, Doctor Godbey shows conclusively that the group composing Israel, by whatever name known, was a racial conglomerate. Nothing is clearer than this when we consider the widely different racial groups that passed through or sojourned in the land of Canaan. Semite and Hittite, Horite and Hivite, Hamite and Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, and Greek, all went into the melting-pot and came out Israelite or Jew. Commerce had carried the sons of Mycenæ and Crete to the Far East and the caravans of the East had traveled through the ancient passes westward from time immemorial. The tramp of armies, back into the fourth millennium before the Christian era, coming from the East and the North, had been heard within the borders of Palestine. As the centuries passed her soil became the battle-ground, the Armageddon, of the nations. Commerce and war each contributed to the racial amalgam. Who then was Semite, who Aryan or Mongolian, could never be determined. This is the fact so well known to all anthropologists, often so disregarded by Biblical students. Pure racial stock among any people is a fiction and nowhere more so than among the Jews, is the argument of the book.

Doctor Godbey further shows how incoming peoples frequently appropriate to themselves the traditions of the old residents, and how genealogical research easily finds for the new group a worthy local ancestry. Thus residents in Palestine, from whatever stock, easily grafted the hero stories into their own history, appropriated the sacred places and the important achievements as their own, and gloried in an ancestry to which they may not have been even remotely akin. The modern claim of a Mayflower ancestry would seem to have excellent precedents.

On the other hand the author shows that the Israelites, a conglomerate of races, had been deported time after time. Judah suffered even worse than Israel and from the earliest days people from both the North and the South had migrated far and near. Further, few of these mongrel, dispersed folk had kept themselves separate from non-Semitic taint.

Mingling with every race under the heaven, they had taken on in part the color of their environment.

But these people were touched by a mighty religious impulse and numbers of them responded nobly to it. The first great outburst of Yahwism was in the time of Elijah and continued on into the Assyrian period. It may not have been popular at any time, but it was permanent. The second great movement was in the period of the Babylonian exile, and the argument of the book is that it was under the influence of a Babylonian group, outside of the Israelitish exiles, perhaps Hurri, who were worshipers of Ea, the Old Testament Yahweh. This is most significant and is worthy of serious consideration.

Further this Yahwism, from whatsoever source, was a missionary religion. Proselytizing was one of its chief characteristics. We cannot do more than suggest the further argumentation. From these two centers, Palestine and Babylonia, a passionate missionary zeal on the part of a few dedicated and noble souls carried this lofty, spiritual religion to all parts of the earth.

It is a fascinating book. There is no question but that the general positions will be sustained by Old Testament scholarship. No ten tribes ever were lost. Only a small group ever whole-heartedly accepted the essential principles of Yahwism, most of the people all the time were idolaters. The religion of Yahwism was missionary, and Hebrew history must be rewritten. The clear-cut statement of these facts is well done and is exceedingly valuable.

Perhaps still more valuable are the questions that are raised throughout the work. Suggestions that are arresting are found in every chapter. Pan-Amoritism and its advocates will find little comfort, and even the saner view of Pére Dhorme (*Revue Biblique,* 1928, pp. 63-178), which, by the way, is not mentioned either in the body of the book or the bibliography, would scarcely be tolerated. The author's treatment of the proselyte, the *ger,* the Hurri, the Hivite, the Hebrew, the Levite, and the influence of Ea, and many other factors in history all stimulate the inquirer. In itself the book is a great piece of work; in the issues it presents, it is even greater. We do not expect that it will become the "book of the month," or even receive "honorable mention," but in the field of Old Testament scholarship, it may easily be the book of the decade. At least, it will take a decade to resolve some of the questions that it raises. Congratulations to the author and to the University Faculty of which he is a member.

I. G. Matthews.

The Accuracy of the Old Testament. The Historical Narratives in the Light of Recent Palestinian Archæology. J. Garrow Duncan, B. D. London: S. P. C. K.

Much good material from recent archæological work has been assembled in this small volume. Excellent illustrations, numbering thirty-two, ranging from photographs of native huts to those of ancient temples, scattered throughout the 187 pages, serve to illumine the ancient scenes.

The title of the book indicates the aim of the author. In the preface he states:

> The object of the book is to show that the Old Testament characters, instead of being merely legendary heroes enshrouded in mist, as we have hitherto regarded them, were really playing a part in the actual history and development of the civilization of the country; or that at least the historical setting in which they are placed by the writers is in perfect conformity with the revelations that have been made to us by the results of excavation. . .

This seems definite enough to satisfy the most ardent Bibliolatrist and general enough to let the scientist go his way rejoicing. There *was* a flood in the Babylonian valley; walled cities abounded in Palestine; Philistines poured into the land and settled there; pits, cisterns, and store-chambers abound on hill and plain alike; paganism of many types, sun-worship, serpent-worship, child-sacrifice flourished in early days; iron-working was common and forges were necessary; all this has always been accepted and archæology has but added light to the page. The author has added his quota of interpretation to the facts.

But has archæology proved that there was only one flood in Babylonia? or that the evidences of the flood that have been uncovered in Ur of the Chaldees were in any way related to the Biblical story? or that the water covered all the high mountains under the whole heaven fifteen cubits and upward? or that all the species of all the birds and beasts and creeping creatures went into the ark? or that every living thing was destroyed from off the face of the earth? Questions that have arisen while reading this book might easily run into pages. There is no suspicion as to the values of archæology and the caution that must be exercised in dealing with Biblical material. But while the spade has brought to light material that has been valuable for the reconstruction of ancient history, it is equally true that it has buried forever many cherished theories, that were based on a literal interpretation of Biblical tradition. Here the author has sometimes seemed fearful of letting his light shine.

I. G. Matthews.

The Passion Week Day by Day. A Handbook for Ministers, Laymen, and Study Groups. Walter E. Bundy, De Paw University. Chicago: Willett, Clark & Colby. 1930.

The title indicates the contents and the purpose of the above volume. Its aim is practical rather than critical, and it is offered as a guide to the general reader for the study of those Gospel passages that are concerned with the last words of our Lord. As a simple interpretation of the parallel accounts given in the synoptics together with the additions that are found in the Fourth Gospel, it could scarcely be better done. Theological interpretation is at a minimum, and the significance of the facts should easily be grasped by any layman.

I. G. Matthews.

The Study Bible. Editor, John Stirling. **Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs.** A Little Library of Exposition, with New Studies. By Maclean, Elmslie, Scott, and Ranston. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc. Pp. xii, 148. **Price, $1.25 net.**

In one handy volume of 148 pages we have a popular treatment of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Songs, by men who have competent scholarship for the task attempted. Here we have introduction that introduces and does not obscure and interpretation that indicates the historical processes and does not ignore the practical application. Without preaching it easily and surely puts the preacher in control of the salient facts, and religious values are splendidly preserved without blinking the findings of scholarship. In fact only the ripest scholarship could have produced so valuable a book. No better introduction to these three books is at hand for the beginner, and the maturest student of this literature will most appreciate their worth.

I. G. Matthews.

The Old Testament in Greek, According to the Codex Vaticanus, Supplemented from Other Uncial Manuscripts, with Critical Apparatus containing the Variants of the Chief Ancient Authorities for the Text of the Septuagint. Edited by Alan England Brooke, D. D., Norman McLean, M. A., and Henry St. John Thackeray, M. A. Volume II. The Later Historical Books. Part II. I and II Kings. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1930. Sole American Agents, The Macmillan Company.

The quality of this work is too well known to require lengthy comment. It was undertaken by Brooke and McLean at the request of the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press in 1895. The Octateuch was completed in 1906. Later H. St. John Thackeray was added to the editorial board, and the research work of Rahlfs of Göttigen was kindly placed at the

disposal of the editors. In 1927 Volume II, Part I, namely I and II Samuel was published. This was a treasure-house for those working in Samuel. Within reasonable limits of space there has been presented in a concise and pleasing page the important evidence available for the reconstruction of a text of the Septuagint. This like the preceding volumes will be invaluable to all who are interested in scholarly textual work.

I. G. MATTHEWS.

The Influence of Christ in the Ancient World. T. R. GLOVER, Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1929. Pp. 122. Price, $1.50.

DOCTOR GLOVER'S fame as a classical scholar is assured, and rightly. He knows Greek and Roman literature as only one who has lived long years with it and has loved it can. Few men are better equipped to make these authors reveal their times and temper. This little volume comprises a series of lectures delivered on the Haskell Foundation at Oberlin. The conversational tone has been preserved, probably wisely, and the author's conversational tone, it may be remarked, does not encourage scanning. To appreciate his argument every word that he writes must be read. To picture vividly the life and thought of the world into which the Christian message came, Doctor Glover has with great effectiveness let the men of these days speak for themselves. Many of the quotations are quite outside the circumscribed bounds of "illustrative material"; all are pointed and unhackneyed.

It is a gloomy and almost depressing picture that is painted. Perhaps it is not overdrawn, but one wonders if the desire for contrast has not, if unconsciously, deepened the sable shades. He is convinced that this new force that Jesus unleashed "dephlegmatized" the old world, shook it out of its nonchalance, and quickened it into life. The word put into his mouth by the Fourth Evangelist exactly catches Jesus' fire: "I am come that they might have vitality and overflow with it."

There is always a danger, when an author has dealt with the same subject in various books, that the latter ones may show the effect. This is conspicuously not the case with these lectures. They have all the life and sparkle of a first quest. Perhaps it is not unfair to remark that a certain impatience at views which seem to him unwarranted is to be detected in this volume, as in earlier writings. To dispose of an interpreter of Pharisaism like Herford—and he is by no means a *vox clamantis*—with the thrust: "Sometimes a single sentence will sufficiently exhibit an author's capacity for judging character or writing history," may be arrest-

ing, even brilliant writing, but is after all a bit rash, not to say unfair. But the volume is decidedly well worth while and is one which will reward its owner.

MORTON S. ENSLIN.

Word Pictures in the New Testament. ARCHIBALD THOMAS ROBERTSON, A. M., D. D., LL. D., Litt. D., Professor of New Testament Interpretation in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary of Louisville, Kentucky. Volumes I and II (six volumes proposed). New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc. 1930. Pp. xviii, 406 and xvii, 298. Price, $3.50 each.

SAID the preacher long years ago, "And furthermore, my son, be admonished: of making many books there is no end." Today has this scripture been fulfilled in our ears. On the jackets of these two volumes (and four more are destined to come) is a list of thirty-four volumes which have appeared from Doctor Robertson's never quiet pen. How any one man can write so much, or, for that matter, can want to do so, are amongst those things past tracing out. Without attempting an answer to these questions it may be observed in passing that the content would not have suffered if the number had been sensibly diminished. Even Hercules, if my memory does not fail, was limited to twelve labors.

In these two volumes the author has romped through Matthew, Mark, and Luke, commenting on anything that happens to strike his interest. "These volumes," he quite unnecessarily confesses, "do not claim to be formal commentary. Nowhere is the whole text discussed, but everywhere those words are selected for discussion which seem to be richest for the needs of the reader in the light of present-day knowledge. A good deal of the personal equation is thus inevitable. My own remarks will be now lexical, now grammatical, now archæological, now exegetical, now illustrative, *any* thing that the mood of the moment may move me to write that may throw light here and there on the New Testament words and idioms" (Vol. I, p. ix).

The mood of the moment is everywhere evident; the light of present-day knowledge is very dim. It is discouraging to see how completely the results of modern study of the Gospels are ignored in this pious but utterly worthless babbling interspersed with "See my book, *X*." It is not the author's fault that the Greek is transliterated. The publishers cannily insisted on this to cut down expense. And it is of little moment, since no scholar in his sober senses will make use of the work. One's imagination almost reels, however, at the thought of the thousands of sermons (to say nothing of the Sunday-school lessons) which will be embellished and made instructive by the original Greek, now heard in one's own tongue.

MORTON S. ENSLIN.

Theism and the Modern Mood. WALTER MARSHALL HORTON. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1930. Pp. ix and 181. Price, $2.00.

THIS is an example of beautiful bookmaking. The wide margins and the artistic typography are attractive. A very minute index makes the book quickly serviceable when a reference is desired. The literary workmanship of the author deserved the aid of the printer's art. It is not often that a difficult and perplexing theological problem is presented so clearly, while yet revealing the mastery of philosophical questions involved.

The title of the volume is itself an indication of insight. "Theism" we know, but what is "the modern mood"? The first chapter is a clear-cut presentation of the mood, and a mood it is. Such moods have recurred time and again in human history, but different names have been given them. All that was needed was for some one to coin the phrase "Man the measure of all things," to make it possible for subsequent occasions to use the same idea, if not the same phrase. Varying interpretations of the phrase were necessitated by new emphases put upon the value of man and his achievements in the course of human progress. In this volume "the modern mood" is caught and examined and labeled "Humanism." Professor Horton's label is the only one that describes theologically the situation today. It is an unique mood, possible only because we are heirs of so many humanistic moods.

The second chapter asks the question, "Whither Humanism?" It is a sympathetic critique. The whither implies distance and motion, and the author is a delightful guide along the road. Chapters three and four, entitled "The God of Human Experience" and "The God of Christian Faith" respectively, are constructive in purpose and content. They will prove quite a tonic to all who may feel depressed in their modern mood.

The author is at home in contemporary philosophical literature; he has had the advantage of technical preparation in Harvard and Union Theological Seminary. For years he has been Professor of Theology in Oberlin College. In this book he has touched upon and pointed out the way in which reflective minds will conserve the values of both theism and humanism, as voiced by the foremost Christian theist in history,—"One God and Father of all, who is over all, and through all, and in all."

MILTON G. EVANS.

The Christian Life. JOSEPH STUMP, D. D., LL. D., L. H. D. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1930. Pp. 308. Price, $2.50.

THE subtitle of this volume is *A Handbook of Christian Ethics*. The qualifications of the author may be inferred from a brief statement of his

activities. He was graduated from the Lutheran Theological Seminary, Philadelphia, in 1887. For twenty-eight years he was pastor during which time he was a diligent student of theology and religious education. He published several books that won favorable attention, notably *Bible Teachings,* a popular text-book of Christian doctrine and ethics, and *An Explanation of Luther's Small Catechism.* Both these books were received with praise by the Lutheran churches and were widely used in their educational activities. Quite certainly, in view of his writings, in 1915, he was elected Professor of Dogmatics, Ethics and Apologetics in the Theological Seminary of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, Chicago. During 1920-1921 he was Dean and Professor of the same subjects in the Chicago Lutheran Divinity School. In 1921, he became President and Professor of Dogmatics, Ethics and Apologetics in Northwestern Lutheran Theological Seminary.

This volume, then, comes with the authority of an alert and studious pastor, quick to adopt the most recent pedagogical methods in transplanting the truths of Luther's Small Catechism, and of a teacher training young men for the Lutheran ministry. The author's preface gives the scope of the book: "This book aims to set forth distinctively Christian ethics. This marks it off not only from philosophical ethics in general, but from those works which though written from the philosophic standpoint are more or less colored by Christianity and pervaded by its spirit. The author's purpose is to depict the Christian life from the standpoint of faith and regeneration; in other words, to present the moral life from the religious point of view." Another paragraph of the preface will prepare readers to appreciate and possibly to depreciate some of the more doctrinal portions of the volume: "The author has written from the evangelical standpoint and accepts the Holy Scriptures as the authoritative norm by which the nature of the genuinely Christian life is to be determined. Although this position is assailed, not only by writers who make no profession of Christianity, but by many who claim to be Christians, the author is convinced that the position is sound, and that evangelical Christianity alone presents the principles and alone offers the power for the leading of a truly ethical life." But apart from any differences of opinion that may arise from the author's use of Scripture, or from his theological position, the book will commend itself to all Christian readers. There is a stimulus to wholesome life in all social relations, grounded in the character of God.

The contents of this volume are: Introduction; Part I: The Christian, pp. 29-123; Part II: The Christian Motive, pp. 127-166; Part III: The Christian Conduct, pp. 169-289. In Part III is discerned the fine common

sense of a pastor of experience and the judicial poise of an experienced teacher in dealing with practical questions arising in the family, in the church, in the state, and in society in general. A good bibliography and a fairly exhaustive index add to the value of the book.

MILTON G. EVANS.

The Great Awakening in Virginia, 1740-1790. WESLEY M. GEWEHR, Ph. D. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press. 1930. Pp. 292. Price, $4.00.

THIS work may be said to complete the studies of those strange phenomena in early American history known as the Great Awakenings. As such it deserves to rank with such eminent authorities as Jonathan Edwards' own *Thoughts on the Revival of Religion in New England, 1740:* Maxson's *The Great Awakening in the Middle Colonies,* and Cleveland's *The Great Revival in the West;* the present book, as announced, being "the first comprehensive treatment of any religious movement in the Southern colonies and States."

Doctor Gewehr has made a very thorough study of the social conditions in the colony during this half-century as indicating the origins of the Awakening and shows that the phenomenon is the effort of the people to attain their rights, dignity, and sense of worth. The leaders of the great movement, North and South, gave voice to the common people, dispossessed and dispersed, lifting them into unity and power, and thus, in large measure, led to the transformation and overthrow of the old social institutions. The origin, therefore, of the Presbyterian, Baptist, and Methodist Churches is found immediately to pre-date the Revolution. Alone as a contribution to the study of the real, historical rise of these three religious bodies in America the work is abundantly worth while.

The book is exceptionally well documented and carefully indexed. A long list of valuable bibliographical material is also appended.

R. E. E. HARKNESS.

George Fox, Seeker and Friend. RUFUS M. JONES, LL. D. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1930. Pp. 215. Price, $2.00.

THIS book, a volume in the Creative Life series, edited by Dr. Harold E. B. Speight, is written in the simple, conversational but brilliant style for which Professor Jones is so well known. With just enough quotations to give his authorities, the author tells the fascinating story of the development of this great religious leader from childhood and youth to old age. And in the unfolding of the tale we discover a man kindly, generous, tolerant, never argumentative and harsh, yet ever stanch in his convictions.

He is in search of finer things of the human spirit than he has yet seen among men, even those of the Christian churches. Thus, "his long depression had been due not to his own personal battle with sin, but rather to his discovery that church-members and professing Christians of the time lived, in the main, like other people and had no mark of victory in their lives." In an age of religious turmoil, intolerance, bloody conflict, and authority of the sword this man became a Seeker in very truth, finding certainty, assurance, compelling conviction not in Book or Church or Priest but in the promptings and findings of his own heart. Nor were these "mystic" experiences of this Seeker and Friend mere vague, ineffable submersions of the self in the great Absolute; rather they were experiences that empowered and strengthened him to do the works of righteousness, to give practical guidance, and to hold high counsel with such men as Oliver Cromwell, Lord Protector of the realm.

Professor Jones is not guilty of fulsome praise for his hero; he is aware of his limitations, his weaknesses, and his mistakes. It is a human being he presents to his readers, but a man who, clinging to his convictions, suffered therefor without anger and rancor for his persecutors.

R. E. E. Harkness.

Puritan Principles and American Ideals. Henry Hallam Saunderson. Boston: The Pilgrim Press. 1930. Price, $2.00.

A New England author, proud of his New England heritage, writing on New England origins for popular consumption and therefore in many of his statements and conclusions wholly unreliable.

For instance, on page 89 the author states that "The Church of England could not be a model for the church of the Puritans in New England" because they believed "that the pattern of the church of Christ, as discovered in the New Testament, did not establish a higher order of clergy to rule the presbyters or pastors of the local churches." Superficially such a statement is true, but the real objection went deeper. The Church of England was a State Church—the State was supreme. The Puritans, being Calvinists, believed that the Church should be supreme, and that the order of organized society should therefore be turned round about. In the divine order, as revealed in the Old Testament, which the Puritans followed rather than the New, the Church ruled and the clergy formed a very real "autocracy" in New England as may be seen from a study of the source records of that seventeenth century.

It is this insistence upon a theocracy by the Puritans which explains most of the "harsh" features of their history and which, the author failing

to recognize, leads him into many mistakes of interpretation. We are told that Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson were banished for political reasons solely and not for their religious opinions. True these two and their followers did endanger the political order, but they did so not because they were at all opposed to that order but because of their denunciation of the religious conceptions on which the political system was built. It was the Theocracy, with its resultant autocracy of the Church, its absolute denial of religious liberty, which these contended against. And, of course, if that religious construction was overthrown the political order would be endangered.

Again, the persecution of the Quakers is defended on political grounds, —"the government had proceeded on the principle that it was not persecuting Quakers for their religious ideas but suppressing men and women who menaced the Commonwealth." The author does not seem to know that Massachusetts wrote Rhode Island asking how it was that the latter colony was able to get along so peaceably with the Quakers within its borders, and that the reply was made that they paid no attention to them and so silenced them. "Soul liberty" in Rhode Island kept the peace.

The refusal of the United Colonies in 1644 and 1648 to receive Rhode Island into the federation is explained by the statement that since the federation had been formed "partly to subdue the Indians, Roger Williams might prove a weakness instead of a strength, because of his ideas of Indian rights." Yet Governor Winthrop tells again and again in his journal that it was Roger Williams, banished from Massachusetts, who more than once had saved that colony from destruction by the Indians.

The book, it must be admitted, is well written but there is just sufficient truth in it to make it dangerous reading from the historical standpoint.

R. E. E. Harkness.

Two Centuries of American Mennonite Literature. Harold S. Bender. Goshen, Indiana: The Mennonite Historical Society. 1929.

This book comprises a "Bibliography of Mennonitica Americana, 1727-1928," and is the first publication in a series of studies in Anabaptist and Mennonite history.

The work is divided into four sections: Part I, The Mennonite Church. The Colonial Period, 1727-1799. The Middle Period, 1800-1860. The Recent Period, 1861-1904. The Contemporary Period, 1905-1928.

Part II. The General Conference of Mennonites of North America. The Early Period, 1847-1897. The Contemporary Period, 1898-1928.

Part III. Other Mennonite Groups. A list of some ten divisions or

sects of the Mennonites, with dates of their origin or appearance in America and literature concerning each.

Part IV. Appendices.

Mr. Bender has done an excellent piece of work not alone for his own religious body but also for all students of Christianity, and especially for those interested chiefly in the history of American Christianity. His bibliography is indispensable for those who would follow the achievements of those Continental folk who championed religious liberty not only in their native land but also in the New World to which they were exiled for their convictions and beliefs

R. E. E. HARKNESS.

Growing Up: The Story of How We Become Alive, Are Born and Grow Up. KARL DE SCHWEINITZ. New York: The Macmillan Company.

IT would be hard to imagine a more informing and yet innocuous description of the mystery of the propagation of life, interesting alike to the initiated and the novice, the sophisticated and the naive. The reviewer had several mothers read it together with their children. The children were deeply charmed with the story and the mothers were enthusiastic. Here is what thousands of parents have wanted. It is a pity that an urgent commendation should be regarded as in any sense a commercial matter. It is a gospel of life's mystery so happily voiced that it meets one of the gravest problems of parents with growing little children and does it without wakening suspicion or forbidden thought of ill. It answers the questions which sooner or later come to all children and does that for them before the children learn from tainted minds the truth they need to know but stained with unclean allusion. Every mother should read it with her little children. It is so written that no unbidden blush need mantle the countenance.

SPENSER B. MEESER.

The Atonement and the Social Process. DEAN SHAILER MATHEWS. New York: The Macmillan Company.

ANOTHER book from the pen of a rather prolific author. To say that it is interestingly done and represents a fresh approach would be true only to the novice in theological reading and study. It is true we have a new word—"pattern"—for an old idea. The Chicago school seems fertile in its adaptation of new words in this fashion, and in making them a coin of the realms of learning. Here we have a review of the doctrines of atonement and the recognition that certain social ideas or ideals gave form to the rationalizations these doctrines take. We used to call these moulds categories, did we not? "Pattern" is, on the whole, a more easily under-

stood word and quite serviceable for the purpose in view. But one wonders whether that justifies a new book.

We can see that there may be a service for the volume among the uninitiated or the ultra-dogmatist, or even the uncritical theologian. Perhaps this treatment of the changing forms the doctrine has taken may be new—to some; and help create a morally liberal spirit among the lay folks. To this end we wish it God-speed and heartily commend it to them. It may be an eye-opener.

"The Death of Christ in the Pattern of Process" is what brings to us a real contribution. The "pattern" is drawn from the scientific conception of life and may be thought to lack appeal; but

> Once men realize that all theology rationalizes religious experience only tentatively and functionally, they will be much more friendly toward those who claim the same loyalties but use different doctrinal formulas.

In this "pattern" Jesus is conceived as bringing us in right and dynamic relation to the environing personal forces which develop personality, the goal of life. He does this by actually participating in man's moral struggles, sharing in the results of human sin and error and submitting to death. So "Not Good Friday but Easter is the true Holy Day of Christians."

We must recognize the value of the distinction, grounding this work, which the Dean makes between "patterns" used as metaphors and metaphors which come to be taken for "facts." "All Christian doctrines are patterns." They originate as analogies, they come to be regarded as literal realities from which inferences may be drawn.

But again this is familiar thought in most respects, long recognized and much taught. In this instance it comes in a new dialect.

One suspects that all this, however, is justification for a new "pattern" by which to cut the doctrine of "atonement"; and to this no one objects. In the closing chapter we find the new fresh value of the book which makes it worth while. This chapter, aptly entitled by the author, shows how Jesus really becomes the power of God unto salvation.

The *interpretation* of the death of Christ is not a matter of religious experience but of theological belief, "and if one believes that following the teaching and appropriating the attitude of Jesus will establish one in a new and transforming relationship with divine forces"—that is the reality. "For the Christian religion is not a doctrine of the atonement or of anything else, but a way to the attainment of the highest personal goods through (right) personal relations with men and God."

SPENSER B. MEESER.

The Significance of Personality. Richard M. Vaughan, Professor of Christian Theology, Newton Theological Institution. New York: The Macmillan Company.

Here is "philosophy in the style of literature," as easily read and understandable. There are many books at present which attempt to analyze personality, many which find nothing much left of mind or soul and a great variety of more or less vague and fruitless endeavors to make something of it. In this volume is the effort to take personality in the simple sense of "our whole spiritual selfhood" and to understand it not so much in itself and without regard to what gives it meaning: but to understand it in its historical relationships and inward meaning. And then "to employ it as a principle of interpretation in the wide range of our intellectual and practical interests."

This opens a rich field which is richly treated. In a series of eleven chapters the author spreads a feast of good literature. His article in this number of the Quarterly will make clear something of the charm of his style. In later numbers the Editor will have occasion for many references to the book. What a storehouse this is of suggestive material for the preacher only careful reading can reveal.

Spenser B. Meeser.

Psychology in Service of the Soul. Leslie D. Weatherhead. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1930. Pp. 220. Price, $2.00.

There can be no doubt that present-day psychology, despite certain of its obsessions and perversions, is making unsurpassed contributions to that practical workman who is engaged in growing personalities full of health, or on occasion pointing those sick in mind to the way of wholeness and health. Such workmen are greatly indebted to those who, having specialized in this area of human knowledge, are extracting these contributions from the mass, justifying them in practice, and then giving their findings to us all. That is just the case of this minister-author and his *Psychology in Service of the Soul.*

The entire volume is a fine combination of theory plus practical, pastoral experience in illumination of the theory. This is one of its exceeding virtues from the view-point of the active minister. Most such will in no sense hope to become psychotherapy practitioners, yet all may be advantaged by being informed of its significance. For instance, who would not wish to know about the meaning and interpretation of dreams, the value of auto-suggestion, the significance of confession for health, the romance of hidden motives, the religious value of hypnosis, the way to harness instincts, the curse and cure of impure thoughts, and the soul's drive for

completeness? Here are challenging studies presented without technical terms and in a style as fascinating as a book of fiction. Every reader of THE CROZER QUARTERLY ought to own a copy of this work on psychology in theory and practice.

WILLIAM R. McNUTT.

The Art of Jesus as a Teacher. CHARLES FRANCIS McKOY. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1930. Pp. 185. Price, $1.50.

HERE is a thesis presented for the doctor's degree in New York University. In the Foreword, written by Prof. Herman H. Horne of the School of Education in that University, is this paragraph finely revealing the purpose and the point of view of the volume.

> The way Jesus taught is a *model* for all Christian teachers. As nearly as we can we are to teach as he taught. We are to ask questions as he asked them, we are to tell stories as he told them, we are to utilize occasions as he utilized them, we are to understand the problems of persons as he understood them, we are to have ready answers to difficulties as he had them—all, of course, as nearly as we can. His way of teaching is to become our way. We know whom to imitate, for he is our Exemplar.

The author thus states his purpose,

> This study will seek to discover the artistry in the teaching of the Master—the skill and the intelligence with which he presented his teachings to his disciples and through them to the world. An attempt will be made to answer the question, "What evidence is provided in the discourses, conversations, questions, parables, epigrams, and other features in the teachings of Jesus, of genuine artistic ability?"

The volume constitutes a careful, critical study of the method and spirit of the master-teacher, and will be both help and inspiration to all who teach.

WILLIAM R. McNUTT.

Junior Worship Guide. CHARLOTTE CHAMBERS JONES. Boston: The Pilgrim Press. 1930. Pp. 280. Price, $2.00.

THAT an understanding worship lies close to the heart of the highest expression of the religious life has gripped our leaders in religious education. Moreover this conviction is percolating down as a dynamic in every well-regulated church-school. Hence this meaty volume. The author has prepared a suggestive service of worship for the junior department of the church school for each Sunday in the year, correlating these with The Church School Closely Graded Courses produced by the Methodist Episcopal Church, the Methodist Episcopal Church South, and the Congregational churches.

Such a work, finely wrought out as this is, is most timely. The idea of worship in most church schools is strangely new, hence most leaders of the junior department feel helpless when they would create a service of worship. The author has put all such greatly in her debt when she presents this series of rich and suggestive services. She of course hopes that junior department superintendents will accept her programs as merely helps and hints in producing their own. Thus used this *Junior Worship Guide* becomes invaluable.

WILLIAM R. MCNUTT.

The Practical and Profitable in Church Administration. ARTHUR T. BROOKS. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1930. Pp. 202. Price, $2.00.

WE Americans shout for the man who achieves when the odds are against him. Rev. Arthur T. Brooks has so achieved in his pastorate of nearly a decade at the old Dudley Street Baptist Church, Boston. Great preachers had preached it empty, changing conditions in environment seemed to be forcing its doors closed. At that juncture the author of this volume was called to take charge of what many said would be "the last obsequies." The very opposite has happened. The entire program and method were radically changed, the old church began to adapt herself to the new conditions, and the result has been a transformation that is little less than a resurrection.

This book is a book of the methods employed in the saving of this old church and its congested district for the Kingdom. It will therefore be of inestimable value to whoever faces similar problems, and of such pastors there are many.

WILLIAM R. MCNUTT.

Waste-Basket Surgery. GORDON S. SEAGRAVE. Philadelphia: The Judson Press. 1930. Pp. 174. Price, $1.50.

GORDON SEAGRAVE, M. D., is one of the younger medical missionaries under the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society, serving in the extreme north of Burma. Thoroughly equipped by collegiate and medical training he went out in 1922 to Namkham. Here he has had a most remarkable ministry despite the handicap of most inadequate equipment. At home on furlough, 1928, his addresses before associations and conventions were electrifying, with their humor, pathos, courage, and inspiration.

Waste-Basket Surgery is the story of the work of this good physician. It is a human-interest story which no one should miss. It ought to be on

the missionary bookshelves of every pastor and every church. It will be worth many times its weight in gold to the cause of our Lord.

WILLIAM R. McNUTT.

The Christian Apprehension of God. H. R. MACKINTOSH. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1929. Pp. 230.

THIS volume is composed of the eight lectures delivered on the James Sprunt Foundation in the Union Theological Seminary, Richmond, Va. The reader does not go far before he discovers that Professor Mackintosh (New College, Edinburgh) is a straightforward thinker whose aim is that of the finest type of conservator. He believes that the Christian religion is in possession of certain great realities, for instance, Revelation, God, and Divine Purpose, realities which man's maturer thought will conserve.

Religion without God is a monstrosity akin to that psychology which needs no soul. Man has ever assumed God or gods and has acted accordingly. He is religious because he needs to be. "This feeling of need is a symptom that man is constituted for God, and that the impact and challenge of this great Presence lies upon him from the first."

The religious act is not merely nor primarily a knowing act, though knowledge is a living element in it. Faith is convinced that it is possession of genuine knowledge concerning God, though it has not arrived at that knowledge by the scientific route. Science proceeds by the way of *theoretic judgments,* religion by that of *value judgments,* and these ways are equally valid in their respective realms. And let it be frankly stated that unfaith when it takes account of all the facts, has greater difficulties on hand than does faith.

The idea of Revelation, namely, that God makes himself known savingly to men, is legitimate. There is a very true sense in which all man's knowledge is a revelation; nature reveals herself to him. Revelation is assumed by the religious genius of every age. One is called a seer who looks beyond to that which is veiled to most men, yet he sees only what is revealed. Keats in his "Ode on a Grecian Urn" sees for us all, and yet what he apprehends is only that which is revealed in the depths. In like manner Hosea apprehends the winsome love of God, and Jesus the fulness of his glory. God always reveals himself to man in satisfying degree.

Religious men believe that they have real knowledge of God, knowledge of his personality, holiness, love, and sovereign purpose, which is as valid as that possessed by the scientist concerning his fact or the mathematician his formula.

WILLIAM R. McNUTT.

Pulpit and Parish Manual. HENRY HALLAN SAUNDERSON. Boston: The Pilgrim Press. 1930. Pp. 235.

IN response to that time-spirit which makes for public church services built to give large room for worship, the first section of this Manual offers materials for enriching the Order of Service. These consist in Calls to Worship, Prayers, and Benedictions. A second section deals with materials for the Occasional Service, such as baptism (of the infant), reception of members, the Lord's Supper, marriage, consecration of a home, ordination and installation of a minister, and the consecration of a teacher, while a final section deals with the funeral service.

This Manual is a piece of work well done, and hence makes a real contribution to the tool-kit of the minister who would be "a workman that needeth not to be ashamed." Every parish minister should have a shelf in his library devoted to a collection of these little booklets, and *Pulpit and Parish Manual* should be on that shelf.

WILLIAM R. MCNUTT.

The Red Harvest, the Poets' Cry for Peace. VINCENT GODFREY BURNS. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1930. Pp. 433. Price, $3.75.

A FINE anthology of poems dealing with war and peace. The volume illustrates the best in editorial work; the assembling reveals the widest reading, the arrangement genuine skill. On the whole the book constitutes a terrific indictment of war and a telling apologia for peace. The author therefore has put not only every lover of peace in his debt, but also every reader of the poetry of war.

A few of the headings for the fifteen sections will suffice to create a desire to possess this work: The Outbreak, The War-God Wakes, The Trenches, Spring in War Time, Christ in War, The Ghostly Marchers, The Armistice, The Unknown Soldier, In Memoriam.

WILLIAM R. MCNUTT.

The Country Church and Public Affairs. HENRY W. MCLAUGHLIN, editor. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1930. Pp. 260. Price, $2.00.

THIS volume is issued under the auspices of the Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, and offers nineteen papers, presented by as many authors at the Round Table as a basis for discussions of the rural church, its mission, problems, and opportunities. It is therefore a sort of brief encyclopedia of current thought and opinion relative to this important institution. Most of those who here speak do so with authority, hence the volume can scarcely be neglected by the alert rural or village

minister, neither by one who seeks to understand the rural church and its present-day challenge.

WILLIAM R. MCNUTT.

Will India Become Christian? J. W. R. NETRAM. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc. 1930. Pp. xvii, 142. Price, $1.50 net.

THE title of this book presents a question which is asked in many quarters. The author is well fitted to undertake the task of answering it as he is an Indian whose experiences as missionary and traveler have given him unusual opportunities for contact with leaders of native and Christian thought. He gives an impressive word picture of the India of today, presenting the positions of all groups with evident fairness, and making unfavorable criticisms in a kindly spirit.

After answering the questions "What is India?" and "Who is an Indian?" he discusses briefly the coming of Christianity to that country and attempts to estimate the influence upon it of the British Government and of the Gandhi, Suddhi, and other religious movements. The decay of Brahmanism and the changes in the Mohammedan world also are given consideration.

In the opinion of the writer Christianity in India has passed the stages of opposition and indifference and is well through the stage of tolerance into that of acceptance. India looks for Christ, not in Western civilization, the organized church, the creeds, nor the Scriptures, but in those who manifest his spirit through unselfish service. "She wants to see Christ actually at work, not a theory or dogma, but a reality in the lives of professed Christians."

The author concludes that India "cannot escape the inescapable Christ" and that "she has begun to recognize this truth and to fix her eyes on this unique Person, the Christ, as they have never been fixed before."

RITTENHOUSE NEISSER.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The Authority of Jesus and Its Foundation: A Study in the Four Gospels and the Acts. BERTRAM LEE WOOLF. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc. 1930. Pp. 301.

To BE reviewed in the October number.

Early Traditions About Jesus. J. F. BETHUNE-BAKER. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1930. Pp. 205. Price, $1.50.

To BE reviewed in the October number.

The Virgin Birth of Christ. J. GRESHAM MACHEN, D. D., Litt. D., Professor of New Testament in Westminster Theological Seminary, Philadelphia. New York and London: Harper and Brothers. 1930. Pp. xii, 415. Price, $5.00.

A FULL survey. To be reviewed in the October number.

The Purpose of Jesus in the First Three Gospels. CAMPBELL N. MOODY. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc. 1930. Pp. 159.

THE Bruce Lectures delivered in the United Free Church College, Glasgow, in 1929.

Saint John. D. S. CAIRNS, D. D., Principal of United Free Church, Aberdeen, and J. A. ROBERTSON, D. D., Professor of United Free Church College, Aberdeen. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc. 1930. Pp. 137. Price, $1.25.

The Acts of the Apostles. SIDNEY CAVE, D. D., President of Cheshunt College, Cambridge, and W. F. HOWARD, B. D., Professor of Handsworth College, Birmingham. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc. 1930. Pp. 147. Price, $1.25.

Two volumes in the *Study Bible*. In addition to a critical study of the book under discussion there is a commentary consisting of passages culled from the writings of scholars of all periods of Christian history.

MORTON SCOTT ENSLIN.

Progress and Prospects in Christian Reunion. The REV. PERCY VARNEY NORWOOD, A. M., B. D. Milwaukee: Morehouse Publishing Company. 1930.

THE HALE MEMORIAL SERMON, No. 15, preached by Mr. Norwood in St. James Cathedral, Chicago, on the First Sunday in Advent, Decem-

ber 1, 1929. The sermon is in the interest of Christian Unity, giving a review of the efforts that have been made toward that end and suggesting what may now be done for its accomplishment. The author feels that "episcopacy and the necessity of episcopal ordination" must still be insisted upon.

Yet the author, who is Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the Western Theological Seminary, Evanston, Ill., is aware of the difficulties confronting such an emphasis not alone from the historical standpoint but from that of denominational pride as well.

R. E. E. HARKNESS.

What Is Lutheranism? VERGILIUS FERM, Editor. New York: Macmillan Company. 1930. Price, $2.50.

PERHAPS no denomination in America is more divided, organically, theologically, and racially, than is the Lutheran. And it is very difficult for a non-Lutheran to appreciate the fine distinctions that separate in some instances.

Doctor Ferm has therefore rendered a service of inestimable worth in presenting this "Symposium in Interpretation." Twelve men, ministers and professors, all leaders within the Lutheran body, have collaborated to give this interpretation of that one faith to which they all in general adhere. Within the group may be found all shades of opinion from that which may be termed the most orthodox to that which is most liberal and free.

The book in its arrangement as well as in the scholarly treatment of its subject is a most worthy contribution to the study of the American Church.

R. E. E. HARKNESS.

The Ethics of Paul. MORTON SCOTT ENSLIN, Th.D. (Harvard). New York: The Macmillan Company.

THIS superbly bound volume will have an extended discussion in the October number of the QUARTERLY, by a skilled and distinguished scholar. Meanwhile we counsel all our readers to secure the book, as its contents are of intense interest and significance.

SPENSER B. MEESER.